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PART II.-Additional Illustrations.

SINCE We have come upon this view of the subject, (continued Philo,) which I confess has occupied much of my thoughts, it may perhaps afford you some entertainment, and may be a collateral proof of my argument, if I enter a little into a few metaphysical niceties which seem to be less apprehended than they might, in consequence of men overlooking this great foundation of all belief, the constant perception possessed by the human mind, that it moves within the sphere of design and intelligence. What, for instance, if we spend a few words on the famous question about the existence of the material world?

In the name of Heaven, (said Cleanthes,) what can you propose by running into an inquiry so obscure, and which has brought some very profound metaphysicians into conclusions so remote from common apprehension? Perhaps, like Bishop Berkeley, you propose to deny the existence of matter, with a view of proving, in a more spiritual manner than is usually resorted to, the existence of God. The attempt, however, you must be well aware, is dangerous, for when first principles of belief are once unhinged, the steps by which we arrive at the existence of the divine mind soon vanish from our eyes.

I have no intention (replied Philo) to be so sceptical as you imagine. I have no doubt of the existence of matter, but it is of some consequence, in a speculative view, (as agents, the inquiry need not be made,) to know what we mean when we say there is a material world.

We mean, (said Cleanthes,) that the objects which we see and touch actually exist.

What is the proof of their existence? (said Philo.)

Certainly our senses, (replied Cleanthes.)

Our senses (said Philo) only prove that we see and feel, but sense cannot assure us that there is any thing seen or felt.

Perhaps, then, (said Cleanthes,) I cannot tell you how the belief comes, but we have it, and that is enough."

But, (said Philo,) I think I see both whence it comes and what it is. All our perceptions of the external world

are consistent, regular, systematic. They all convey, therefore, the impression of design, and our minds perceive this character in them as clearly as our senses are impressed with the perceptions themselves. It is from this character, in fact, that they de rive the aspect and form of reality, and that we can distinguish them from dreams and imaginations. Were there nothing steady and consistent, nothing that bore the impress of order and plan in external nature; did it appear for a moment, and then vanish from our eyes: instead of being a system which assists and promotes our views and apprehensions, were it a constant source of delusion and uncertainty: were these its characters, I really do not think we could say it had any other existence than we are apt to ascribe to a troublesome dream, and at present it may have no other existence, than as the lofty language in which we are addressed by the Supreme Intelligence.

Not far from Berkeley, however! (said Cleanthes.)

I mean, (replied Philo,) that when we say we believe there is an external world, our meaning is, we have entire trust and confidence about it. Why? Because we see it is a system, and therefore involves a principle of mind upon which we can depend. In fact, the word belief means nothing else but the feeling of trust. Nobody will pretend to say what the material world is: of what kind of being or substance it consists: or that it is any thing more than a somewhat about which we have an assurance, and with a reference to which we act without any kind of distrust: which is more than can be said of dreams or reveries. I suspect, after all, this is the idea which Berkeley meant to express, but that he was rather incautious in his manner of stating it. He says often that he believes there is a material world, and that his belief does not differ from that which is commonly entertained. He cannot, indeed, separate the object perceived from the act of perception. I admit that we have an impression of these being distinct things, but I say we should not have this impression, unless our percep tions were of things orderly and consistent. The ordering and arranging of our perceptions, we are conscious, does not proceed from ourselves. It

is clearly then the work of another mind. The existence, therefore, of a Supreme Mind, is constantly impressed upon us by the scene of external existence, and this, I maintain, is at least as certain an impression as that of the existence of external objects themselves, although my argument goes to prove that it is more certain, and that it is in consequence only of the regularity and consistency of the material world that any fixed impression remains with us of its actual existence. According to this view, therefore, we perceive that mind exists, before we have any steady belief of the existence of matter, and our belief of the existence of matter is little else but a sentiment of trust in that Mind by which it is ordered and arranged.

I do not mean to say, Philo, (said Cleanthes,) that in these opinions there is no truth, but you do not seem to have made them out quite to your own satisfaction; and, therefore, I think you may as well come down to more level ground.

My wish was to show, with Berkeley, (replied Philo,) that, properly speaking, there is no system of nature which can afford the slightest pretext for materialism. If he goes too far in saying, mind is the whole, I think I am justified in saying, that it is owing only to the order produced by Mind that we have any steady belief of the existence of such a thing as Matter. I willingly, however, leave this speculation, as I am ready to acknowledge to you that I have not quite satisfied myself respecting its solidity.

There is another speculation, how ever, which amounts pretty nearly to the same thing, and which, I believe, may be made more level to our apprehension. Let our belief of the existence of matter come as it may; and, if you will, let it rest upon its own foundation, and not upon any adventitious support from the concomitant perception of the existence of mind: still, I say, that matter cannot be presented to us, without bringing along with it the traces of design and intelligence.

Do I rightly understand you? (said Cleanthes.) I admit, that an orderly world, such as we inhabit, bears the constant indications of design upon its countenance; but you surely do not

mean to say that this is the case with matter considered abstractedly from the system into which we see it thrown.

An orderly world (said Philo) is an evidence not merely of design, but of exquisite wisdom: but I wish to pursue materialism to the fountainhead, and to show that matter cannot exist in any form without bearing some indications of intelligence. Can matter exist without form? What is form but an order of existence, a mode of being suited to something, to the faculties, for instance, of a percipient? Matter imperceptible to every being can scarcely be said to exist. You cannot suppose an atom so fine, but you may conceive an eye capable of taking it in. Now, there must be a relation between the eye and the atom. This relation is something adapted, sorted, regulated, designed. Take the system of Epicurus: conceive innumerable atoms rushing. through infinite space. No single atom can exist without some adaptation of parts, (if an atom has parts, if it has none it is nothing,) an adaptation which suits it better than any other. Whence did it get these? Is not intelligence apparent in the formation of an atom as well as of a system? Then take different atoms in their corporate form, uniting together and making something, no matter what, something as rude as you will: whatever it is, there must be a prin ciple of order in it, a coherency of parts, harmony of some kind or other: and you will find, if you examine these ideas, design and intelligence lurking at the bottom of them. Poets speak of a chaos, but, it is evident, that is a supposition merely poetical, or rather it is one which the human mind cannot make. It is a supposition of contradictions. Wherever there is matter at all, there must be order of some kind or other. It may seem to be order without any purpose, and so can scarcely be called design. Yet order implies the operation of mind. Thus, you see, Pamphilus, that I find traces of intelligence not merely in the regular forms of crystallization, but in the most rude and inartificial of material bodies.

I have been so often disgusted (said I) with materialism, and have seen so much of it among the continental philosophers, that I am really not at

all disposed to engage in its defence. Your former scepticism on the subject of religion I could endure: there was modesty and hesitation in it, but the abominable self-sufficiency with which these people vent abroad their coldblooded systems of atheism is so hate ful to any man who ever heard any thing better, that I always looked upon it with the most perfect antipathy, and I shall be very happy to see you tear up materialism by the roots.

I believe (said Philo) every system of materialism is founded on a mistaken application to matter, of ideas which belong to mind only, and on supposing qualities in matter which it does not possess. They all rise from want of attention to that early and constant impression of the existence of order and design in nature which the mind of man receives in its first opening, and from applying to matter itself those conceptions which it is merely the means of conveying to the mind. Every thing in nature proceeds on a plan, and there is not a human being in existence to whom the great outlines of the plan are not apparent; but if we forget that the idea of a plan necessarily implies mind or intelligence, we must look in the plan itself for some unintelligent principle by which it is carried on. It is then we begin to talk of the powers of nature, and the necessary concatenation of causes and effects, and similar expressions of that kind, which, when applied to the material system, are in reality words without meaning.

This whole subject (said Cleanthes) lies under a very considerable degree of embarrassment, and it would be of much consequence for the elucidation of our present inquiry, if the relation of Cause and Effect were placed upon a right footing.

I will let you know (said Philo) what are my views on the subject, but I must first premise, that the proofs for the existence of God, which I have already stated, are independent of all speculations on the nature of that relation. We read design upon the face of the universe, previously to all contemplation of design as a cause, and the universe as an effect. The universe is rather as it were a mirror which reflects the face of Divine Intelligence, and our belief that it is caused or produced by the Divine Mind seems to be an after consideration.

The plan of things exhibits the existence of mind before we reflect that mind was the principle which gave a real being to the things planned. Suppose, then, the relation of cause and effect were found to be imaginary, or to be no tie among events themselves, but merely a feeling produced by custom in the mind in consequence of its constantly perceiving the same events in the same succession: Suppose, I say, the notion of causation in the Deity were removed by such a speculation, still the universe would prove his existence, in like manner as a mirror proves the existence of the object which it reflects.

The kind of sceptical attempt, therefore, which was made in this country to throw doubts upon the existence of God, by showing that it is merely custom or experience which establishes the relation of cause and effect, and nothing in the reason of things, must fall to the ground; because, whether God is the cause of the universe or not, or whether or no the universe has a cause, we still read his existence from the universe, in the same way as a book proves the existence of the mind of the author, even although you could possibly separate the notion of his being the author from that of the intelligence which

the book exhibits.

The error prevalent in systems of materialism, again, is the reverse of this sceptical notion. The materialist proceeds on the maxim, that every ef fect must have a cause; he thinks he finds the cause of every effect in nature, and having found the cause, he finds all that is necessary, all that must be had, and, accordingly, he is satisfied, without having recourse to the existence of mind as the supreme cause of all. I might in like manner say to the materialist, prove as you will that mind need not be resorted to as the cause of natural appearances, still these appearances prove to me the existence of mind as infallibly as your words and actions prove you to be an intelligent being. When I believe you to be an intelligent being, do not speculate upon the principle of intelligence being the cause of your actions, but I read in them, as in a book, the fact, that there is intelligence involved in them, it may be, more properly than causing them. Make what you please of the uni

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verse then, make its cause what you will, still I read intelligence in it, and this is sufficient to prove the existence of Deity.

else but a manner of operation in nature? of an order of things which seems quite arbitrary, and might be the reverse of what it is without any absurdity in the supposition? In inquiries into natural phenomena, therefore, we never discover why they must exhibit such or such appearances; at least we never make an ultimate discovery of that kind. We may discover, that admitting such and such previous appearances, others will follow of course, but the first admissions are entirely gratuitous, and have no necessity in the nature of things. Philosophy is nothing more than the science of the order of nature, and of the methods observed in its operations. There is no more necessity in any thing which it discovers, than there is that the sentence which I am now speaking should have followed that which went before it.

So far, then, (said Cleanthes,) you agree with the sceptical opinion about cause and effect, that there is no necessary connection between them.

None (replied Philo) between those things which are called causes and effects in the system of nature.

Where, then, do you find this relation? (said Cleanthes.)

The system of materialism, however, it is evident, is a very low and earth ly system, and argues a great want of philosophical penetration. The slight est attention to natural successions of events must convince us, that although they are regular and constant, they are still quite arbitrary, and might be conceived to be in every respect the reverse of what they are. We can discover no necessity whatever, that heat should be the consequence of fire, or cold of ice. Why should a round body in the Heavens called the Sun necessarily emit light and heat? No investigation of philosophy, how ever profound, can possibly discover any necessary connection between any two events in nature. Philosophy in the investigation of causes does nothing more than trace out those circumstances in nature which invariably precede others, and exhibits them divested of accidental circumstances which may occur in particular instances. When it has found out a leading general fact, it then farther examines whether this fact, if supposed to precede other facts, will ac- I cannot well tell you (said he) count for them, by which is meant, where I find necessary connection, but will be the rule or measure of their I think I can easily point out to you appearances. Thus, it is discovered, a connection sufficiently strong to that a body falling to the ground in- build this relation upon. What say creases its velocity according to a de- you to the connection between voliterminate proportion as it approaches tion and its consequences? I know the ground. This is a fact, but we the effects of will are said to be arbican discover no sort of necessary con- trary as well as any thing else. I nection between the body called a may will a thing this moment which stone, and this principle of gravity may not take place, although, perhaps, which regulates its descent. For any it would have taken place the moment thing we know to the contrary, the before. My hand may be suddenly stone might exist without the gravity. palsied, and may not follow my voliIf thrown into the air it might pro- tion when I determine to move it; ceed for ever upwards, or it might va- yet, whenever I do move my hand, in nish into smoke, or any thing might consequence of volition, I am conhappen to it as well as what does hap-scious that the motion proceeded from pen. There may be some more general fact which may account for this principle, something, the previous supposition of which will explain all the operation of gravity; but in the meantime, the discovery of this principle is a very important one, since the motions of the heavenly bodies agree exactly with the supposition of this being the law which regulates them. But is it not clear that this See a short essay on Cause and Effect, discovery is the discovery of nothing in our Number for last December.

the will, and would not have been without the will. The volition here was more than a precedent event,was an event, without which, the other would not have been, and out of which, if I may so speak, it was; and this is all that is meant by the word cause."

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I cannot think, (said Cleanthes,)

that, by this explanation, you account sufficiently for the impression on our minds, that every event must have a cause: You leave the connection too loose.

You will observe, (said Philo,) that you cannot show me any event which does not occur in nature; but there is a constant impression on the mind of man that nature is a scheme; therefore, every event is part of the scheme: a scheme or plan supposes a mind: we cannot conceive a mind devoid of volition: every event, then, in nature, is an effect of the volition of mind. If you could imagine a chaos, which I believe to be an impossible supposition, then you might also imagine events, changes to take place without causes. It is the circumstance of design in nature which proves that there is a real bond of connection between cause and effect,that every change must have a cause, that is, must proceed from the volition of mind, Materialism, then, is altogether built on a wrong application of words. Power means nothing else but will accomplishing its end, and we cannot conceive causation independently of volition. The powers of nature, and the necessary concate nation of natural causes and effects, are mere words without meaning.

I hope, Philo, (said Cleanthes) that you have now done with your metaphysical niceties, as you call them; for, to tell you the truth, I am getting a little wearied of them.

Nay, Cleanthes, (said Philo,) this is scarcely fair,-you led me into the last speculation on cause and effect yourself, and, in pity to my audience, I have been rather more hasty upon it, and have left more to be supplied by their own reflections than was quite doing justice to my cause, and yet you are the first to complain of the effect. I will, however, put an end to these discussions, if you will permit me to say a few words on another point which seemed to confuse our ideas a little on the outset of our inquiry-I mean on the grounds of all argument from Experience and Analogy.

I repeat, then, that the foundation of this argument can never be custom er a mere association of ideas: indeed, I believe, every thing which bears the character of reason, has its foundation in some original perception of the understanding, and it is

never a satisfactory account of any natural process, used in the discovery of truth, to say we are carried to it by a mere arbitrary association,-by the relations of resemblance or contiguity in place or time, or by the force of custom in rivetting any particular chain of ideas upon the mind. Imagination is the field in which associations prevail,-not reason; and although habit may make imaginations appear reasonable, yet, I believe, every thing which nature gives that character to, must rest upon a firmer basis. Let us then examine facts. What we have commonly experienced to take place, we expect will take place again; and those events which are similar to others formerly experienced, or bearing upon other appearances in nature, we think much more probable than those which are entirely insulated and unlike any thing else. We constantly expect that fire will burn, and that the sun will rise every morning; and we think it more probable that the planets, like this earth, have inhabitants, than that they are vast bodies totally useless in creation. To resolve these views of the mind into the mechanical influence of custom, seems, as I say, very unsatisfactory. I do not see how custom should be the ground of any opinion. From the custom of seeing fire at all times burn, and the sun rising every day, I can conceive that the idea of fre should never occur to me without the idea of burning, or of the sun without the idea of its rising. But I do not see how the opinion should hence be generated that, as a fact, fire will always burn, and that the sun will continue daily to rise.

If such an account of this process of mind be unsatisfactory, it seems to me an unphilosophical one to ascribe all these convictions of the understanding to particular instincts. There seems a kind of reasoning in the opinions that the sun will rise to-morrow, and that the planets are inhabited,a sort of reasoning which is stronger in the one case than in the other; and if any principle can be found which will form a basis for all these reasonings from experience and analogy, it seems much more philosophical to rest them upon it, than to suppose different shades of instinct answering to every variety of opinion and belief. Now, to me it appears that the early

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