take for a truth; provided the diftrufted propofition be fuch as we would PHYSICS. acquiefce in, if we could reconcile it to the fuppofed truth.

Upon the whole it appears, that when two propofitions are laid down, one whereof is made evident to us by experience, or by reason, acting within its own jurisdiction or compafs, and the other fufficiently prov'd, by being mathematically demonftrated, or duly attefted by divine revelation; we ought not to reject either of these propofitions as no truth, merely because we do not yet know how to reconcile them; but we should rather think that the collected propofition is only a gradual or limited truth; or elfe confider, that we knowing but fo imperfectly as we do, the particular natures of privileged fubjects, there may poffibly be a fuperior intellect, able to difcern an agreement between what is deliver'd about that subject, and the affirmation which feems repugnant to it; tho' we are not quickfighted enough to perceive this agreement.

Nor will this doctrine, if duly limited to the subjects wherein alone I would have it admitted, expofe us to have falfities impofed on us at the pleasure of bold and dictating men. For if neither of the things be privileged, but both in the jurisdiction of ordinary reafon; I require, that the propofitions framed about them be estimated according to the common diEtates of reason. And even in cafes where one of the propofitions is about a privileged thing, I do not at all think fit that it fhould be receiv'd, in fpite of its being repugnant to the gradual truth deliver'd in the other; unless it can, by fome other argument, fufficient in its kind, be prov'd to be true. Thus, tho' men know not how to reconcile the liberty of their own will with the infallible knowledge that God has of thofe actions that flow from it; yet they have unanimously judg'd it reasonable to believe both free-will, and prefcience; the former, because they felt it in themfelves; and the latter, because the fore-knowledge of things, being manifeftly a perfection, ought not to be deny'd to God, whom they look'd upon as a Being fupremely perfect; and because some actions and events that they all judg'd to flow from mens free will, were, as the generality believ'd, foretold by prophetic oracles. But fince we have fcarce any way of discovering a falfity, but by its being repugnant, to fomewhat that is true; to deny, that, in cafes within the jurifdiction of ordinary reason, the repugnancy of a propofition to any manifest truth ought to fway our judgments, were to deprive us of the most useful criterion to distinguish between truth and falfhood.

Laftly, in privileged things we ought not always to condemn that opi- The fixth and nion which is liable to ill confequences, and encumber'd with great incon- laft rule for veniences, provided the pofitive proofs of it be fufficient in their kind. judging of That this rule may be the more eafily admitted, I fhall feparately fug-reafon. things above geft three things, which I defire may be afterwards confider'd all toge

ther.

First, clear pofitive proofs, proportionate to the nature of things, are genuine, and proper motives to induce the understanding to affent to a VOL. II.

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PHYSICS. Propofition as true; fo that 'tis not always neceffary to the evidence and firmness of an affent, that the understanding takes notice of the confequences that may be drawn from it, or the difficulties wherewith it may be encumber'd. This is plain in thofe affents, which, of all others, merely natural at least, are, by knowing men, thought to be the most undoubted, and the best grounded; I mean the affents that are given to the truth of geometrical demonftrations: yet Euclid, for inftance, in all his elements of geometry, in fome of which furprizing paradoxes are deliver'd, contents himself to demonftrate his affertions in a mathematical way, and does not answer, or take notice of any one objection. And the geometricians of our days think they may fafely receive his propofitions upon the strength of demonstrations annexed to them, without knowing, or troubling themfelves with the fubtilties employ'd by the fceptic Sextus Empiricus, or others of that fect, in their writings against the mathematicians, and all affertors of affured knowledge.

The fecond thing I would offer is, that we have fhewn there are fome things which our imperfect understandings either cannot or at least do not perfectly comprehend; and that nevertheless men have not refrain'd from prefuming to dogmatize, and frame notions and rules about fuch things, as if they understood them very well. Whence it must needs come to pass that if they were mistaken, as in things so abftrufe 'tis very likely they of ten were; those who judge by the rules they laid down, must conceive the propofitions oppofite to their mistakes to be liable to very great, if not infuperable difficulties and objections.

Thirdly, as we need not wonder that privileg'd things, which are ufu ally fo fublime as to have been out of the view of those who framed the rules whereby we judge of other things, fhould be thought liable to great objections by them who judge of all things only by thofe rules; fo we fhould not require or expect more evidence of a truth relating to fuch things, than that there are for it fuch fufficient pofitive reafons, as notwithstanding objections and inconveniencies, make it, upon the whole, worthy to be embraced.

Euclid, indeed, befides that more fatisfactory way of direct probation, which perhaps he might have oftener employ'd than he did, has fometimes, where he thought it needful, had recourfe to a way of arguing to an abfurdity. But in these cafes he never goes out of the difcipline he treats of; and confining himself to arguments drawn from quantity, he urges nothing as abfurd, but what is undeniably repugnant to fome truth he had already demonftrated, or to thofe clear and undifputed definitions, axioms, or poftulata, which he fuppofes to have been already granted by thofe he would convince. But tho' he thus argues, to prove that his readers cannot contradict him without contradicting themselves; yet we find not that he was at all folicitous to clear those difficulties, that a man fo quick-fighted could not but know fome of his theorems were attended with; but he is contented to demonftrate the incommenfurability of the

fide and diagonal of a fquare, without troubling himfelf to take notice of PHYSICS, the feeming abfurdities that attend the endless divifibility of a line, which would follow from what he demonftrated.

'Tis true, about fome privileg'd things there are, and about fome others there may be, contradictory opinions maintain'd. Now as both of these cannot be true, one of them must be fo; as tho' it be hotly difputed whether quantity be endlesly divisible, yet certainly it either muft, or must not be divisible without end; and, as was formerly observ'd, which fide foever you take, the inconveniencies will be exceeding great, and perhaps there will lie objections against it scarce to be directly answer'd. And fince one of the two oppofite opinions must be true, it will not always be necessary that an opinion must be false, which is encumber'd with great difficulties, or liable to puzzling objections. And therefore if the pofitive proofs on one fide be clear and cogent, tho' there be perplexing difficulties objected by the other, the truth ought not, for their fake, to be rejected; because fuch difficulties proceeding ufually either from notions that men prefume to frame about things above their reach, or from rules that were not made for fuch points as are in difpute; the objections are not to be judg❜d fo well founded, as is that acknowledg'd principle in reasoning, "from truth nothing but truth can be juftly inferr'd."

I confefs I have always thought it reasonable in fuch cafes to compare as well the pofitive proofs of one opinion with those of the other, as the objections that are urg'd on either fide; and thence make my estimate, upon the whole, tho' with a peculiar regard to that opinion which has a great advantage in point of pofitive arguments; because thofe are, unqueftionably, the proper inducements to affent. And then the objections may well enough be fufpected to proceed from the abftrufe nature of privileged things, and the great narrowness of the rules whereby men usually judge of things. For we may have a fufficiently clear proof that a thing is, whilft we have no fatisfactory conception of its manner of exifting, or operating our inferr'd knowledge being clearer, and extending farther, than our intuitive, or apprehensive knowledge.

But even about things that we cannot fufficiently understand, we may in some cases exercise our reafon, in answering objections that are thought unanswerable, because not directly fo. For we may fometimes fhew, by framing in another cafe a like argument, which the adverfary muft confefs does not conclude well; that neither does the argument, containing his objection, conclude right.

However, we must not expect to be able, as to privileged things, and the propofitions that may be framed about them, to refolve all difficulties, and answer all objections; fince we can never directly answer those which require for their folution a perfect comprehenfion of what is infinite. As a man cannot well anfwer the objections that may be made against the Antipodes, the doctrine of eclipfes, that of the different phases of the moon, and of the long days and nights of fome months near the poles,

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PHYSICS. poles, the theory of the planets, &c. unless he understand the nature of the sphere, and fome other principles of cofmography and aftronomy. So that where privileged things are concern'd, clear and pofitive arguments ought to be of great weight, in favour of the opinion they conclude for; even when, on the contrary fide, we may difcourfe ourselves into fuch difficulties as perplex, and, perchance, puzzle our limited understandings.

THE

THE

Philofophical Difficulties

Relating to the

RESURRECTION,

CONSIDER'D.

PHYSICS.

HE queftion, I here defign to confider, is, Whether to believe Preliminary the refurrection of the dead, which the chriftian religion teaches, obfervations. be to believe an impoffibility?

I do not pretend, that the refurrection is a thing knowable, or directly provable, by the mere light of nature; nor that it may poffibly be effected by mere phyfical agents: fo that, treating of the poffibility of the general refurrection, I here take it for granted, that God has been pleased to promife and declare, that there fhall be one; and that it shall be effected, not according to the ordinary courfe of nature, but by his own immediate power.

It must also be observed, that the refurrection taught by the christian religion, is not here meant, in fuch a latitude, as to comprize all that any particular church, or fect of chriftians, much less what any private writer hath taught about it; but only what is plainly deliver'd as to this point, in the scripture.

I must further premife, that 'tis no eafy matter to determine what is Identity; the abfolutely neceffary, and but fufficient to make a portion of matter, con- difficulties of fider'd at different times, or places, fit to be reputed the fame body. That conceiving it. the generality of men, in vulgar difcourfe, allow themselves a great latitude, in this cafe, will be eafily granted, by him who obferves the receiv'd forms of speaking. Thus Rome is faid to be the fame city, tho' it hath been often taken, and ruin'd by the Barbarians, and others. Thus, an university is faid to be the fame, tho' fome colleges fall to ruin, and new ones are built; and, tho' once in an age, all the perfons who compos'd it, are fucceeded by others. Thus, the Thames is faid to be the fame river, that it was in the time of our fore-fathers; tho' indeed, the water,

that