PHYSICS. mention'd, fhould be judged fo near as to be co-incident. Among Latin writers, the acceptations of the word nature are fo many, that I remember, one author reckons up no less than fourteen or fifteen. Hence we see how eafy 'tis for the generality of men, without excepting those who write of natural things, to impofe upon others and themselves, in the use of a word fo apt to be mif-employ'd. Means of avoiding this ambiguity. I have often look'd upon it as an unhappy thing, and prejudicial both to philofophy and phyfic, that the word nature hath been fo frequently, and yet fo unskilfully employ'd, by all forts of men. For the very great ambiguity of this term, and the promifcuous ufe made of it, without fufficiently attending to its different fignifications, render many of the expreffions wherein 'tis employ'd, either unintelligible, improper, or falfe. I, therefore, heartily wish, that philofophers, and other leading men, would, by common confent, introduce fome more fignificant, and less ambiguous terms and expreffions, in the room of the licentious word nature; and the forms of speech that depend on it: or, at least, decline the ufe of it, as much as conveniently they can; and where they think they must employ it, declare in what clear and determinate fenfe they use it. For unless fomewhat of this kind be done, men will very hardly avoid being led into mistakes, both of things, and of one another; whence fuch wranglings about words and names will be ftill kept on foot, as are usually managed with much heat, and little advantage. But 'tis far more difficult than any one, who hath not try'd, would imagine, to difcourfe long of the corporeal works of God, and efpecially of the operations and phenomena attributed to nature, and decline the frequent ufe of that term, or forms of fpeech whereof 'tis a principal part; without frequent, and tedious circumlocutions. But to avoid, as much as poffible, this inconvenience; I fhall hereafter call those who maintain the vulgar notion of nature Naturists: an appellation I rather chufe than that of Naturalifts, because many, even of the learned among them, are not philofophers. This inconvenience might perhaps be a little farther remedied, if, 1. Inftead of the word nature, taken for Natura naturans, we use the term God, which 'tis put to fignify. 2. If, instead of nature, used for that which makes a thing what it is, we employ the word effence; fometimes also we may make use of the word quiddity; which, tho' a barbarous term, is yet frequently employ'd, and well understood in the schools; and tho' very comprehensive, is free from ambiguity. 3. If what is meant by the word nature, taken for what belongs to a living creature at its nativity, or accrues to it by its birth, be expreffed, fometimes, by faying, that an animal is born fo; and, fometimes, by faying, that a thing has been generated fuch; and, fometimes alfo, that 'tis thus or thus qualified by its original temper and constitution. 4. If, instead of the word nature, taken for an internal principle of local motion; we fay, fometimes, that this or that body moves as it were, or feems to move fpontaneously, upwards, downwards, &c. or that it is put into this or that motion, or determined to this or that action, by the PHYSICS. concourse of particular causes. 5. If, instead of nature, used for the established courfe of things corporeal, we fubftitute, what it denotes, the established order, or the fettled course of things. 6. If, inftead of nature, taken for an aggregate of the powers belong. ing to a body, we employ the conftitution, temper, mechanifm, or the complex of the effential properties or qualities; and, fometimes, the condition, the ftructure, or the texture of that body: and, fpeaking of the greater portions of the world, we may use the terms, fabric of the world, fyftem of the universe, &c. 7. If, where men employ the word nature for the universe, or the fyftem of the corporeal works of God; we ufe the word world, or univerfe; and, instead of the phenomena of nature, fubftitute, the pheno mena of the univerfe, or of the world. 8. And, laftly, if, inftead of ufing the word nature, taken for either a goddess, or a kind of fémi-deity; we wholly reject, or very feldom employ it. Some, I know, will have the nature of every thing, to be only the law Whether the that it receives from the creator, and according to which it acts on all oc- nature of a cafions. And, indeed, this opinion, tho' neither clear nor comprehen- law it receives thing be the five, seems capable of a fair conftruction. There is often fome refem- from the creblance between the orderly and regular motions of inanimate bodies, and ator. the actions of agents, that proceed conformably to laws. And I, fometimes, fcruple not to speak of the laws of motion and reft, that God has established among things corporeal, and, now and then, to call them the laws of nature. But, in ftrictness, to fay, that the nature of this or that body, is but the law of God prefcribed to it, is an improper, and figurative expreffion. For this gives us but a very defective idea of nature, fince it omits the general fabric of the world, and the contrivances of particular bodies; which yet, are as neceffary as local motion itself, to the production of particular effects and phenomena: and, to speak properly, a law being but a notional rule of acting according to the declared will of a fuperior, 'tis plain, that nothing but an intellectual Being can be properly capable of receiving and acting by a law. For if it does not understand, it can not know what the will of the legiflator is; have any intention to accomplish it; or act with regard thereto. Now 'tis intelligible, that God fhould, at the beginning, imprefs determinate motions upon the parts of matter, and guide them, as he thought requifite, for the primordial conftitution of things: and that ever fince he fhould, by his ordinary and ge neral concourse, maintain thofe powers, which he gave the parts of matter to tranfmit their motion to one another. But I cannot conceive, how a body, deftitute of understanding and fenfe, truly fo called, can moderate and determine its own motions; efpecially fo, as to make them conformable to laws, that it has no knowledge of. And that inanimate bodies, PHYSICS. bodies, how ftrictly foever called natural, properly act by laws, cannot be proved by their acting fometimes regularly, and, as men think, in order to determinate ends: fince, in artificial things, we fee many motions. very orderly perform'd, and with a manifeft tendency to particular and defign'd ends. Thus, in a watch, the motions of the spring, wheels, and other parts, are so fitted and regulated, that the hand upon the dial-plate moves with great uniformity, and feems to moderate its motion, fo as not to arrive at the points that denote the time of the day, either a minute fooner, or a minute later than it fhould do. And when a man fhoots an arrow at a mark, fo as to hit it; tho' the arrow moves towards the mark, as it would, if it could, and did design to ftrike it; yet none will fay, that this arrow moves by a law, but by an external impulfe. Ariftotle's defi- But, poffibly, the definition of a philofopher may exempt us from the nition of na- perplexities, to which, by the ambiguous expreffions of common writers, ture objcure and unjatisfa- we are expofed. I therefore confidered, with more than ordinary atten Dory. tion, the famous definition of nature, that is left us by Ariftotle; which I shall recite rather in Latin than English, because 'tis very familiarly known, among scholars in that language; and because there is fomewhat in it, that seems difficult to be, without circumlocution, render'd intelligibly in English: Natura (fays he) eft principium & caufa motus & quietis ejus, in quo ineft, primò per fe, & non fecundum accidens. Now as, according to Aristotle, the whole world is but a fyftem of the works of nature; we might well expect, that the definition of a thing, the most important in natural philofophy, fhould be clearly and accurately deliver'd; yet, to me, this celebrated definition feems fo dark, that I receiv'd no affiftance from it, towards framing a clear and fatisfactory notion of nature. For I dare not hope, that what, as to me, is not itself intelligible, fhould make me understand what is to be explained by it. And, confulting fome of Ariftotle's interpreters upon the fense of this definition, I found the more confiderate. of them fo puzzled with it, that their difcourfes about it feem'd to tend, rather to free the definer from tautology and felf-contradiction, than to manifeft the definition itself to be good and inftructive. And indeed, tho' the immoderate veneration they have for their mafter, engages them to make the best they can of his definition, even when they cannot juftify it without ftrain'd interpretations; yet what every one feems to defend in grofs, almost every one of them cenfures in parcels; this man attacking one part of the definition, and that another, with objections fo weighty, that if I had no other arguments to urge against it, I might borrow enow from the commentators on it, to juftify my diflike thereof. Several things are commonly received as belonging to the idea of nature, that are not manifeftly or at all comprehended in this Ariftotelian definition, which never declares whether the principle, or caufe here mentioned, is a substance, or an accident; and if a fubftance, whether corporeal or immaterial nor is it clearly contain'd in this definition, that nature does all things moft wifely, and still acts by the fhortest ways, without ever miffing of her end; and that she watches against a Vacuum, for the wel TH SECT. II. PHYSICS. ture; what? HE best way to difcover the common opinion of nature, is, to con- The receiv'd fider what axioms pafs for current about her, what titles and epi- notion of nathets are unanimously given her by philofophers, other writers, and by the generality of men who have occafion to difcourfe of her, and her actions. Of fuch axioms and epithets, the principal feem to be these. Nature is exceeding wife, and all her works are perform'd with understanding. Nature does nothing in vain. Nature never fails of her purpose. Nature always does what is beft. Nature always acts in the fhortest manner. Nature is neither too lavish, nor too sparing in necessary things. Nature always preferves it felf. Nature cures difeafes. Nature always watches to preferve the univerfe. Nature dreads a Vacuum. From which particulars put together, it appears, that the vulgar notion of nature may be expreffed by fome fuch description as this. Nature is a moft wife being, that acts nothing in vain, never miffes of her ends, but always does what is beft, and that by the most direct way, neither employing any things fuperfluous, nor being wanting in things neceffary; teaching and inclining every one of her works to preserve itfelf: and as, in the human frame, fhe cures diseases; fo, in the world, for the confervation of the universe, she abhors a Vacuum; making particular bodies act contrary to their own inclinations and interests to prevent it. If I were to propose a notion, as lefs unfit than any I have met with, to 4 new notion pass for the principal one of nature; with regard to which, many axioms of nature, general and parand expreffions, relating to that word, may be conveniently understood; ticular,advan I should firft diftinguish between the univerfal, and the particular nature ced. of things. And of univerfal nature, the notion I would offer, fhould be fomething like this. Nature is the aggregate of the bodies that make up the world, in its prefent ftate, confidered as a principle, by virtue whereof they act and fuffer, according to the laws of motion, prefcribed by the author of things. And this makes way for the other fubordinate notion; fince the particular nature of an individual confifts in the general nature, apply'd to a diftinct portion of the univerfe; or, fuppofing that placed as it is, in a world, framed by God, like ours, it must be a convention of the mechanical properties (fuch as magnitude, figure, order, fituation, and local motion) of parts, convenient and fufficient to conftitute of, or entitle to its particular fpecies or denominations, the particular body they make up; the concourfe of all these being confidered as the principle of motion, reft, and changes in that body. The vulgar notion of nature, as it hashad, doubtless, may have an ill effect Ill effects of on religion. The looking upon merely corporeal,and often inanimate things, the vulgar notion of nature as endow'd with life, fenfe, and understanding; and afcribing to nature, VOL. II. and upon religion. PHYSICS. and fome other Beings, things that belong to God alone, have been grand caufes of the polytheifm and idolatry of the Gentiles. The most ancient idolatry, probably, was the worship of the celestial lights, efpecially the fun and moon; as appears both from facred and profane hiftory. The great Hippocrates attempts to account for the origin of the world from his immortal heat, which he esteems as a deity. And Galen himself, who was not unacquainted with Mofes's writings, and with christianity, fancy'd the earth had a certain foul or mind imparted to it by the fuperior bodies. And an inquifitive perfon, who, having liv'd many years in China, and feveral of the neighbouring kingdoms, affured me, that, in a folemn conference he had with fome of the more eminent doctors of the Chinese religion, they frankly profeffed, they believed the heavenly bodies to be truly divine, and deferving to be worshipped, because they imparted to men fuch good things, as light, heat, rain, &c. And this belief, they declared, they thought more rational than that of the Europeans, who worship a deity, whole fhape, colour, and motion, and whose efficacy on fublunary things, were invisible. Many of the ancient philofophers held the world to be animated, and believed, that the mundane foul was not barely a living, but a most intelligent and wife active Being; the Stoics held the world to be an animal; and the notion of the foul of the world, and of nature, seem so near allied, that fome of the old fages appear to have confounded them, and to have made no other univerfal nature, than the foul of the world. However, the great and pernicious errors they were led into, by believing that the universe itself, and many of its nobler parts, befides men, were endowed with life, understanding, and providence; may make us chriftians jealous of admitting fuch a Being, as that which men venerate under the name of nature: fince they afcribe to it as many wonderful powers and prerogatives, as the idolaters did to their adored mundane foul. They, alfo, facrilegioufly abused this Being, as well under the very name of nature, as under that of the foul of the world: fometimes making it the fame with the world, at others the fame with God; and Orpheus has a hymn address'd to nature as a goddess. Aristotle, indeed, and his commentators, do not fo directly idolize nature, as did Orpheus; yet, I doubt, they go further than they can juftify, when they fo freely and often affert many extraordinary things of her, particularly when they call the works of God, the works of nature, and mention him and her together, not as a creator and a creature, but as two coordinate governors. Those who thought the fun endowed, not only with a living foul, but with understanding and a will, muft, if they had duly confider'd, have been much more puzzled, to find food for so vaft a body, and organs in him neceffary to prepare and digeft it, and to perform the other functions that belong to animal nutrition, than the philofophers who maintain'd him to be fire. 'Tis without proof prefumed and afferted, that the celestial bodies are endow'd with understanding and prudence, efpecially fo as to be able to know the particular |