the man in whose interest the party organisation is worked. In three constituencies out of four the organisation which is most skilfully worked, and which spends most money, will carry the day. At the last General Election the Conservative party had almost a monopoly of these organisations. It is said that their opponents have learnt something of the art, although it must be admitted that the most recent election struggle, that namely at Southwark, does not give satisfactory evidence of improvement. In attempting to answer the question, therefore, whether the real nature of the crisis will be made plain to the constituencies, and in attempting to forecast in very general terms the result of the appeal to the country, ali these considerations must be duly weighed. We must discount a fair percentage of losses which will fall to the side of the Liberal party because of these elements of internal strife, and because of an assumed superiority in the organisations of the Conservative party throughout the country, and having done so, let us roughly calculate the result. It is necessary, however, to explain that Ireland is omitted from the following estimate of gains and losses. Ireland owes much to the Liberal party. It is no exaggeration to say that every beneficial reform which has been carried out in Ireland during the last fifty years has been effected by Liberal Governments, generally in opposition to their political opponents. On the other hand, and looking at the debtor side of the account, the Liberal Governments of the last fifty years owe something to the Irish contingent in the House of Commons. Without the co-operation of the Irish Liberals the bead-roll of the achievements of the Liberal party would not stand so well in history as it does. It is unnecessary to enter into details. But it may be frankly admitted by English and Scotch Liberals that they have received valuable assistance from Ireland in carrying out the reforms on which they justly pride themselves. And equally it may be admitted by Irishmen that the material condition of their country has been cared for and ameliorated by the exertions of the English and Scotch Liberals in Parliament. That being so, it is unfortunate that there are no means in this country of forming any clear or definite idea as to what may be the influence on the strength of the two parties after the General Election of the Irish vote. can calculate with any approach to certainty how the Irish constituencies will act. The motives which actuate large bodies of electors in Ireland are an unknown quantity on this side St. George's Channel. They cannot be ascertained, even approximately, by any of the processes by which those of English or Scotch electors are gauged. The North of Ireland is tolerably certain to return more Liberals than it did in 1874. But with regard to the centre and south of the country no one can form an opinion which is of any value. Home Rulers will probably preponderate; and if a rough guess might be made on the subject, we would say that those districts will return a contingent to Parliament of from forty to fifty votes. Liberals have No one it is probable that it will not be with their opponents in the future. Beyond that general belief it is hazardous to move. On these grounds, therefore, the case of Ireland is excluded from these calculations. How then does the matter stand with regard to England, Wales, and Scotland? The figures at the date of writing, after the Southwark and before the West Norfolk election, are as follows: Government majority in England, Wales, and Scotland = 80. The question then to which we would address ourselves is this: assuming that the main issue before the country is what has been stated the predominance, namely, for the next six years, of Militarism or of Industrialism; and assuming, further, that the aspect of affairs is not materially different at the dissolution from what it is at present-there may of course be changes or surprises which make against or for the Government-assuming these two points, the question is, Is there a reasonable hope that the Opposition will succeed in winning forty seats from the Ministerialists in England, Wales, and Scotland? If the local leaders of the Liberal party in the respective constituencies conduct their business after the fashion of the local leaders in Liverpool and Southwark, at the recent elections in those two boroughs, there is not only no reasonable hope of success, but absolutely no hope at all. Liverpool has for upwards of half a century been an essentially Conservative borough. Only on one occasion since 1832 have the Liberals held a preponderance of the representation. To those who have watched the ways of constituencies, it was regarded as certain that a Conservative, and especially a popular local Conservative, must be returned. But the local managers, buoyed up by the excellence of their candidate, and by the knowledge that the Knowsley influence was with them, were carried away by the expectation that they could reverse the order of electoral things, and return a second Liberal in this Conservative constituency. Finding, early in the struggle, that they had miscalculated their strength, they adopted the rash and dangerous expedient of influencing their candidate-an excellent candidate, but a tyro in the tactics of electioneering-to make concessions; verbal concessions, if you will, but still concessions, to the Irish electors. Any chance which they might previously have had-the remote chance even of snatch In the man in whose interest the party organisation is worked. three constituencies out of four the organisation which is most skilfully worked, and which spends most money, will carry the day. At the last General Election the Conservative party had almost a monopoly of these organisations. It is said that their opponents have learnt something of the art, although it must be admitted that the most recent election struggle, that namely at Southwark, does not give satisfactory evidence of improvement. In attempting to answer the question, therefore, whether the real nature of the crisis will be made plain to the constituencies, and in attempting to forecast in very general terms the result of the appeal to the country, ali these considerations must be duly weighed. We must discount a fair percentage of losses which will fall to the side of the Liberal party because of these elements of internal strife, and because of an assumed superiority in the organisations of the Conservative party throughout the country, and having done so, let us roughly calculate the result. It is necessary, however, to explain that Ireland is omitted from the following estimate of gains and losses. Ireland owes much to the Liberal party. It is no exaggeration to say that every beneficial reform which has been carried out in Ireland during the last fifty years has been effected by Liberal Governments, generally in opposition to their political opponents. On the other hand, and looking at the debtor side of the account, the Liberal Governments of the last fifty years owe something to the Irish contingent in the House of Commons. Without the co-operation of the Irish Liberals the bead-roll of the achievements of the Liberal party would not stand so well in history as it does. It is unnecessary to enter into details. But it may be frankly admitted by English and Scotch Liberals that they have received valuable assistance from Ireland in carrying out the reforms on which they justly pride themselves. And equally it may be admitted by Irishmen that the material condition of their country has been cared for and ameliorated by the exertions of the English and Scotch Liberals in Parliament. That being so, it is unfortunate that there are no means in this country of forming any clear or definite idea as to what may be the influence on the strength of the two parties after the General Election of the Irish vote. can calculate with any approach to certainty how the Irish constituencies will act. The motives which actuate large bodies of electors in Ireland are an unknown quantity on this side St. George's Channel. They cannot be ascertained, even approximately, by any of the processes by which those of English or Scotch electors are gauged. The North of Ireland is tolerably certain to return more Liberals than it did in 1874. But with regard to the centre and south of the country no one can form an opinion which is of any value. Home Rulers will probably preponderate; and if a rough guess might be made on the subject, we would say that those districts will return a contingent to Parliament of from forty to fifty votes. Liberals have No one it is probable that it will not be with their opponents in the future. Beyond that general belief it is hazardous to move. On these grounds, therefore, the case of Ireland is excluded from these calculations. How then does the matter stand with regard to England, Wales, and Scotland? The figures at the date of writing, after the Southwark and before the West Norfolk election, are as follows: Government majority in England, Wales, and Scotland = 80. The question then to which we would address ourselves is this: assuming that the main issue before the country is what has been stated the predominance, namely, for the next six years, of Militarism or of Industrialism; and assuming, further, that the aspect of affairs is not materially different at the dissolution from what it is at present-there may of course be changes or surprises which make against or for the Government-assuming these two points, the question is, Is there a reasonable hope that the Opposition will succeed in winning forty seats from the Ministerialists in England, Wales, and Scotland? If the local leaders of the Liberal party in the respective constituencies conduct their business after the fashion of the local leaders in Liverpool and Southwark, at the recent elections in those two boroughs, there is not only no reasonable hope of success, but absolutely no hope at all. Liverpool has for upwards of half a century been an essentially Conservative borough. Only on one occasion since 1832 have the Liberals held a preponderance of the representation. To those who have watched the ways of constituencies, it was regarded as certain that a Conservative, and especially a popular local Conservative, must be returned. But the local managers, buoyed up by the excellence of their candidate, and by the knowledge that the Knowsley influence was with them, were carried away by the expectation that they could reverse the order of electoral things, and return a second Liberal in this Conservative constituency. Finding, early in the struggle, that they had miscalculated their strength, they adopted the rash and dangerous expedient of influencing their candidate-an excellent candidate, but a tyro in the tactics of electioneering-to make concessions; verbal concessions, if you will, but still concessions, to the Irish electors. Any chance which they might previously have had the remote chance even of snatch at once knocked on the head. Whether the Irish vote would have been cast with the Liberals or not if no concession had been made is an open question. But that many votes of moderate Liberals, of Scotch and Welsh Protestant Dissenters, of men of no political bias, and of workmen actuated by race antipathy against the Irish, were lost by the concession is beyond all doubt. The Ministerialists took every advantage of this tactical error of their opponents. Indeed they pushed their advantage almost beyond the range of fair party fighting by affecting an hypocritical horror at what they termed this attempt at the dismemberment of the Empire. But they had their opportunity, and they used it. The moral, therefore, to be drawn from the Liverpool election is that John Bull will submit to no flirtation with the more advanced spirits in Ireland. And if the Opposition are to win the forty seats from their opponents, the official leaders of the party must give a clear and precise definition of their position with regard to the question of Home Rule. On this point there must be no misunderstanding. Coquetting with Home Rule will never bring the Liberal party into power. Reliance even on the votes of the Irish members, if the Liberals were in power, would result, as it did in 1873, in discomfiture and humiliation. It is no doubt perfectly true that the Ministerial withers are not unwrung in this respect. Leading members of their party have been intriguing with the Irish malcontents. The movement called Home Rule was admittedly initiated by Irish Conservatives as an offset to the disestablishment of the Irish Church. It has not been proved, and it is probably difficult to prove, that the official Conservatives who now hold office, or any of them, were privy to the machinations by which the movement was set on foot. But there is no difficulty in proving that the movement has not been discountenanced by the present Prime Minister, inasmuch as it was at his instance that Mr. King Harman was made Lord Lieutenant of his county. Mr. King Harman is the man who boasted on the hustings that he was the first to wave the banner of Home Rule. He is the man who posed before his constituents as a determined Home Ruler.' And he is the man who was selected by the Irish malcontents in the House to second Mr. Shaw's motion for the very inquiry which Lord Ramsay, at Liverpool, half accepted and was ostracised for so doing. But while any unbiassed person must admit that both sides have lavished their attentions on the Home Rulers, it has somehow happened that by adroit, and some people would say unscrupulous, management, all the odium of the action has been cast upon the Liberals, while the Ministerialists, laughing in their sleeves, have escaped condemnation. The moral of the Southwark election is different. There all the newest Birmingham machinery for the selection of a candidate was in fine working order and in full operation. The raison d'être of the Birmingham scheme is to prevent a split in the Liberal interest, to prevent anything like private nomination, to produce unity of action, and to enforce the will of the majority. In three of the four points |