An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: Being an Argument in Favour of the Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind. To which are Added, Some Remarks on the Systems of Hartley and HelvetiusJ. Johnson, 1805 - 263 стор. |
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Сторінка 1
... pursuit of our own interest . The objects in which the mind is in- terested may be either past or present , or future . These last alone can be the ob- jects of rational or voluntary pursuit ; for neither the past , nor present can be ...
... pursuit of our own interest . The objects in which the mind is in- terested may be either past or present , or future . These last alone can be the ob- jects of rational or voluntary pursuit ; for neither the past , nor present can be ...
Сторінка 24
... pursuit of any object is by the supposition incompatible with any such interest as belongs to the ac- tual enjoyment of any good , or to the idea of possession . The real object of any par- ticular volition is always a mere physical ...
... pursuit of any object is by the supposition incompatible with any such interest as belongs to the ac- tual enjoyment of any good , or to the idea of possession . The real object of any par- ticular volition is always a mere physical ...
Сторінка 28
... pursuit , but what is strictly imaginary it is absurd to suppose that it can have a real interest in any such object directly whether relating to ourselves , or others ( this has been I trust sufficiently shewn already ) : neither can ...
... pursuit , but what is strictly imaginary it is absurd to suppose that it can have a real interest in any such object directly whether relating to ourselves , or others ( this has been I trust sufficiently shewn already ) : neither can ...
Сторінка 42
... motives to action do not depend so much on a real interest in the thing which is the object of pursuit as on a general disposition to serve that particular person occasioned by a pre- vious habit of kind offices and by transfer- ring the ...
... motives to action do not depend so much on a real interest in the thing which is the object of pursuit as on a general disposition to serve that particular person occasioned by a pre- vious habit of kind offices and by transfer- ring the ...
Сторінка 66
... pursuit of any object , neither wisdom nor folly , generosity , or selfishness : all would be left to the accidental concur- * See the last note but one . rence of some mechanical impulse with the immediate desire to 66.
... pursuit of any object , neither wisdom nor folly , generosity , or selfishness : all would be left to the accidental concur- * See the last note but one . rence of some mechanical impulse with the immediate desire to 66.
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An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: And Some Remarks on the Systems ... William Hazlitt Перегляд фрагмента - 1969 |
An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: Being an Argument in Favour of ... William Hazlitt Попередній перегляд недоступний - 2014 |
Загальні терміни та фрази
absolute abstract absurd actual affected asso associated ideas association of ideas attachment benevolence brain cause child circumstances communication conceive connection consciousness consequence continued deep foundation desire direct disinterested disposition distinct duce equally evil excite exist faculty fect force foundation future feelings future interest future sensations ginal give gratification habit Hartley Helvetius human mind hypothesis idea of pain iden identity imaginary imagination immediate impelled implies impres impression indifferent individual ject kind manner means mecha ment metaphysical motive to action nature necessary nerally never notion object original ourselves particular past pathy perceived person personal identity pleasures and pains posed present pression previ principle produce pursuit rational reason recollection relation respect self-interest self-love selfish sense sensible shew shewn similar sion sophism sort suppo suppose supposition sympathy tain tendency terest thought tion true turally ture tween uneasiness vidual volition voluntary action welfare whole
Популярні уривки
Сторінка 73 - That which is now a horse, even with a thought The rack dislimns, and makes it indistinct, As water is in water. EROS. It does, my lord. ANT. My good knave Eros, now thy captain is Even such a body.
Сторінка 72 - Sometime, we see a cloud that's dragonish, A vapour, sometime, like a bear, or lion, A tower'd citadel, a pendant rock, A forked mountain, or blue promontory With trees upon 't, that nod unto the world, And mock our eyes with air : thou hast seen these signs ; They are black vesper's pageants.
Сторінка 124 - The first foundation of friendship is not the power of conferring benefits, but the equality with which they are received, and may be returned.
Сторінка 133 - There are moments in the life of a solitary thinker which are to him what the evening of some great victory is to the conqueror and hero — milder triumphs long remembered with truer and deeper delight. And though the shouts of multitudes do not hail his success, though gay trophies, though the sounds of music, the glittering of armour, and the neighing of steeds do not mingle with his joy, yet shall he not want monuments...
Сторінка 224 - ... emanative sphere of our thoughts and feelings ; in other words, of our life. It is different in different persons, and in the same person at different times, as it is always in correspondence with our inward states. In all depressing mental conditions, as, for instance, in melancholy, this nimbus or sombre exhalation is to be removed by dispersive passes, which is one of the most effectual ways of changing the morbid mental condition of a patient, and of...
Сторінка 205 - Quand les deux sensations à comparer sont aperçues, leur impression est faite, chaque objet est senti, les deux sont sentis, mais leur rapport n'est pas senti pour cela.
Сторінка 6 - They are, as it were, most closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together. And the prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of language and want of reflection.
Сторінка 135 - ... shall bitterly regret my own folly and insensibility, I ought, as a rational agent, to be determined now by what I shall then wish I had done, when I shall feel the consequences of my actions most deeply and sensibly. It is this continued consciousness of my own feelings which gives me an immediate interest in whatever ,' relates to my future welfare, and makes me at all times accountable to myself for my own conduct. As, therefore, this consciousness will be renewed in me after death, if I exist...
Сторінка 3 - The imagination, by means of which alone I can anticipate future objects, or be interested in them, must carry me out of myself into the feelings of others by one and the same process by which I am thrown forward as it were into my future being, and interested in it.
Сторінка 204 - Apercevoir, c'est sentir; comparer, c'est juger; juger et sentir ne sont pas la même chose. Par la sensation, les objets s'offrent à moi séparés, isolés, tels qu'ils sont dans la nature; par la comparaison, je les remue, je les transporte pour ainsi dire, je les pose l'un sur l'autre pour prononcer sur leur différence ou sur leur similitude , et généralement sur tous leurs rapports. Selon moi la faculté distinctive de l'être actif ou intelligent est de pouvoir donner un sens à ce mot est.