within the sphere of nature, and the jurifdiction of philofophy; many of PHYSICS. the things which reveal'd religion declares, are so fublime and abftrufe, that they may well be look'd upon as of an higher order than merely phyfical ones, and therefore cannot be fatisfactorily reach'd by the mere light of nature. 'Tis true, our philofopher will examine more strictly than ordinary men, the proofs brought for this or that proposed revelation; but that is no difadvantage to a fupernatural religion, fuch as the chriftian, if it be true: and the real truth about religion itself does not require credulity, but only docility. If a piece of coin, that paffes for true gold, be offer'd to an ordinary man, and to a skilful refiner, the latter will indeed examine it more ftrictly, and not acquiefce in the ftamp, the colour, the found, and other obvious marks, that may fatisfy a fhop-keeper, or a merchant; yet, when he has try'd it by the feverer ways of examining, fuch as the touch-ftone, the cupel, Aqua fortis, &c. and finds it to hold good in those proofs, he will readily and frankly acknowledge that 'tis true gold, and be more thoroughly convinc'd of it than the other person; whofe want of skill will make him ftill apt to retain a diftruft, and render him, indeed, more easy to be perfuaded, but more difficult to be fully fatisfy'd. Thus, tho' our virtuofo will examine with more ftrictness and skill than ordinary men are able, miracles, prophecies, or other proofs, faid to be fupernatural, that are alledg'd to evince a reveal'd religion; yet if the certain and genuine characters of truth appear in them, he will be more thoroughly convinc'd of it, than a lefs skilful man, whose want of good criteria, and found judgment, incline him to be diffident, and to be ftill afraid of having been impofed on.

I expect it will be here objected, that I degrade the human understanding, by afcribing fo much to experience, natural or fupernatural, that it has left nothing for reafon to do, but fervilely to obey.

This objection, indeed, is plaufible; yet the answer to it will not be very difficult, if the matter itself be duly confider'd, and reason be brought to act, not as an interefted party, but an unbyafs'd judge.

For we have already fhewn, that rational philofophers fcruple not to alter or renounce the opinions which specious reasons had fuggefted to them, when once they either find thofe opinions contradicted by experience, or meet with other opinions more conformable to it. And Ariftotle himself, tho' he be accused of having wrested phyfics to logical and metaphyfical fancies, confeffes, not only that in the fcience of nature, reason ought to comport with the phenomena, and the phenomena with reafon; but that to adhere to plaufible reafonings, and neglect fenfible obfervations, is a weakness or difeafe of the mind. And whether the understanding be, as Ariftotle taught, like blank paper, and receives no knowledge but what has been convey'd to it thro' the fenfes; or whether the notions are congenite with the understanding, or fo cafily and early acquired by it, as to appear innate; they are but very few, in comparifon of those that are requifite to judge aright about any one thing, that occurs either

in

PHYSICS. in natural philofophy, or theology. For, in the divine nature, power, wifdom, and other attributes, there is an exuberance that has produced numberless contrivances, laws, and other things, which exceedingly furpafs both the number and variety that the dim and limited intellect of man could reach to, by framing, and compounding ideas, without the affiftance of the patterns afforded by the works and declarations of God.

On account of the fame prerogative of the divine knowledge, it must frequently happen, that the notions and opinions men take up of the works and mind of God, upon the mere fuggeftions of abitract reafon; will not only be almoft conftantly very deficient, but often very erroneous. Of this we fee evident proofs in many opinions of the old philofophers; who, tho' men of ftrong natural parts, were mif-led, by what they miftook for reafon, to maintain fuch things about the works, and the author of nature, as we, who, by the favour of experience and revelation, stand in a much clearer light, know to be falfe, and often juftly think utterly extravagant.

Abstract reafon is a narrow thing, and reaches but to a very small share of the knowable truths, whether human or divine; which may be obtain'd by the help of further experience, and fupernatural revelation. This reafon, furnish'd with no other notices than it can fupply itself with, is fo fhallow and deceitful, that he who feeks for knowledge only within himself, fhall be fure to be quite ignorant of far the greatest part of things; and will scarce escape being mistaken about a large part of those he thinks he knows.

I am far from intending to deny reafon any of its juft prerogatives; experience itself is but an affiftant to reason, and fupplies informations to the understanding; which ftill remains the judge, and has the power, or right, to examine, and make use of the teftimonies that are prefented to it. The outward fenfes are but the inftruments of the foul, which hears by the intervention of the ear, and in refpect of which, the eye itself is but a more immediate optical tube; and the fenfe does but perceive objects, not judge of them. Nor do the more wary among the philofophers truft their eye, to teach them the nature of the vifible object; but only employ it to perceive the phenomena it exhibits, and the changes that happen to itself by the action of it. 'Tis confefs'd too, that the fenfes may deceive us, if the requifites of fenfation be wanting; as, when a fquare tower appears round at a diftance, and a ftrait ftick, half in the water, appears crooked: 'tis, therefore, the part of reafon, not fenfe, to judge whether none of the requifites of fenfation be wanting; which, by the way, often requires, not only reafon, but philofophy: and then, alfo, 'tis the part of reafon to judge, what conclufions may, and what cannot, be fafely grounded on the informations of the fenfes, and the teftimony of experience. So that, when we fay, experience corrects reafon, 'tisan improper way of speaking; fince 'tis reafon itself, that, upon the information of experience, corrects the judgment it had made before.

2

To illuftrate the ufe of reafon, let us fuppofe an able judge coming to PHYSICS. hear, and decide caufes, in a ftrange country: 'tis plain, that the general notions he brings with him, and the dictates of juftice and equity, can give him but a very short and imperfect knowledge of many things, that are requifite to frame a right judgment about the cafes which will first be brought before him; and, 'till he has heard the witneffes, he may be very apt to fall into prejudiced opinions of things: but, when an authentic and fufficient teftimony has clear'd matters to him, he then pronounces, according to the light of reafon he is mafter of; to which the witneffes did but give information; tho' that fubfequent information may have obliged him to lay afide fome prejudices he had entertain'd before he receiv'd it. And, what is faid of natural experience, with regard to the understanding, may, with due alteration, be apply'd to fupernatural revelation: for here, also, the understanding is to examine, whether the teftimony be indeed divine; and whether a divine teftimony ought to be believ'd, in what it clearly teaches. I do not, therefore, degrade reason from the dignity that belongs to it, of perceiving, and judging; tho' it be obliged, by its own dictates, to take in all the affiftance it can from experience, whether natural, or fupernatural; and by the fuller accounts of things it receives from those informations, to rectify, if need be, its former lefs mature judgment.

In short, those who cry up abstract reafon, as if it were felf-fufficient, exalt it in words; but we who addrefs reafon to phyfical and theological experience, and direct it how to confult both, and take its informations from thence, exalt it in effect: and reafon is much less usefully ferv'd by the former fort of men, than by the latter; fince, whilft thofe do but flatter it, these take the right way to improve it.

THE

THE

High Veneration

MAN'S INTELLECT Owes to

GOD.

IS with indignation and wonder that I hear many men, and some of them divines too, who, little confidering what God is, and what themselves are, talk of him and his attributes

as freely, and as unpremeditately, as they would of a geome

trical figure, or a mechanical engine. And even the less prefumptuous frequently difcourfe, as if the nature and perfections of that unparallel'd Being were objects their intellects could grafp; and fcruple not to dogmatize about those abftruse subjects as freely as about other things, that are confeffedly within the reach of human reafon.

Yet God may have feveral attributes and perfections utterly unknown to us; and of thofe attributes whereof we have fome knowledge, there are · effects and properties, whofe fublimity or abftrufenefs furpaffing our comprehenfion, makes the divine cause, or author of them, deserve our higheft wonder and veneration.

As there are two chief ways to arrive at the knowledge of God's attributes, the contemplation of his works, and the study of his word; it may be doubted whether either, or both of thefe, will fuffice to acquaint us with all his perfections.

For tho' philofophers have rationally deduced the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, from those marks of them which he hath ftampt upon many of his vifible works; yet, fince the divine attributes which the creatures point at, are those whereof themselves have fome participation, or refemblance; and fince the fertility of the divine nature is fuch, that its

excellencies may be participated, or reprefented many ways; how can wе PHYSICS. be fare, but fo perfect, and exuberant a Being, has excellencies not expreffed in the visible world, or any of its known parts?

Some of thofe divine attributes we know, being relative to the crea- God may have tures, could fcarce be difcover'd by fuch imperfect intellects as ours, but everal attributes and perfrom confidering fome things actually done by God. Thus, fuppofing, fections unbefore the foundations of the visible world were laid, the angels had no known to us. more knowledge than men ; they could fcarce imagine in God a power of creating matter, and of producing local motion in it: much less could they have known how the rational foul, and human body act upon one another. Whence it seems probable, that if God hath made other fyftems than that wherein we live (and who can affure us, he hath not?) he may have difplayed in fome of the creatures that compofe them, feveral attributes that we have not difcover'd by the help of thofe works of his wherewith we are acquainted.

I readily grant, that the revelations God hath vouchfafed us, have clearly taught us feveral things concerning their adorable author, which the mere light of nature either would not have fhewn, or but very dimly discover'd. Yet the fcripture itself informs us, that in this life "we know but in part, and fee things but darkly ;" and that we are fo far from being able to find out God to perfection," that even the ways of his providence are to us unfearchable. Hence God may have attributes unknown

to us.

But it may be alledged, that, befides the two ways mentioned of attaining the knowledge of God's attributes; there may be a third preferable to both the others, by confidering the idea of a Being fupremely, or infinitely perfect; in which idea, all poffible perfections may be faid to be contained; fo that no new one can be added to it. And, indeed, I readily grant, that this idea is the most genuine I am able to frame of the Deity; yet there may be feveral attributes, which, tho' in a general way contain'd in this idea, are not, in particular, difcovered to us thereby. 'Tis true, that when, by whatever means, any divine perfection comes to our knowledge, we may well conclude, 'tis, in a fenfe, comprized in the comprehenfive notion we have of a Being abfolutely perfect; tho', 'tis poffible, that perfection would never have come to our knowledge by the bare contemplation of that general idea, but was fuggefted by particulars; whence fuch difcoveries are not fo much derived from, as refer'd to the notion we are speaking of.

Thefe confiderations perfuade me, that God may have, not only various attributes, but various excellencies and perfections, unknown to us. And, farther, many of the attributes we know he hath, we have but an imperfect knowledge of, especially if compared with his; for he poffeffes them in a manner peculiar to himself, and far tranfcending that wherein men poffefs fome faint refemblances of them..

The power and wifdom of God are difplay'd both in his corporeal, and his incorporeal creatures.

VOL. II.

Mm

Among