of learning, (for which the commentators are partly responsible,) the absence of illustration from the history of modern Europe, are chief among the forbidding features of Puffendorff and Grotius. It is possible that the apparent difficulty and laboriousness of a study of the law of nations, serves to aggravate that distaste of foreign affairs which we have elsewhere noticed. At all events, we are glad to have the business of a diplomatist, and the principles of international law, discussed in three pink volumes of lively French. We hope that some Englishman, instead of adding, by a translation of these volumes, to the discreditable stock of borrowed works, will be induced by them to frame a book still better calculated to render English readers familiar with public law and foreign policy. It may seem a superfluous task to excite, in the English people of this day, greater jealousy of those who administer public affairs; but it is really true, that while the most complicated questions of internal government are freely handled, and the decision of them frequently assumed by the people, that branch of administration in which nine-tenths of our national debt have originated, is either neglected as a matter of little moment, or shunned as a mystery beyond our comprehen

sion.

The work before us embraces almost every subject with which a diplomatist has an official connection; from the highest points in the law of nations, to the smallest trifles in court etiquette, The arrangement is exceedingly awkward, especially in the want of a sufficient distinction between the formal and the essential.† All the topics, however, are handled agreeably and sensibly; we are deterred only by the apprehension of lengthiness from following him through the whole.

We must omit the graver questions of law, which rest with a government rather than with its agents; allowing ourselves, however, one word on the principle of that law. The authors who have written upon the law of nations have differed in the origin which they have assigned to the law; and it has been asked how a law can exist, which there is neither a legislature to enact nor a tribunal to enforce? Some persons, therefore, would altogether deny the existence of any set of rules binding upon the

Vol. viii. p. 35.

The technical arrangement of Parts and Books is confused and almost unintelligible. In the preface the author professes to write in eight books, of each of which he gives the purport, but there is in the text also a division into Parts; and some great heads (see particularly vol. ii. p. 313,) have no distinction of Part, Book or Section. We mention this with a view to a second edition. There is also a lamentable want of references to authorities. This defect has obliged us to omit many of the author's illus trations.

conduct of nations; while others pretend to find, in the science of the law of nations, an answer to every question which can arise.

Both parties are wrong. We will not lose ourselves in a metaphysical discussion of the origin of the moral sense, or of the natural foundation of the principles of equity, but we hold that the same law is binding upon men, united in nations, as upon each individual person: this is, among Christians, that law of God which is the foundation of honesty and of honour. The same motive, be it more or less derived from religion, which deters a man from wronging his neighbour, condemns him when he joins in an injury upon another state. Men should always remember that though they may act in a body, they will be judged hereafter man by man.

While confidently asserting this great principle, which is asserted also by our author in a subsequent chapter,t we admit that cases of real difficulty and doubt will occur every day. And the attempt is utterly vain to frame a systematic treatise, laying down distinct rules of conduct for every possible occasion.

In cases which do not involve moral right or wrong, customs continued and acknowledged may afford a rule equally reasonable and convenient: but Grotius," celebrated as the founder of the science of the Law of Nations," fully acknowledges the obligations of religion, and recognizes moreover an international law, deriving its force from custom and tacit consent. Puffendorff, Vattel, and their school, assume natural right as synonimous with the law of nations; the work of Puffendorff is, in truth, a discourse upon moral philosophy.

We do not altogether agree with our author, in considering the theory of some German writers, of a positive law of nations. founded upon treaties, as a new theory opposed to that of Puffendorff. The followers of custom, and the upholders of natural right, equally acknowledge the obligation of treaties; but a reference to the one and to the other is frequently required, for the due construction of a compact, as well as for the decision of cases to which no compact extends. The Law of God and Nature, Custom and Treaties, bear nearly the same relation to each other, as the Law of God and Nature, Common Law, and

Upon this part of the subject, we have an English treatise by Robert Ward, entitled "An Inquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe, from the time of the Greeks and Romans to the age of Grotius. London, 1795." See particularly chapters II. and III. Mr. Ward is better known as the author of the clever but somewhat prosy novels of Tremaine and De Vere; his history is a work of much thought and originality, and so full of pleasant illustrations as to have drawn from Mr. Canning the remark, that "Ward's novels are dull, and his law-books lively."

+ Liv, ii. sect. 4.

Vol.i. p. 59.

Statutes, in our municipal constitution. From the whole there results in both cases an obligation, to fail wherein is a moral offence.

of It is in consistency with this view of the duties of men and statesmen, that our author places in the very front of his argument, a condemnation of cunning in politics and diplomacy.

"A crafty policy," he says, "however clever it may appear to the vulgar, often fails of its end. Cunning is the resource of a limited genius. No state ever perished from following the rules of justice: how many have ruined themselves by neglecting them!" Again: "In negociations between powers, fairness* triumphs more easily than cunning, because the sagacity of the other party is not prepared for it. Falsehood only knows how to contend with falsehood."-vol. i. pp. 36. 83.

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The sentiment is just; but we recommend to our politicians a higher motive for sincerity. The " ancien ministre" betrays the politique astucieuse" of the old school, when he recommends dealing, because an adversary is thereby deceived. Honesty so trickish will only be successful once; habitual and avowed, it will always triumph. We leave the word as we have written it; but a triumph is not precisely the object to be attained. To obtain from the other party, in a meeting upon private business, the utmost that can be achieved by dexterity, ought not to be the boast of a gentleman and man of honour. No diplomatist "ought to lose sight of these characters: but there is this great difference bet between private and public negociations, that a bargain for an estate, if not absolutely fraudulent, will be confirmed by the law, whereas there is no such security for the permanence of an arrangement between states. If they are states of corresponding strength, the first opportunity will be found for breaking an agreement, and even an inferior power may often find a protector against oppression.

A rights, but to calculate his means of maintaining them. Hence, POLICY may often dictate forbearance, where law would justify exaction. It is necessary for a nation, for the maintenance even of undisputed rights, to manage and conciliate various interests, and to bring negociation to the aid of force.

sbman, therefore, has not only to ascertain his legal

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Our author gives us a Report, in which Count Sebastiami, recently the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Louis Philippe, illusrated the importance of diplomacy from the history of modern Europe.

La loyauté. We have no word exactly corresponding with this, † Vol. i. p. 64.

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According to this document, the science of the law of nations and diplomacy assumed a regular form in the time of Francis L., when Europe was threatened with the universal domination of the house of Austria. The French minister takes occasion to dilate on the great effects produced by the union of France and England, when our Elizabeth declared that the fall of the French monarchy would be the fall of England.* At this time, nego ciation was combined with force; diplomacy approached perfection; the disputes, especially those of the cabinet of Henry IV., are proofs of sagacity and good faith, and, in spite of the antiquated style, may pass for models. That king's ministers displayed great firmness, a wise policy, and a rare probity. All this is very just, with the exception of "bonne foi," and "probité rare." After Henry was driven by his necessities, and by the scantiness of Elizabeth's support, into the Treaty of Vervins so much vaunted by Sebastiani, he continued to injure Spain through the revolted provinces, and never ceased to urge England to join with him in a clandestine continuance of those measures against Spain, from which his plighted faith bound him to abstain. We would not deny to Henry IV. some traits of personal heroism, or to Sully sagacity and adroitness; but, pour probité, non.

Richelieu's diplomacy is condemned as machiavelian and immoral under Mazarin, the treaties of Westphalia constructed an edifice which lasted until the French Revolution, and the e peace of the Pyrenees led to the will of Charles II. After the peace of Nimeguen (1679) commenced the personal diplomacy of Louis XIV., and the whole period from the treaty of Vervins to that of Utrecht exhibits the rapid progress of diplomacy, and the ability and influence of the diplomacy of France.

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The importance of the peace of Westphalia is here much exaggerated. The treaties of Munster and Osnaburgh arranged multifarious interests in central Europe; but, although th they we formally invoked in the second article of almost every subsequent treaty until very modern times, their provisions had not much influence upon war and peace in the eighteenth century. But certainly, the negociations of Westphalia involved diplomatic dis cussion much beyond former examples, though out-done, as well in importance as in dispatch, by those which the present age has witnessed.

The diplomacy of Louis XIV., ending at Utrecht, is cited in illus

tration of the intimate connection between diplomacy and force;"la force qui appuie, et l'adresse qui indique et prepare." Except, perhaps, in the intrigues at Madrid, which preceded the death of Charles II., address had not, in our opinion, much to do in the wars which were terminated at Utrecht. The results, which, according to Sebastiani, were only partially favourable to France, were brought about by brave soldiers and accomplished generals. Where France obtained an advantage, otherwise than by her arms, she owed it less to the skilfulness of her diplomacy than to the laxity of her principles; she excelled not so much in the art of making treaties, as in the readiness to break them.

The success of French diplomacy under Richelieu and Louis XIV., Sebastiani attributes to the support which it received from the French arms,-from force seriously menaced, and employed when requisite. Under Louis XV. diplomacy was extremely brilliant and sagacious, but rendered useless by the weakness of the government. The most memorable event of this period, was the Austrian alliance of 1756. It was not the fault of this diplomatic measure, that France did not interfere for Poland. If France had spoken boldly, Austria would have united with her against the partition; again, under Louis XVI., and just before the revolution, France lost, through irresolution and timidity, the opportunity of injuring England by a vigorous support of the republicans in Holland.

These two periods of diplomacy well supported, and therefore successful, and diplomacy left to itself, and therefore useless, were followed by a third, in which Bonaparte held diplomacy in contempt, and lost thereby the power which his victories had obtained. Had Napoleon listened to the advice of Talleyrand after the battle of Marengo, and strengthened himself by alliances, and by patronizing the vanquished states, he would have had a great and lasting empire. But the conqueror neglected the advice of his prudent minister, offended Russia by a careless disclosure of views upon Turkey, and excited the resistance which finally overwhelmed him.

Thus far Sebastiani. We cannot doubt but that if Bona→ parte had shown greater moderation, had he been contented with a dominion a little less extensive, he would have enjoyed it more securely. Yet, it is not that he despised diplomacy, but that the object of his diplomacy was bad. He was himself am expert diplomatist, and occasionally practised all the cajoleries of the art. After Austerlitz, and at Tilsit, he showed himself no mean negociator. Negociations, it is said, would have saved his empire at Chatillon; that is, moderation and concession might