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PART II.--Additional Illustrations. are consistent, regular, systematic.
They all convey, therefore, the imSINCE we have come upon this pression of design, and our minds perview of the subject, (continued Phi- ceive this character in them as clearly lo,) which I' confess has occupied as our senses are impressed with the much of my thoughts, it may per- perceptions themselves. It is from haps afford you some entertainment, this character, in fact, that they deand may be a collateral proof of my rive the aspect and form of reality, argument, if I enter a little into and that we can distinguish them a few metaphysical niceties which from dreams and imaginations. Were seem to be less apprehended than they there nothing steady and consistent, might, in consequence of men over- nothing that bore the impress of order looking this great foundation of all and plan in external nature; did it belief, the constant perception pos- appear for a moment, and then vanish sessed by the human mind, that it from our eyes : instead of being a moves within the sphere of design and system which assists and promotes our intelligence. What, for instance, if views and apprehensions, were it a we spend a few words on the famous constant source of delusion and unquestion about the existence of the certainty : were these its characters, material world?
I really do not think we could say it In the name of Heaven, (said Cle- had any other existence than we are anthes,) what can you propose by run- apt to ascribe to a troublesome dream, ning into an inquiry so obscure, and and at present it may have no other which has brought some very pro- existence, than as the lofty language found metaphysicians into conclusions in which we are addressed by the Suso remote from common apprehen- preme Intelligence. sion ? Perhaps, like Bishop Berkeley, Not far from Berkeley, however! you propose to deny the existence of (said Cleanthes.) matter, with a view of proving, in a I mean, (replied Philo,) that when more spiritual manner than is usually we say we believe there is an external resorted to, the existence of God. The world, our meaning is, we have entire attempt, however, you must be well trust and confidence about it. Why? aware, is dangerous, for when first Because we see it is a system, and principles of belief are once unhinged, therefore involves a principle of mind the steps by which we arrive at the upon which we can depend. In fact, existence of the divine mind soon va- the word belief means nothing else nish from our eyes.
but the feeling of trust. Nobody will I have no intention (replied Philo) pretend to say what the material to be so sceptical as you imagine. I world is: of what kind of being or have no doubt of the existence of substance it consists : or that it is matter, but it is of some consequence, any thing more than a somewhat about in a speculative view, (as agents, the which we have an assurance, and with inquiry need not be made,) to know a reference to which we act without what we mean when we say there is a any kind of distrust: which is more material world.
than can be said of dreams or reveries. We mean, (said Cleanthes,) that the 'I suspect, after all, this is the idea objects which we see and touch ac- which Berkeley meant to express, but tually exist.
that he was rather incautious in his What is the proof of their exista manner of stating it. He says often that ence? (said Philo.)
he believes there is a material world, Certainly our senses, (replied Cle- and that his belief does not differ anthes.)
from that which is commonly enterOur senses (said Philo) only prove tained. He cannot, indeed, separate that we see and feel, bút sense can- the object perceived from the act of not assure us that there is any thing perception. I admit that we have seen or felt.
an impression of these being distinct Perhaps, then, (said Cleanthes, I things, but I say we should not have cannot tell you how the belief comes, this impression, unless our percepbut we have it, and that is enough. tions were of things orderly and con
But, (said Philo,) I think I see both sistent. The ordering and arranging whence it comes and what it is. All of our perceptions, we are conscious, our perceptions of the external world does not proceed from ourselves. It
is elearly then the work of another mean to say that this is the case with mind. The existence, therefore, of a matter considered abstractedly from * Supreme Mind, is constantly im- the system into which we see it pressed upon us by the scene of thrown. external existence, and this, I main- An orderly world (said Philo) is tain, is at least as certain an impres- an evidence not merely of design, but sion as that of the existence of exter- of exquisite wisdom : but I wish to nal objects themselves, although my pursue materialism to the fountainargument goes to prove that it is more head, and to show that matter cannot certain, and that it is in consequence exist in any form without bearing only of the regularity and consistency some indications of intelligence. Can of the material world that any fixed matter exist, without form? What is impression remains with us of its ac- form but an order of existence, a mode tual existence. According to this of being suited to something, to the view, therefore, we perceive that mind faculties, for instance, of a perciexists, before we have any steady be- pient ? Matter imperceptible to every lief of the existence of matter, and being can scarcely be said to exist. our belief of the existence of matter You cannot suppose an atom so fine, is little else but a sentiment of trust but you may conceive an eye capable in that Mind by which it is ordered of taking it in. Now, there must be and arranged.
a relation between the eye and the I do not mean to say, Philo, (said atom. This relation is something Cleanthes,) that in these opinions adapted, sorted, regulated, designed. there is no truth, but you do not seem Take the system of Epicurus : conto have made them out quite to your ceive innumerable atoms rushing own satisfaction; and, therefore, I through infinite space. No single think you may as well come down to atom can exist without some adaptamore level ground.
știon of parts, (if an atom has parts, My wish was to show, with Berke- if it has none it is nothing,) an adapley, (replied Philo,) that, properly tation which suits it better than any speaking, there is no system of nature other. Whence did it get these? Is which can afford the slightest pretext not intelligence apparent in the form for materialism. If he goes too far in mation of an atom as well as of a saying, mind is the whole, I think system? Then take different atoms in I am justified in saying, that it is ow. their corporate form, uniting together ing only to the order produced by and making something, no matter Mind that we have any steady belief what, something as rude as you will: of the existence of such a thing as whatever it is, there must be a prinMatter. I willingly, however, leave ciple of order in it, a coherency of this speculation, as I am ready to ac- parts, harmony of some kind or other: knowledge to you that I have not and you will find, if you examine quite satisfied myself respecting its these ideas, design and intelligence solidity.
lurking at the bottom of them. Poets There is another speculation, how- speak of a chaos, but, it is evident, that ever, which amounts pretty nearly to is a supposition merely poetical, or the same thing, and which, I believe, rather it is one which the human may be made more level to our ap- mind cannot make. It is a supposiprehension. Let our belief of the ex- tion of contradictions. Wherever there istence of matter come as it may; and, is matter at all, there must be order if you will, let it rest upon its own of some kind or other. It may seem foundation, and not upon any adven- to be order without any purpose, and titious support from the concomitant so can scarcely be called design. Yet perception of the existence of mind : order implies the operation of mind. still, I say, that matter cannot be pre- Thus, you see, Pamphilus, that I find sented to us, without bringing along traces of intelligence not merely in with it the traces of design and in- the regular forms of crystallization, telligence.
but in the most rude and inartificial Do I rightly understand you? (said of material bodies. Cleanthes.) I admit, that an orderly. I have been so often disgusted (said world, such as we inhabit, bears the I) with materialism, and have seen constant indications of design upon its so much of it among the continental countenance; but you surely do not philosophers, that I am really not at all disposed to engage in its defence. The plan of things 'exhibits the existYour former scepticism on the subject ence of mind before we reflect that of religion I could endure: there was mind, was the principle which gave a modesty and hesitation in it, but the real being to the things planned. abominable self-sufficiency with which Suppose, then, the relation of cause these people vent abroad their cold and effect were found to be imaginablooded systems of atheism is so hate- ry, or to be no tie among events themful to any man who ever heard any selves, but merely a feeling produced thing better, that I always looked upon by custom in the mind in consequence it with the most perfect antipathy, of its constantly perceiving the same and I shall be very happy to see you events in the same succession : Suptear up materialism by the roots. pose, I say, the notion of causation in
I believe (said Philo) every sys- the Deity were removed by such a tem of materialism is founded on a speculation, still the universe would mistaken application to matter, of prove his existence, in like manner as ideas which belong to mind only, and a mirror proves the existence of the on supposing qualities in matter which object which it reflects. it does not possess. They all rise The kind of sceptical attempt, from want of attention to that early therefore, which was made in this and constant impression of the existe country to throw doubts upon the exence of order and design in nature istence of God, by showing that it is which the mind of man receives in its merely custom or experience which first opening, and from applying to establishes the relation of cause and matter itself those conceptions which effect, and nothing in the reason of it is merely the means of conveying to things, must fall to the ground; be.. the mind. Every thing in nature cause, whether God is the cause of proceeds on a plan, and there is not a the universe or not, or whether or no human being in existence to whom the the universe has a cause, we still read great outlines of the plan are not ap- his existence from the universe, in the parent; but if we forget that the idea same way as a book proves the existof a plan necessarily implies mind or ence of the mind of the author, even intelligence, we must look in the plan although you could possibly separate itself for some unintelligent principle the notion of his being the author by which it is carried on. It is then from that of the intelligence which we begin to talk of the power's of na- the hook exhibits. ture, and the necessary concatenation The error prevalent in systems of of causes and effects, and similar ex- materialism, again, is the reverse of pressions of that kind, which, when this sceptical notion. The materialist applied to the material system, are in proceeds on the maxim, that every efreality words without meaning. fect must have a cause; he thinks he
This whole subject (said Cleanthes) finds the cause of every effect in nalies under a very considerable degree ture, and having found the cause, he of embarrassment, and it would be of finds all that is necessary, all that much consequence for the elucidation must be had, and, accordingly, he is of our present inquiry, if the relation satisfied, without having recourse to of Cause and Effect were placed upon the existence of mind as the supreme a right footing.
cause of all. I might in like manner I will let you know (said Philo) say to the materialist, prove as you what are my views on the subject, but will that mind need not be resorted I must first premise, that the proofs to as the cause of natural appearances, for the existence of God, which I have still these appearances prove to me already stated, are independent of all the existence of mind as infallibly as speculations on the nature of that re- your words and actions prove you to lation. We read design upon the face be an intelligent being. When I beof the universe, previously to all con- lieve you to be an intelligent being, I templation of design as a cause, and do not speculate upon the principle of the universe as an effect. The uni- intelligence being the cause of your verse is rather as it were a mirror actions, but I read in them; as in a which reflects the face of Divine Intel book, the fact, that there is intelliligence, and our belief that it is cause gence involved in them, it may be, ed or produced by the Divine Mind more properly than causing them. seems to be an after consideration, Make what you please of the unis
Verse then, make its cause what you else but a manner of operation in nawill, still I read intelligence in it, and ture? of an order of things which this is sufficient to prove the exist- seems quite arbitrary, and might be ence of Deity.
the reverse of what it is without any The system of materialism, however, absurdity in the supposition? In init is evident, is a very low and earth- quiries into natural phenomena, ly system, and argues a great want of therefore, we never discover why they philosophical penetration. The slight- must exhibit such or such appear est attention to natural successions of ances; at least we never make an ulevents must convince us, that although timate discovery of that kind. We they are regular and constant, they may discover, that admitting such and are still quite arbitrary, and might be such previous appearances, others will conceived to be in every respect the follow of course, but the first admisreverse of what they are. We can sions are entirely gratuitous, and have discover no necessity whatever, that no necessity in the nature of things. heat should be the consequence of Philosophy is nothing more than the fire, or cold of ice. Why should a science of the order of nature, and of round body in the Heavens called the the methods observed in its operaSun necessarily emit light and heat? tions. There is no more necessity in No investigation of philosophy, how- any thing which it discovers, than ever profound, can possibly discover there is tliat the sentence which I am any necessary connection between any now speaking should have followed two events in nature. Philosophy in that which went before it. the investigation of causes does now . So far, then, (said Cleanthes,) you thing more than trace out those cir- agree with the sceptical opinion about cumstances in nature which invaria- cause and effect, that there is no nebly precede others, and exhibits them cessary connection between them. divested of accidental circumstances None (replied Philo) between those which may occur in particular in- things which are called causes and stances. When it has found out à effects in the system of nature. leading general fact, it then farther W here, then, do you find this relaexamines whether this fact, if sup« tion? (said Cleanthes.) posed to precede other facts, will ac- I cannot well tell you (said he) count for them, by which is meant, where I find necessary connection, but will be the rule or measure of their I think I can easily point out to' you appearances. Thus, it is discovered, a connection sufficiently strong to that a body falling to the ground in- build this relation upon. What say creases its velocity according to a de- you to the connection between voli. terminate proportion as it approaches tion and its consequences ? I know the ground. This is a fact, but we the effects of will are said to be arbi. can discover no sort of necessary con- trary as well as any thing else. I nection between the body called a may will a thing this moment which stone, and this principle of gravity may not take place, although, perhaps, which regulates its descent. For any it would have taken place the moment thing we know to the contrary, the before. My hand may be suddenly stone might exist without the gravity. palsied, and may not follow my voli. If thrown into the air it might pro- tion when I determine to move it ; ceed for ever upwards, or it might va- yet, whenever I do move my hand, in nish into smoke, or any thing might consequence of volition, I am con-' happen to it as well as what does hap- scious that the motion proceeded from pen. There may be some more gene- the will, and would not have been ral fact which may account for this without the will. The volition here principle, something, the previous was more than a precedent event,supposition of which will explain all was an event, without which, the other the operation of gravity ; but in the would not have been,-and out of meantime, the discovery of this prin- which, if I may so speak, it was; and ciple is a very important one, since this is all that is meant by the word the motions of the heavenly bodies cause. * agree exactly with the supposition of I cannot think, (said Cleanthes,) this being the law which regulates them. But is it not clear that this . See a short essay on Cause and Effect, discovery is the discovery of nothing in our Number for last December.
that, by this explanation, you account never a satisfactory account of any nasufficiently for the impression on our tural process, used in the discovery of minds, that every event must have a truth, to say we are carried to it by a cause; You leave the connection too mere arbitrary association,-by the loose.
relations of resemblance or contiguity You will observe, (said Philo,) that in place or time, or by the force of you cannot show me any event which custom in rivetting any particular does not occur in nature; but there chain of ideas upon the mind. Imais a constant impression on the mind gination is the field in which associaof man that nature is a scheme; there- tions prevail, --not reason; and alfore, every event is part of the scheme: though habit may make imaginations a scheme or plan supposes a mind: appear reasonable, yet, I believe, every we cannot conceive a mind devoid of thing which nature gives that characvolition : every event, then, in na- ter to, must rest upon a firmer basis. ture, is an effect of the volition of Let us then examine facts. What mind. If you could imagine a chaos, we have commonly experienced to which I believe to be an impossible take place, we expect will take place supposition, then you might also again ; and those events which are siimagine events,-changes to take place milar to others formerly experienced, without causes. It is the circum- or bearing upon other appearances in stance of clesign in nature which nature, we think much more probaproves that there is a real bond of ble than those which are entirely inconnection between cause and effect, sulated and unlike any thing else. that every change must have a cause, We constantly expect that fire will that is, must proceed from the voli- burn, and that the sun will rise every tion of mind, Materialism, then, is morning; and we think it more proaltogether built on a wrong applica- bable that the planets, like this earth, tion of words. Power means nothing have inhabitants, than that they are else but will accomplishing its end, vast bodies totally useless in creation. and we cannot conceive causation in- To resolve these views of the mind dependently of volition. The powers into the mechanical influence of cusof nature, and the necessary concate- tom, seems, as I say, very unsatisfacnation of natural causes and effects, tory. I do not see how custom should are mere words without meaning. be the ground of any opinion. From • I hope, Philo, (said Cleanthes that the custom of seeing fire at all times you have now done with your meta- burn, and the sun rising every day, I physical niceties, as you call them; can conceive that the idea of fire for, to tell you the truth, I am getting should never occur to me without the a little wearied of them.
idea of burning, or of the sun withNay, Cleanthes, (said Philo,) this out the idea of its rising. But I do is scarcely fair, you led me into the not see how the opinion should hence last speculation on cause and effect be generated that, as a fact, fire will yourself, and, in pity to my audience, always burn, and that the sun will I have been rather more hasty upon continue daily to rise. it, and have left more to be supplied If such an account of this process by their own reflections than was quite of mind be unsatisfactory, it seems to doing justice to my cause, and yet you 'me an unphilosophical one to ascribe are the first to complain of the effect. all these convictions of the underI will, however, put an end to these standing to particular instincts. There discussions, if you will permit me to seems a kind of reasoning in the opisay a few words on another point nions that the sun will rise to-morrow, which seemed to confuse our ideas a and that the planets are inhabited, little on the outset of our inquiry-I a sort of reusoning which is stronger mean on the grounds of all argument in the one case than in the other; and from Experience and Analogy. if any principle can be found which
I repeat, then, that the foundation will form a basis for all these reasonof this argument can never be custom ings from experience and analogy, it or a mere association of ideas: in- seems much more philosophical to deed, I believe, every thing which rest them upon it, than to supposé bears the character of reason, has its different shades of instinct answering foundation in some original percep- to every variety of opinion and belief. tion of the understanding, and it is Now, to me it appears that the early