PHYSICS. fpeculations. But as to all metaphyfical difficulties, wherein neither matters of fact, nor the hypothefes of fubordinate parts of learning are of force, we have little to expect. And, however it be as to other abstruse objects; I am very apt to think, there are fome things relating to the infinite Being, which will ftill remain incomprehenfible, even to philofophical understandings. I can fcarce hope to fee thofe obftacles furmounted, that proceed not from any perfonal infirmity, or evitable faults, but from the limited nature of the human mind. Befides, as mankind may hereafter explain fome of thofe grand difficulties, which have hitherto perplex'd philofophers; fo their inquiries may, poffibly, lead them to dif cover new difficulties more perplexing than the firft. For, even amongst the things wherewith we are already acquainted, there are many which we think we know, only because we never, with due attention, try'd whether we can frame fuch ideas of them, as are clear, and worthy for a rational mind to acquiefce in. This appears from the great intricacy that confidering men find in the notions commonly receiv'd of fpace, time, and motion, &c. and the difficulties of framing clear, and fatisfactory apprehenfions, even of fuch obvious things. We fee alfo, that the angle of contact, the doctrine of afymptotes, and that of furd numbers, and incommenfurable lines, all which gives no concern to common accomptants and furveyors, perplex the greatest mathematicians. Hence the growing curiofity of mankind is not more likely to folve some difficulties, than to raife others; which may prove more infuperable than they.

The motion of a coach-wheel is fo obvious, and feems fo plain a thing, that the coach-man never looks upon it with wonder; yet after Aristotle had taken notice of the difficulty that occurr'd about it, this trivial phenomenon has perplex'd even famous mathematicians, and continues yet to do fo: there being fome circumftances in the progreffive motion and rotation of the circumference of a wheel, and its nave; or of two points affign'd, the one in the former, and the other in the latter, that have appear'd too fubtile for modern writers.

After what And here we may obferve, that reafon operates according to certain ideas, manner human axioms, and propofitions, wherewith, as by rules and measures, it conreafon acts. ceives, eftimates, and judges of things. And, indeed, when we say, that a thing is confonant or repugnant to reafon, we mean ufually, that it is either immediately or mediately deducible from, or at least confiftent with, or contradictory to one or other of thefe ftandard-rules or notions. But if these rules and notions be fuch as are drawn only from finite things, or are agreeable but to thofe; they may prove ufelefs or deceitful, when we go to stretch them beyond their meafure, and apply them to infinites.

To illuftrate and confirm this notion. All the things that we naturally do or can know, may be divided into fuch as we may acquire without a medium, and such as we cannot attain to, but by the intervention of a medium, or by a difcurfive act. To the firft belong fuch notions as are fuppofed to be connate; as, that "Two contradictories cannot be both true;" "The whole is greater than a part thereof;" "Every whole number is

"either even or odd;" &c. as alfo, those other truths, that are affent- PHYSICS. ed to upon their own account, without needing any medium to prove them; because that, as foon as by clear terms, or fit examples, they are plainly propofed to the understanding, they difcover themfelves to be true fo manifeftly by their own light, that they want no propofition to make the understanding acquiefce in them. Of this kind are fome of Euclid's axioms; for inftance, "If to equal things equals be added, the totals will "be equal.

To the fecond fort of things knowable by us, belong all that we acquire by the act of reafoning; wherein, by means of propofitions or mediums, we deduce one thing from another; or conclude, affirmatively or negatively, one thing of another. This being fuppofed, and we being conscious to ourselves that we are not the authors of our own nature; all the experience we have hitherto had, leads us to think, that the measures fuggested to us, either by sensations, the refults of fenfible obfervation, or the other inftruments of knowledge, are fuch as fully reach but to finite things; and, therefore, are not fafely applicable to others. And many of those principles that we think very general, may be only gradual notions of truth; and but limited and refpective, not abfolute and univerfal.

And tho' perfect fyllogifms be counted the best and most regular forms, that our reafonings can affume; yet even the laws of thefe are grounded on the doctrine of proportions; for even between things equal, there may be a proportion. Upon this ground, I fuppofe, it is, that mathematical demonftrations have been publickly propofed of the grand fyllogiftical rules. And, in confequence hereof, geometricians tell us, there is no proportion between a finite line and an infinite; because the former can never be fo often taken, as to exceed the latter; which, according to Euclid's definition of proportion, it should be able to do. Since then, the understanding operates but by the notions and truths 'tis furnifh'd with, and fince thefe are its inftruments, by proportion to which, it takes measures, and makes judgments of other things; fuch inftruments may be too disproportionate to fome objects, to be fecurely employ'd to determine feveral particulars about them. Thus, the eye being an inftrument which the understanding employs to estimate diftances, we cannot by that, fafely take the breadth of the ocean, becaufe our fight reaches not far enough, to difcover the extent of so vaft an object. And the common inftruments of furveyors, that would serve to measure the height of a house or a fteeple, or even of a mountain, cannot enable them to take the diftance of the moon. But when aftronomers take, by fuppofition, a line that reaches from the furface to the centre of the earth, tho' by the help of this, and the parallax, they may tolerably measure the distance of the moon; yet, with all their great induftry, they cannot, by the fame way, with any tolerable accuracy, meafure the distance of the stars; the femi-diameter of the earth bearing no fenfible proportion to that of fo vaft a fphere, as makes their parallax vanish: it being all one to fenfe, whether, at fo great a remove, a ftar be obferv'd from the centre, or from the furface of the earth. Thus when I

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PHYSICS. think of a triangle or a fquare, I find in my imagination an intuitive idea of those figures; that is, a picture clear and distinct, as if a figure of three fides, or of four equal fides and angles, were placed before my eyes. But if I would fancy a myriagon, or a figure confifting of ten thousand equal fides, my imagination is overpower'd with fo great a multitude, and frames but a confused idea of a polygon with a very great many fides. For if a man should endeavour to frame ideas of a myriagon, or a chiliagon, they would be both fo confufed, that his imagination would not be able clearly to difcriminate them, tho' the one has ten times as many fides as the other. Thus if you would imagine an atom, of which perhaps ten thousand would scarce make up the bulk of one of the light particles of duft that plays in the fun-beams, fo extraordinary a minutenefs, not having fallen under any of our fenfes, cannot truly be reprefented in our imagination. So when we fpeak of God's omnipotence, and other of his infinite attributes and perfections; we have fome conceptions of the things we fpeak of, but may very well difcern them to be inadequate. And tho' feveral propofitions relating to things above reafon feem clear enough to ordinary capacities, yet he who fhall with a competent attention, curiofity, and skill, confider and examine them, will find that either their parts are inconsistent with one another, or that they involve contradictions to fome acknowledg'd or manifeft truth, or are veil'd over with darkness, and encumber'd with difficulties, from whence we are not able to refcue them. Thus, when the fide and diagonal of a fquare are proposed, we have clear and diftinct ideas of each of them a-part; and when they are compared, we may have a conception of their incommenfurability; yet this negative notion, if it be thoroughly confider'd, and far enough purfued, clearly contains that of a strait line being divifible in infinitum; and this divifibility is encumber'd with fo many difficulties, and is fo hard to be reconciled to fome confefs'd dictates of reason, that philofophers and geometricians, tho❞ convinc'd of the truth, are to this day labouring to extricate themselves out of these perplexing intricacies.

'Tis evident that fome fubftance or other, whether God, the world, or matter, never had a beginning, that is, has been for ever: but when we speak of an eternity à parte ante, as they call it, we do not fpeak of a thing whereof we have no conception at all; as will appear to a confidering perfon: yet the general notion we have is fuch, that when we come attentively to examine it, by the fame ways whereby we judge of almost all other things, the understanding is confounded: for we must conceive, that the time eflux'd fince the firft man began to live, bears no greater proportion to the duration of God, or of matter, than a moment. And as there are fome things, whofe nature and confequences puzzle our faculties; there are others, whereof tho' we have a notion, yet the Modus operandi is beyond our comprehenfion. I do not mean only the true and certain Modus operandi, but even an intelligible one. Thus tho' many, especially Cartefians, and that upon a philofophical account, affert that God created the world, yet how a substance could be made out of nothing, I fear we cannot conceive.

And tho' all philofophers, very few excepted, believe that God made the PHYSICS. world out of pre-exiftent matter; yet how he could make it, but by locally moving the parts of the matter it was to confift of, and how an incorporeal substance can move a body, which it may pafs thro' without refiftance, will be found hard to explain. If it be faid that the foul being an immaterial substance, can nevertheless move the limbs of the human body rightly difpofed; I answer, it does not appear that the rational foul gives any motion to the parts of the body, but only guides or regulates that which she finds in them already.

Thus then by making obfervations of fuch things as are the proper objects of our faculties, and by drawing just confequences from fuch obfervations, and from our other knowledge, we may come to be certain that fome things exift, and fo have general and dark ideas of them; when, at the same time, we are at a loss to conceive how they can be fuch, or how they can operate and perform what they do; fuppofing the truth and fufficiency of fome other things we are convinc'd of. To be fhort, negative apprehenfions we may have of fome privileged things; and pofitive, but indiftinct apprehenfions of others; and that is enough, in fome fort, to make us understand ourselves, and one another, when we fpeak of them: tho' when we fufficiently confider what we fay, we may find that our words are not accompany'd with clear, diftinct, and fymmetrical conceptions of thofe abftrufe and perplexing things we fpeak of. And fince we find by experience that we are unable fufficiently to comprehend things, which by clear and just confequences may be proved to exift; this ftrongly argues, that some of our conceptions may be of things whereto fomewhat belongs, that tranfcends our reafon, and furpaffes our comprehenfion. So that when natural philofophy had taught men to believe God to be an infinitely perfect Being, we ought not to fay that they had no idea of fuch a Being, becaufe they had not a clear and adequate one. And fince Ariftotle profeffedly discourses of infinity, and cites the ancienter philofophers for having done fo before him; and fince Democritus, Epicurus, GafJendus, and others, maintain either that the world is boundless, or that fpace is not finite in extent, or that the world confifts of atoms, infinite in number; we must not fuppofe they faid they knew not what, as they muft have done if they wrote without ideas of the things they treated of: tho' we may justly fay, that the fubject being infinite, the ideas they framed of it could not be comprehenfive and accurate. Thus, when the eye looks into a deep fea, tho' it may pierce a little way into it, yet when it would go deeper, it only discovers fomewhat dark and indiftinct, which affects the organ fo differently from what other more genuine objects do, that we thence eafily difcern our fight fails us in the way, before it arrives at the bottom; and confequently that there may be many things conceal'd there which our fight is unable to reach. But if we really find there are things which our reafon cannot comprehend, then, whether the account I have given why our faculties prove infufficient for these things, be good or not, there must be some true account or other of that insufficiency.

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PHYSICS. ciency. And fome things must appear to us fo fublime and abftruse, that we are unable to comprehend them, and to difcern fo much as the reafon why they cannot be comprehended by us.

Whether men

Upon the whole, then, we may reasonably fuppofe, that the great author of nature fo framed man, as to have furnifh'd his intellective faculty with a light, whereby it can, not only estimate the power of a multitude of other things, but alfo judge of its own nature and power, and difcern. fome of the limits, beyond which it cannot fafely exercise its act of judging and defining. But the rational foul does not only pafs judgment of the things without her, but about herself, and what paffes within her: fhe searches out, and contemplates her own fpirituality, and union with the body. The intellect judges wherein its own nature confifts, and whether or no itself be a diftinct faculty from the will. And to come yet closer, logic and metaphyfics are the works of the human mind; which, by framing thofe difciplines, manifefts that it not only judges of reasoning, but of the very principles and laws thereof; teaching what things are neceffary to obtain evidence and certainty, and what kind of mediums they are, from whence we must not expect any demonftrative arguments relating to a fubject. Thus, if we compare the bodily eye with the understanding, which is the eye of the mind; we muft allow this difference, that the intellect is as well a looking-glafs as a fenfory; fince it does not only fee other things, but itself too, and can difcern its own blemishes, bad conformation, or whatever other infirmities it labours under. The foul, therefore, when duly excited, is furnish'd with a light that may enable her to judge, even of many of thofe original notions, by which the judges of other things. In fhort, the foul, upon trial, may find, by an inward fense, that fome things furpafs her force; as, a blind man being fet to lift up a rock, would quickly find it too unwieldy to be managed by him: and the utmost exercise of his ftrength, would but convince him of the infufficiency of it to furmount fo great a weight. We do not then pretend, that the eye of the mind fhould fee invifibles; but only, that it fhall difcern the limits of that sphere of activity, within which nature hath bounded it; and confequently, that fome objects are difproportionate to it. Ariftotle himself fays, that the eye fees both light and darkness; which expreffion, tho' fomewhat odd,. may be defended: fince, tho' darkness is a privation, not a Being, it cannot properly be the object of fight; yet it may be perceiv'd by means of the eye, from the very different affection which that organ fuffers, when imprefs'd by luminous objects, and when it is made useless to us by darkness.

But it may be ask'd, how can we juftify our difcourfing, atall, of things may, with ju- tranfcending reafon ? Rice, difcourfe of things above reason?

The better to clear this matter, I muft make fome diftinctions of the notions or conceptions of the mind; and, for brevity fake, give names to those I have now occafion to employ. I confider then, that whether the conceptions or ideas we have of things, be fimple or compounded, they may be diftinguish'd into fuch as are particular or diftinct, and fuch as are