ends to be obtain'd by them, the more plainly we difcern the admirable PHYSICS, wisdom of the author of things; who is "wonderful in counfel, and excellent in working." Nor will the fufficiency of the intermediate caufes make it needlefs to admit a first and fupreme caufe, fince that order of things, by virtue whereof thefe means become fufficient to fuch ends, muft have been at first instituted by an intelligent caufe. And if it be irrational to afcribe the excellent fabric of the univerfe, and the actions that have manifeft tendencies to determinate useful ends, to fo blind a caufe as chance; it will be rather more irrational to afcribe to chance the first formation of the universe; of which the prefent ftate of things is but the natural confequence, or effect. For it may indeed be plaufibly faid, that in the present ftate of things the feveral parts of the universe are, by the contrivance of the whole, determin'd, and thereby qualify'd to obtain their ends; but it cannot be rationally pretended, that at the first formation of the world there was a fufficiency in the fenfelefs materials of it, without any particular guidance of a wife fuperintendent to frame bodies which are fo excellently contriv'd, and fitted to their respective ends. Upon the whole, it appears, that all confideration of final caufes is not to be banish'd from natural philofophy, but that 'tis rather allowable*, and, in fome cafes, commendable, to argue, from the manifest uses of things, that the author of nature pre-ordain'd them; that the fun, and moon, with the other çeleftial bodies, excellently declare the power, wifdom, and glory of God; and were, fome of them, among other purpofes, made to be ferviceable to man; that, from the fuppos'd ends of inanimate bodies, whether celeftial or fublunary, 'tis very unfafe to draw arguments to prove the particular nature of those bodies, or the true fyftem of the univerfe; that, as to animals, and the more perfect fort of vegetables, 'tis warrantable to fay, particular parts were preordained to particular uses, relating to the welfare of the animal, or 66 "increas'd, and at others, diminish'd. We PHYSICS. plant itself, or to its fpecies; but that fuch arguments may eafily deceive, if those who form them are not very cautious to avoid mistaking, among the various ends that nature may have in the contrivance of an animal body, and the various ways which fhe may fuccefsfully take to compass the fame ends; and laftly, it appears, that a philofopher, nevertheless, must not let the fearch or knowledge of final caufes make him neglect a careful inquiry after efficients. THINGS PHYSICS. THINGS ABOVE REASON, CONSIDER'D. I SECT. I. three kinds. T appears to me, that, among the objects of our reafon, there are Things above fome, whofe nature we cannot comprehend; others, whofe attri- reafon, of butes, or actions, we cannot reconcile to the fubject; and, lastly, others, that we cannot conceive how they should confift with fome acknowledg'd truth: and these may be called things above reafon. By which I here understand, not such things as are false, and abfurd; but fuch as, tho' the understanding fees fufficient cause to affent to, yet finds itself reduced to this affent, with a remarkable, and peculiar, disadvantage. And this difadvantage, ufually, proceeds either from the nature of the thing proposed; which is fuch, that we cannot, fufficiently, comprehend it; or, from our being unable to conceive the manner of its existence, and operation; or, because it involves fome notion, or propofition, that we fee not how to reconcile with fome other, which, we are perfuaded, is The first of these three forts of things, may be call'd incomprehenfible; the fecond, inexplicable; and the third, unfociable. true. The first confifts of thofe things, whofe nature is not diftinctly, and ad- Incomprehenequately, comprehenfible by us; to which, perhaps, we may refer all fuch fible. intellectual Beings, if any be granted, as are, by nature, of an higher or der than human fouls; at leaft, we may refer to this head the great au thor of nature. The second fort of things above reason, confifts of fuch as, tho' we do Inexplicable, not deny to exift, yet we cannot clearly, and fatisfactorily, conceive how they can be what we acknowledge they are: as, how matter can be infinitely divifible; and how there fhould be fuch an incommenfurability betwixt the fide, and diagonal, of a square, that the smallest line cannot, adequately, meafure them both. PHYSICS. Unfociable. The third fort, are things incumber'd with difficulties, and objections, that cannot directly, and fatisfactorily, be removed by those who acquiefce in the receiv'd rules of inferior fciences, and reafon but at the common rate; fuch objects of contemplation having fomething belonging to them, that appears irreconcilable with fome very manifeft, or acknowledg'd truths. Thus, that man has free will, at least with regard to civil matters, is the general confeffion of the fpecies: all the laws that forbid, and punish, murder, adultery, theft, and other crimes, being founded upon a fuppofition, that men have a power to forbear committing them: and the sense men have of being poffeffed of this power over their own actions, is great enough to make malefactors acknowledge their punishments juft; being condemned by their own consciences, as well as by their judges. Yet the generality of mankind ascribe to God an infallible prefcience of human actions. But how a certain fore-knowledge can be had of contingent things, and fuch as depend upon the free-will of man, is that which we are unable clearly to comprehend. And, doubtlefs, 'tis hard to conceive, how an infinitely perfect Being should want prefcience; or, that our will should want the liberty we almost perpetually exercise. Again, geometricians teach the divifibility of quantity ad infinitum, to be mathematically demonftrable. Suppofe, then, a ftrait line, of three feet long, divided into two parts, the one double to the other; now a line of two feet is divifible into infinite parts, or it is not; if you fay it is not, you contradict a demonstration; if you fay it is, you must confefs, either that the line of one foot is divifible into as many parts as the line of two feet; or else, that the infinite parts into which the line of one foot is granted to be divifible, is exceeded in number by the parts into which the line of two feet is divifible; and, confequently, that the line of two feet has a multitude of parts, greater than infinite. Which reafon may let us fee, that we may be reduced, either to reject inferences fairly drawn from manifefted, or granted truths, or to admit conclufions that appear abfurd; if we will have all the common rules, whereby we judge of other things, to be applicable to infinites. Hence it is clear, in the general, that there may be things which furpafs our reafon; at least, so far, as not to be judg'd of by the measures and rules used in judging of things what? ordinary occurrences: for which reafon, I fhall call them privileg'd things. Privileg'd The imperfection of the human mind. But, to manifeft the imperfections of our reason, with regard to privileg'd things, we need not have recourse to the divine nature: a mathematical demonstration may ferve the turn. For, fuppofe a great-circle, divided into its 360 degrees; and fuppofe any number of ftrait lines, drawn from the feveral affignable parts of fome one of these degrees, to the centre; 'tis manifeft, that the degrees being equal, as many lines may be drawn from any other; and fo from every one of the rest. Then, fuppofe a circular arch, equal to the affumed degree, to be further bent into the circumference of a little circle, concentrical with the great one; it follows, from the nature of a circle, that the femi-diameters PHYSICS. of it, how many foever they be, can no where touch one another, but in the centre. Whence 'tis evident, that all the lines, drawn from the circumference to the centre of the greater circle, must pass thro' different points of the circumference of the smaller; and, confequently, that as many lines as can, even mentally, be drawn from the feveral points of the cir cumference of the great circle to the common centre of both circles, muft all pass thro' different points of the little circle; and thereby divide it into as many parts as the greater circle is divided into. Here, then, the circumference of the leffer circle prefents us with a curve line, which was not poffibly divisible into more parts than an arch of one degree, or the 360th part of the circumference of the greater circle; yet, without being lengthen'd, it becomes divifible into as many parts as the whole circumference of the fame greater circle. And, tho' we should suppose the circumference of the internal circle not to exceed one inch; and that of the exterior circle to exceed the circumference of the terreftrial globe, or Orbis magnus itself; ftill the demonftration would hold. And, furely, 'tis very agreeable, both to the nature of God, and to that of man, that fuch things as these should prove true; for we mistake, and flatter human nature too much, when we think our understanding so unlimited, both in point of capacity, and of extent; and fo free, and unprepoffefs'd, as many philofophers feem to fuppofe. For, whatever our felf-love may incline us to imagine, we are really but created, and finite Beings, and come into the world but fuch as it pleas'd the moft free author of nature to make us. And, from this dependance, and limitation of our natures, it follows, not only that we may be born with certain impreffions, appetites, or tendencies of mind; but also, that the means given us to employ in the fearch, or judging of truth, are only proportionable to the defign of our make; and, therefore, may, probably, be fuppofed not able to reach all kinds of truths; many of which may be. unneceffary for us to know here: and fome may be referv'd, to render us fenfible of the imperfections of our natures, and to make us afpire to that condition, wherein our faculties fhall be much enlarged, and heighten'd. It feems not, therefore, unreasonable to think, both that God has fo limited our faculties, that, in our present state, there fhould be fome objects beyond the comprehenfion of our understandings, or, that fome of his creatures should not be able perfectly to understand some others; and yet, that he has given us light enough to perceive, that we cannot attain to a clear, and full knowledge of them. It may here, indeed, be objected, that tho' the Instances given, have not been hitherto clear'd by the light of reafon, yet, 'tis probable, they may be fo hereafter; confidering how great a progrefs is, from time to time, made in the discoveries of nature. I answer, that I imagine, what future discoveries are made, will chiefly concern thofe things which either we are ignorant of, for want of a competent hiftory of nature; or mistake, thro' erroneous prepoffeffions, or for want of freedom, and attention, in our fpecu |