we fuppofed was intended; we fay that effect was produced by chance: PHYSICS. fo that chance is indeed but a notion of ours, and fignifies no more than that in our apprehenfions the phyfical caufes of an effect did not tend to the production of what they have, nevertheless, produced. And therefore I wonder, that the philofophers who preceded Ariftotle, never treated of chance among natural causes.

And as fome ftones of the most curious fhapes, have embolden'd many favourers of Epicurus to fet them in competition with those animals, or parts of animals, from their likenefs whereto they have receiv'd their names; we ought to confider, that feveral learned men have, of late, made it very probable, that these stones were once really the animals, or those parts of them which they refemble, and were afterwards turn'd into ftones by the fupervention of fome petrefcent matter, or petrifying cause. And, allowing fome of these forts of tones to be the production of the mineral kingdom; yet it would not clearly follow, that they owe their shapes to chance, fince 'tis no abfurdity to admit feminal principles in the more elaborate forts of fofils. However, I think it very injurious to make these productions rival the animals to which they are compared. For the fhape, in which alone they and the animals agree, being an external thing, is not worthy to be mention'd, in comparison of that wherein they differ; the rude and flight texture of the beft fhaped stone being immenfely inferior to the internal contrivance of an animal; which must confift of a multitude of parts of a determin'd figure, bulk, fituation, &c. as is obvious to thofe who have feen diffections skilfully made. And 'tis not only in the firm and quiefcent parts that this great internal difference between stones, and the animals they refemble, is to be found: there appears a far greater difference between a living animal, and a stone, than any the anatomical knife can fhew us betwixt a dead one, and a stone, tho ever fo curiously figured. For there are numberless liquors, fpirits, digeftions, fecretions, coagulations, motions of the whole body, of the limbs and other parts, which are lodg'd and perform'd in a living body, and are, perhaps, more admirable than the structure of the folid and quiefcent parts themfelves: fo that, tho' a stone, in external appearance very like a fhellfifh, were made by chance; yet from thence to conclude, that chance may make a living shell-fish, would be to argue worfe than he who should pretend, that because an unskilful smith may make a hollow piece of metal like a watch-cafe; and fill it with some rude stuff, he must therefore, be able to make a watch; for there is lefs difference betwixt the skill expreffed in making the cafe of a watch and the movement, than in making a body like a fhell, and the internal parts of a real fish: or, that becaufe putrefaction and winds have fometimes made trees hollow, and blown them into the water, where they fwim like boats; therefore the like caufes may make a regular galley, according to the laws of naval architecture, man it, fteer it, excite and guide all its motions to the best advantage, for the prefervation, and various ufes of the veffel. In fhort, if chance fometimes does strange things, 'tis in regard to what she herself, not to what nature uses to perform.

And

PHYSICS.

Revelation al

than natural philofophy.

And now, to give my thoughts upon the fecond question. 1. I think the naturalift may draw arguments from the ends and uses of the parts of living bodies, provided he proceeds herein with due caution. 2. 'Tis my opinion, that the inanimate bodies here below, proceeding not from seminal principles, have but a more flight texture; fuch as earths, liquors, flints, pebbles; and will not fufficiently warrant reasonings drawn from their fuppofed ends. 3. It feems to me, that the celestial bodies abundantly declare God's power and greatnefs, by the immenfity of their bulk, and, if the earth ftand ftill, the celerity of their motions; and alfo argue his wisdom, and general providence, with regard to them: because he has, for fo many ages, kept fuch a variety of vast vortices, or other maffes of matter in motions immenfely rapid, without permitting them to destroy one another, or lofe their regularity. And I fee no abfurdity in fuppofing that, among other ufes of the fun, and of the ftars, the fervice of man might be intended; tho' I doubt whether, from the bare contemplation of the heavens, and their motions, it can be cogently inferr'd, that the chief end of them all is to enlighten the earth, and bring benefits to the creatures that live upon it.

Hitherto I fuppofe the naturalift to difcourfe merely upon phyfical lows us to speak grounds; but if revelation be admitted, we may rationally believe more, more pofitively and fpeak lefs doubtfully of the ends of God, than bare philofophy will of final causes, warrant us to do. For if God is pleas'd to declare any thing to us concerning his intentions in the making of his creatures, we ought to believe it, tho' the confideration of the things themselves did not give us the leaft fufpicion of it; which yet, in our cafe, they do. The fcriptures exprefly teach us, that "God made the two great luminaries, the greater to rule "the day, and the leffer to rule the night;" that he made the stars al"fo, and fet them in the firmament, or expanfum of heaven, to give light upon the earth." And these are reckon'd among the ufes of these luminaries: "to divide the day from the night; and to be for figns, and "for feasons, and for days and years." And Mofes, diffuading the Ifraelites from worshipping the fun, the moon, and the stars, fays, that "the "Lord had imparted them unto all nations under the heaven." And therefore those Cartefians who admit the authority of holy fcripture, fhould not reject the 'confideration of fuch final causes as revelation discovers to us; fince 'tis certainly no prefumption to think we know God's ends, when he himself acquaints us with them: nor to believe that the fun, tho' generally esteem'd a nobler body than the terrestrial globe, was made, among other purpofes, to enlighten it. 'Tis recorded, in the book of Genefis, that God's defign in making man, was, that he fhould "sub"due the earth, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the "fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." And the fame book informs us, that, after the deluge, God "deliver'd all terreftrial beafts, "and fowl, and fish, and every moving thing that lives," into the hands of men, and intended that they fhould eat animals; as, before the flood, he

had appointed them all the forts of wholefome vegetables for their food. PHYSICS. And fince God was pleased to appoint that men fhould live on these creatures, it cannot be abfurd to fay, that, among other purposes to which he deftin'd the fun, his fhining upon the earth was one; fince, without his light and heat, men could not provide for themselves; and neither thofe plants that men and cattle muft feed upon, could grow and ripen, nor, confequently, thofe animals that were to be their principal food, and ferve them for other ufes, could be fuftain'd, and provided for. Many other texts might be here alledged to the fame purpose, but I fhall content myself to mention that of the royal prophet, when, fpeaking of man to his maker, he fays, "Thou haft made him a little lower than the angels, " and has crown'd him with glory and honour. Thou madeft him to "have dominion over the works of thine hands, and haft put all things "under his feet."

Indeed if we confider only that vifible part in man, his body; the fmallness thereof may make it feem improbable that portions of the univerfe, incomparably greater than he, fhould be intended for his fervice. But chriftians will not think this incredible, if they confider man, as he chiefly confifts of a rational mind; which proceeds immediately from God, and is capable of knowing him, loving him, and being eternally happy with him. They who defpife man, confider'd in this capacity, very little know the worth of a rational foul. But God, who is the best judge in this cafe, was pleas'd to confider men fo much, that it gave David caufe to admire, as we just now faw; and not only to form them in his image, at their first creation; but when they had wilfully loft and forfeited it, he vouchfafed to redeem them by the fufferings and death of his own fon, who is incomparably more excellent than the whole world. And 'tis not incredible that God fhould have intended many of his other works to be ferviceable to man; fince, by miraculous operations, he hath fometimes fufpended the laws of nature, and fometimes over-ruled them for his fake; as appears by the flood, by the paffage of the Ifraelites thro' the red-fea, and the river of Jordan; by the standing still of the fun and moon at JoShua's command; by the inefficacy of the burning fiery furnace on Daniel's three companions; and, in fhort, by the ftupendous eclipse of the fun at the crucifixion of the Meffias.

And we shall the lefs fcruple to admit that such vaft bodies as the fun and moon may tend to serve mankind, if we confider, 'tis far from being a conftant rule, that a thing more excellent cannot be employ'd for the good of a lefs excellent. Thus an angel was fent to relieve Hagar in the wilderness; another had regard to the life of a prophet's afs; and many more were employed on earth, in doing good offices to particular perfons: and, of all the angels in general, the epiftle to the Hebrews informs us, that they are miniftring fpirits, fent forth to minifter unto them who "fhall be heirs of falvation."

PHYSICS.

How inanimate

bodies may alt for ends, wherewith they are unacquainted.

SECT. III.

Reparatory to the difcuffion of the third question,

"Whether, and in

"what fenfe, the acting for ends may be afcribed to an unintelligent, "and inanimate body?" it will be neceffary to clear the grand difficulty that has before, and ever fince the time of Aristotle, perplexed those who allow the confideration of final caufes in natural philofophy. This difficulty is obvious enough; for much the greater part of bodies being fenfelefs, and, most of them, lifeless too; it seems inconceivable how they should conftantly act for ends they are not capable of pre-defigning, and, appofitely employ means they have no knowledge to make choice of.

Ariftotle, who exprefly teaches, that nature does nothing in vain; and, rightly judg'd, that the actions of natural agents had a tendency to certain ends; takes no notice of this difficulty, but feems rather to fhift it off than refolve it.

But, to confider the difficulty itself, there are two accounts on which the actions of natural agents may be faid to tend to a certain end; as, either when the agent has a knowledge of that end, and acts with an intention to obtain it; or, when the action of the proximate agent is directed as it ought, to obtain an end, which, yet, is neither known, nor intended, by that proximate agent; but by a remoter, that is intelligent. In the former of these fenfes, I cannot admit, that any inanimate body acts for ends; fince that pre-fuppofes the agent both to know the end he is to obtain, and to purpose to obtain it: things whereof inanimate bodies are incapable. And, to fancy with fome, that they may have a knowledge, fui generis, as they fpeak; which, tho' confined to the actions proper to a particular kind of body, fhall yet fuffice to determine them to thofe actions, is, to offend against that rational, and receiv'd rule in philofophy, that Beings are not to be multiply'd, without there appears a neceffity for them; and to introduce a fort of knowledge that feems unintelligible.

It remains, then, that I embrace the fecond fenfe, in which 'twas formerly faid, natural things may work for an end; tho', in this cafe too, we must speak fomewhat improperly for the action may more justJy be attributed to the remote intelligent, than to the immediate agent, which is but, as it were, the inftrument of the other. Now, it appears to me, that the moft wife, and powerful author of nature, whofe piercing fight is able to penetrate the whole univerfe, and furvey all the parts of it at once; did, originally, frame material things into fuch a fyftem, and fettle among them fuch laws of motion, as he judged fuitable to the ends he propofed to himfelf in making the world. And as, by virtue of his vaft and boundless intellect that he, at firft, employ'd; he was able, not only to fee the prefent ftate of things he had made, but to foreknow all the effects that particular bodies, peculiarly qualify'd, and acting according to the laws of motion, by him established, would, in particular circumftances, have on one another; fo, by the fame omnifcient power,

he was able to contrive the whole fabric, and all its parts, in fuch a PHYSICS. manner, that, whilft his general concourfe maintain'd the order established, each part of this great engine fhould, without either intention, or knowledge, as regularly and conftantly act towards the attainment of the refpective ends he defign'd them for, as if themfelves really underftood, and industriously profecuted thofe ends. Thus, in a well-made clock, the fpring, the wheels, the balance, &c. tho' each of them act according to the impulfe it receives, and the determination that is given it by the other parts of the engine, without knowing what the neighbouring parts, or what themselves perform; yet their tendencies are fo determined, and over-ruled, and their motions fo regulated, by the structure of the machine, that the whole could not proceed more conveniently, nor better perform the office of a clock, if they knew they ought all to confpire, and were defign'd to make the index truly mark the hours. 'Tis not easy, indeed, to conceive, how one agent should, by so fimple an inftrument as local motion, direct fuch a multitude of others, as make up a world, to act with the fame regularity, as if each of them went upon its own particular defign, and yet all confpire to obey the laws of nature. But if we confider, that this great work is afcribed to an omniscient, and almighty agent, it will not appear incredible; especially fince 'tis manifeft, that a multitude of bodies act as we have fuppofed: and that, if we will not afcribe to God the direction, and fuperintendency of the motions that are manifeftly fitted for the attainment of ends, we must afcribe them to nature; which will not leffen, but increase the difficulty. And, upon viewing a great engine, wherein the works of many trades, and a great variety of other motions were perform'd by little puppets, that managed the tools of the feveral artificers; whilft all of them were fet on work by a fingle fpring, which communicated motions, regulated and determined by the particular ftructure of the little ftatues, &c. I could not think it impoffible, that the great creator fhould be able, by the motions and structures of matter, to fet very many partial, and fubordinate, engines a-going. For 'twill not, I hope, be faid, that the multitude of thefe, any thing near furpaffes that of thofe which I faw in the hand of an illiterate tradefman, fo far as the narrow knowledge of that artificer is furpaffed by the boundless understanding of an omniscient artist. And God's wifdom and skill is more difplay'd in making fo many various bodies act according to their particular defignations, while they all confpire to the general ends of the univerfe; than barely in caufing bodies to act, appofitely, for ends to themselves unknown. For, if moving bodies be duly difpofed, and have a fufficient connection, 'tis not difficult to direct a few of them to the attainment of an end proposed by an understanding agent, tho' unknown to the immediate agents: as, anciently, among the Jewish husbandmen, and, at this day, in fome parts of the eaft, the ox, by treading the corn, feparates the grain from the ftraw, as well as the labourer who thrashes it, on purpose to make that feparation; and a

Z 2

horse,