Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social SciencesCambridge University Press, 30 квіт. 2007 р. This book is an expanded and revised edition of the author's critically acclaimed volume Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. In twenty-six succinct chapters, Jon Elster provides an account of the nature of explanation in the social sciences. He offers an overview of key explanatory mechanisms in the social sciences, relying on hundreds of examples and drawing on a large variety of sources - psychology, behavioral economics, biology, political science, historical writings, philosophy and fiction. Written in accessible and jargon-free language, Elster aims at accuracy and clarity while eschewing formal models. In a provocative conclusion, Elster defends the centrality of qualitative social sciences in a two-front war against soft (literary) and hard (mathematical) forms of obscurantism. |
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Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences Jon Elster Попередній перегляд недоступний - 2007 |
Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences Jon Elster Попередній перегляд недоступний - 2015 |
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alcohol altruistic argued argument assume backward induction bargaining behavior belief formation benefits better BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE bicameralism Cambridge University Press cardinal utility causal cause Chapter choice choose cited claim consequences consider constitution cooperation cost decision desire discussed disulfiram drinking economic effect emotions equilibrium event example expected experiment explanandum explanation fact favor fear Figure folk psychology French game theory hyperbolic discounting idea individuals induce instance intentional interaction interest investor irrational Kitty Genovese later less loss aversion magical thinking mechanism motivated mutation natural selection observed occur offer one’s oneself opportunity optimal option outcome party payoff percent person player pluralistic ignorance political precommitment predict preferences present value Prisoner's Dilemma probability proposal proverb punishment rational agent rational-choice reason reward risk rumors sense situation social norms social sciences strategy subjects suicide Suppose tendency theory Tocqueville triggered trust Ultimatum Game utility violate voting wishful thinking workers