be deemed expedient, similar measures occasionally opened? Are the dwellings may be adopted in this country. of the poor in general constructed with chimneys?

Now phrenology sets us free from all such partial views. The phrenologist does not take his own mind as a standard of human nature. Although benevolence were weak in himself, whence he would have a natural ten dency to regard selfishness as the ruling principle of human conduct, he would be restrained from adopting this idea as the principle of his philosophy, by finding other individuals in whose life and conversation benevolence, in all its native simplicity and worth, bore the predominating sway, and perceiving that they had a great developement of brain where he had a small one. In like manner, a phrenologist would not set down the love of praise as the universal passion, merely because he had an inordinate love of approbation in his own mind; for extended observation would soon make him acquainted with many individuals to whom praise conveyed but little pleasure, and who had no desire to climb the dizzy heights of Fame.

The Metaphysicians, in studying the mind by exclusive reflection on their own consciousness, laboured also under another great disadvantage. No fact is more certain than that individuals differ in their natural capacities of feeling and of thinking. One, perhaps, has naturally a powerful capacity of feeling benevolence and a weak sensibility to justice: Another has a combination precisely the reverse; his sentiment of justice is eminently strong, but his benevolence weak. It is a highly interesting problem in the philosophy of the mind to discover how each of these individuals will feel and be disposed to act in the affairs of life, and how disposed to view the great questions in politics, legislation and religion, that may be submitted to their decision. The philosopher who merely reflects on his own consciousness, has very inadequate means to throw light on such a question. If he confine his attention strictly to his own mind, it is impossible that he can discover even the fact that the na

tural powers of feeling and thinking are different in different individuals. But, suppose him to have discovered the fact by intercourse with society, his mode of philosophizing, which never carries him beyond the circle of his own bosom, cannot afford him a ray of light upon the subject. And yet the point itself is of great importance, for the solution of it must in

volve the theory of the great diversity in human sentiment and judgment, combined with that degree of coincidence which every where exists. Suppose the case to be stated of a person who has lost an immense property by a casual conflagration, and who has thereby been rendered insolvent, and that a creditor has stript him by a legal execution, of the last remnant of his property, and left him in utter destitution and want, and that the opinion of different individuals is asked upon the proceeding. One will probably regard the proceeding as cruel and unjust; while another will call it hard, but not unjust, for, in his opinion, every one is entitled to his own. The sceptical philosopher, on hearing these different decisions, would affirm that there is no standard of right and wrong in human affairs, and no natural sentiment of justice in the human mind; otherwise, he would say, that as all who have eyes see the same object, green or black,-so, if such a sentiment existed, all who possess it ought to see the same object right or wrong. Every metaphysician has felt the difficulty of answering this objection; but phrenology enables us to throw the light of the meridian sun upon it. It proves that there is, in fact, an innate sentiment of justice in the human mind, but it shews that it is strong or weak, according to the size and activity of a particular portion of the brain. It proves, also, however, that there are other innate sentiments in the mind besides justice, such as benevolence, veneration, and others; and that these also are strong or weak in proportion to the size and activity of particular parts of the brain to which they are attached. And, in the third place, it proves that, in the affairs of life, our judgments are the results, not of one faculty alone, but of all our faculties acting together and exerting a mutual influence.

Thus, the individual in whom the sentiment of Justice is weak, and Benevolence strong, would feel strongly by his benevolence for the unhappy debtor, and weakly by his justice for the creditor, who was deprived of his right, and he would pronounce the act cruel and unjust. Another, in whom justice was great and benevolence small, would by his justice feel strongly the claim of right on the part of the creditor, and his benevolence would be weakly affected by the situa

tion of the debtor, and he would give it as his judgment, that the proceeding was fair and proper. But the jar ring of these opinions, when thus explained, does not impugn either the existence or the authority of the sentiment of justice, it shows only, that individuals judge too generally under the influence of the predominating feelings of their own minds, and take too little care to correct their peculia rities by a higher and better standard. It shows also the real object of the philosophy of the mind to be to make mankind acquainted first with human nature, and the standards of right and wrong in the abstract; and, secondly, with the peculiarities of combination among the faculties to which individuals are subject, and the effects of these peculiarities on their judgments, and tendencies to action, so that each may correct himself by, and not erect himself into, the standard of human nature in general.

the metaphysical philosophy affords no means of ascertaining on what precise combination of powers the genius of individuals depends: But in phrenology the difficulties are neither so numerous nor so great. Let us again suppose, what inquiry will prove to be the truth, that particular powers of feeling and of thinking are attached to particular parts of the brain, and that the energy of the different mental powers varies with the size and activity of the parts. If, then, we were to find in Byron's head moderate organs of reflection, much Ideality, with little Benevolence and Hope, we should see the causes of his greatness and of his faults. We should see why he is a poet but no philosopher. We should see in his Ideality the source of his Sublimity, and in his small Benevolence and Hope the causes of the gloom which overhangs his pictures, and of the hate of mankind, which sullies so many of his pages. Let us take another example. By- If, on the other hand, we were to perron and Campbell both are poets, but ceive in Campbell a full reflecting how different their genius! Kemble forehead, with a great Ideality, Beneand Kean are great tragedians, but volence, and Hope, we should discover how different their styles! Ask the such a chaste combination of the elemetaphysician for an account of the ments of sublimity, tenderness, and powers which form the genius of reflective power, as would constitute each, and of those which constitute at once the poet and the philosopher. the differences betwixt them, and how If we found in Kean a great developewill he answer? He will be compel- ment of the reflective and sentimental led to leave his field of science, be- organs, we should see unfolded the cause it affords neither principles nor sources of his strong conceptive power, terms to solve the problems, and re- his vivid passion and emotion. But sort to popular description. He will if we were to perceive in Kemble a tell you that Byron has the greater greater Ideality, and a fuller Cautiousforce, and Campbell the greater soft- ness, we should see the causes why he ness; but in his philosophy there is rises higher than Kean in the sublime, no faculty whose function it is to but falls short of him in fire; we produce energy of character, and none should see that his Ideality enables to produce softness. He will say that him to soar to the loftiest pinnacles Byron has the higher imaginative of greatness, but that his Cautiouspower, and Campbell the chaster fan- ness tames his passion, and throws acy; that Kemble has the more subli- round his manner an air of formality mity, and Kean the greater fire; but and constraint. If we found that he knows of no combination of powers Kean's Ideality was not his greatest which produces the sublimity of the power, we should see why he is more one or the fire of the other. In short, intellectual, more passionate and tenhe will give description but not phi- der, than sublime. If, too, we found losophy. If we ask in what respect his Cautiousness less than Kemble's, the peculiar powers of each depend we should see why his soul blazes on nature's gifts, and in what on cul- forth in the gust of passion, or distivation? Why Kemble should want solves in the flood of tenderness with the warmth of Kean, why Kean the complete effect, and why in him remajesty of Kemble? he will conjure straint never cools emotion, nor sufup habits, and associations, and cir- fers it to struggle for expression. Supcumstances to his aid, and entangle pose, I say, that the principles of u in a wilderness of words. In short, phrenology were true, and that we

VOL. VII.

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applied them in this manner in ana- downright honesty of purpose, qualilyzing the elements of greatness, our ties of infinite value in the founder of conclusions would possess the truth, a science. Dr Gall announced the the profundity, and the precision of discoveries of organs as he successivephilosophy; and by what other mode ly made them, regardless of the ultiof philosophizing may such results be mate results. It was sufficient for attained? him that the facts he announced existed in nature; for he was confident that time and farther inquiries would show their value. At the same time, while a few only of the organs were announced as mere isolated facts, apparently little connected with each other, and still less with the principles of any philosophy previously received, and when they appeared under the guise of Dr Gall's rude and simple nomenclature, there is little cause for wonder that they provoked merriment rather than excited serious attention in the public. But this is no proof that Dr Gall was wrong in his method of proceeding. On the contrary, he showed the highest wisdom in giving nothing but a plain and undisguised statement of the facts as he successively discovered them, without aiming at systematic arrangements or correct analysis, until greater progress was made in ascertaining the facts. Accordingly, such was really the mode of Dr Gall's early proceeding. In the Monthly Magazine for 1806, a plate and a list of the organs will be found exhibiting the discoveries as they stood in that year, and it will be seen that there is no principle of classification, except priority of discovery, no attempt at analysis of the powers, and nothing but a mere statement of developement and accompanying manifestations, and that then there were still blanks in the cranium and faculties undiscovered, which have since been ascertained.

In the last place, allow me to notice a single other observation of your correspondent relative to the founders of phrenology. He speaks of the empiricism of one or both of its founders. It has been the fate of many great men to be contemned during their lives, and to be highly esteemed by posterity; and I am convinced that such will be the fate of Drs Gall and Spurzheim. Your ingenious correspondent has shown too much candour, and too much good-will to phrenology, to allow me to suppose for a moment that he would wish to throw an unmerited slur upon the character of these two individuals. I beg, therefore, to offer him a few words of explanation, which may perhaps alter his opinion of their merits. Dr Gall was the founder of the science, for he first discovered that particular mental powers go in concomitance with particular portions of the brain. When he had made the discovery, he set about following it out with ardour, and what was the result? In the beginning of his inquiries he did not, and could not, foresee either the result to which they were to lead, or even the relation which each successive fact, as it was discovered, would bear to the whole truths which time and experience might bring to light. He, therefore, contented himself with simply observing nature, and announcing the result of his observations. He perceived, for instance, the desire of property, strong or weak, as one part of the brain was large or small, and he announced this fact; and as the most decided proofs were found in thieves, he called the part the Organ of Theft. In the same way he found another part of the brain very large in murderers, and small in those who had no propensity to destroy, and he announced this discovery, and named the part the Organ of Murder. In this mode of proceeding, it is admitted, there was little of refinement or philosophic acumen, and nothing at all of analysis; but there was a great deal of unsophisticated truth and

But what has followed? As soon as observation had brought to light the great body of the facts, a system of the philosophy of man appeared in them coinciding, in the most interesting manner, with the phenomena of life. Relations among the facts then appeared which it was impossible sooner to perceive; and the work of analysis and arrangement then became practicable, which previously it had not been. Hence it was only after the science had been cultivated for twenty years that its real nature and utility were discovered, and it was only then that its form became systematic. Hence also its name and its cha