good man must always seek to do that which, in the broadest sense of the phrase, is 'best under the circumstances.' An Ethics that is empirically normative cannot but regard this as the only intelligible 'best.' The general subjective necessity 'this is what I ought to do,' though prior in the logic of Ethics, that is, prior for us as beings who have to build on the 'fact' of our moral freedom, can have neither meaning nor function apart from the general objective ratification 'this is what I can do.' To forecast which latter condition as rightly as may be possible constitutes an important branch of the work of such an evolutionism as concerns itself with the comparative history of man's attempts to adapt himself to his environment. $39. Meanwhile the present essay does not profess to be a methodology of Ethics, but at most to serve in some sort as an introduction thereto. It will suffice, therefore, if we indicate quite broadly how Validity and Origin, intuitionism and evolutionism, as distinct principles and methods operating in conjunction, are to import logical system into Ethics in the highest attainable degree. This, then, at least is plain-that Ethics cannot be organised on the model of a despot's court, the 'ought' sitting enthroned upon a dais, whilst below and respectfully remote stands this and that attendant 'can.' An Ethics that bases itself on experience-as we understand experience—cannot afford to show the slightest sympathy with the dualistic view that disjoins the a priori from the a posteriori. On the contrary, it must seek to explain and justify the experience of the normal moral subject, who does somehow manage to combine the affirmation of an architectonic end with a due consideration for practicable ways and means. Thus the general body of ethical doctrine must present as free and full as possible a commingling of what we have for the sake of clearness distinguished as the 'subjective' and 'objective' elements or determinants. If 'ought' and 'can' are not to be made to join hands and work together for a common object there is an end of Ethics. But Ethics is, and will not be ended, so long as there are thinkers who are content to try to make the best of what they have got, and to observe experience from within instead of raising futile questions as to what it would look like could one get outside. Now the strength of a science is rightly held to reside in its axiomata media. And so we may say that it is by its power of firmly establishing its secondary principles that the soundness of ethical method is to be tried and tested. How, then, are 'ought' and 'can'-the subjective and objective factors to co-operate to produce such secondary principles? How, for instance, is a catalogue raisonné of particular virtues to be drawn up that shall without inconsistency present them as embodiments of the end and yet likewise as generalised possibilities of conduct? By a compromise, we answer-a compromise based on a clear recognition of their mutual relativeness and dependency; though even so the best of the bargain, in the shape of an appreciable balance of authoritativeness, cannot but fall to 'ought' as against 'can'—to Validity as against Origin. Each left to itself would initiate and pursue a method of its own, Validity an analytic, deductive, and Origin a comparative, inductive, method. But each, unsupported and uncontrolled by the other, is bound, as it seems at least to the empiricist, to stultify itself by onesidedness and extravagance, Validity by engendering mere quixotism, and Origin mere opportunism. Hence, though each may occupy its own sanctum in the ethical laboratory, employing groups of specialists who have no time to interest themselves in the details of one another's work, the true and scientific account of the laws and principles of Ethics must always take the form of a joint report subscribed to by the heads of both departments. Nay, it were obviously best that the minutest specialist on either side, in order to avoid becoming the slavethe ideopath,' so to speak-of his chosen method, should be generally acquainted with the relations of his working assumptions to those of the other branch, that is, with the methodology of Ethics as a whole, and thus be able in a broad way to make the 'professional equation' as he goes. Analytic Ethics prevails over Comparative Ethics simply by reason of its greater affirmativeness both as art and science. And its right to be the more affirmative is grounded on the 'fact' that for the actual moral subject of to-day, both when he is acting, and when in his theoretical mood he asks himself, 'Is this really and truly so for me as a typical moral subject trying to understand himself and his position,' the nature of moral principle is more closely bound up with the subjective, 'intersubjective,' if you will, since typical, but still subjective, than with the objective, element therein contained. In other words, the 'laws' of Ethics ultimately are, in their theoretical no less than in their practical aspect, authoritative pronouncements rather than observed uniformities. Doubtless the conditions which determine the nature of morality as a product are phenomenally of two kinds. There are determinations from within morality itself, and there are determinations from without. But the one kind which consists in the evaluatory selections of a will moved by the intuition of morality as worth realising in itself and for itself (that is, apart from any consequence save itself) appears to Empirical Psychology, in its introspective and historical capacities taken together, to cause more, and to explain more, than the other kind, which is composed of whatever influences control and limit the action of such a will without apparently sharing in its inner guiding purpose. These latter conditions that are ethically 'objective' (in the sense of 'external'-not, of course, in the metaphysical sense of 'determinate,' which may or may not be an adequate expression for Nature as a whole) have doubtless to be reckoned with. The constructive affirmations of any intuitionism are always open to criticism on the score of objective impracticability, when such impracticability is the verdict of a strong induction. But the impracticabilities of morals are on the whole internal rather than physical or physiological. It is chiefly because we do not will, and do not will to will, the seeming Highest strongly enough, not because we otherwise cannot, that—as a matter of 'fact-our characters and conduct are found morally wanting. Broadly speaking in regard to the very general policies of action represented by the particular virtues, we can, and mostly do, realise them all in some degree. Ethically, however, the important question we have to ask ourselves is: How can we do so in the highest degree-that is, so as to give each virtue that place in the system of our life which its relative value warrants? Thus I can practice nationalism and I can practice humanitarianism. Probably the 'best under the circumstances' permits of both. But which for the general purposes of my moral self-realisation is to count for more? When all has been Isaid on both sides, it is to Validity rather than to Origin -to intuitionism rather than to evolutionary utilitarianism -that the good man will go for the 'rational' solution. § 40. We have sought to keep true to empiricism. If our conclusions favour a reflective and critical intuitionism, at least they are conclusions that profess to be founded on simple matter of 'fact.' The ground on which we take our stand is wholly psychological. We allege no more than a psychological, and hence phenomenological, 'ought.' The real 'ought' is for your Will. We (at a certain personal risk of our own-for example, the risk of being thought illogical or foolish) have selected a certain view of moral experience because it seems to be for man (as we seem to know him both in ourselves and otherwise) supremely worthy of attention at the 'level' of Ethics. You must attend to it at your own personal risk. If, by attending to it rather than to anything else in pari materia, you reach a Better (which is not necessarily a physical or biological Better, for all that it turns out to be not incompatible with physical and biological conditions!), then what the pair of us believe is true true, at any rate, until something even truer emerges from the 'visible darkness' that is both in us and about us. VI ART AND PERSONALITY1 By HENRY STURT I. SCOPE AND METHOD 1. Art is a characteristic function of personality. 2. Artistic consciousness should be studied in its creative rather than its receptive form, 3. and in artists that are familiar rather than those that are remote. II. THE SOLIDARITY OF THE HIGHER LIFE 4. An artist's most important quality is enthusiasm, 5. which must be directed upon objects external to himself; 6. these being men, or things with human qualities. 7. The personal element is traceable even in (a) architecture, 8. (6) nature-painting, 9. and (c) music. 10. Though art implies emotion, it is not to be defined as the expression of emotion, either self-regarding, II. or reflective. 12. Though art has to do with pleasure, it is not to be defined as a form of pleasure-seeking, either coarse or refined. 13. Art is not self-reduplication, though it is self-expression. 14. Unselfish appreciation of persons is the mainspring of knowledge and morality also, though both are specifically distinct from art; 15. it unifies our higher life both on its subjective and its objective side; and is a strong vital experience. III. THE SEPARATENESS OF ART 16. Art is separate from morality and knowledge formally 17. and materially, (a) as a subjective experience, 18. (b) in regard to the objects for which it is felt, which are persons. 19. The separateness of art is obscured by the transference of artistic terms and forms to what is outside art. 20. Knowledge and morality are in like manner separate. 21. It is not a vicious circle to define art as the appreciation of art in others. 22. The separateness of our higher interests may be transcended. 1 An abridgement of an earlier draft of this essay is printed in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S. vol. i. |