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with respect to matter. It insists on the abso lute and uncontrollable influence of motives upon the human will and conduct. It asserts, that the determinations and actions of every individual flow with unfailing precision and resistless operation, from the circumstances, motives, or states of mind by which they are preceded; and that, in the whole series of his existence, no specific feeling, thought, or act, could have been different from what it really was, these previous circumstances continuing the same. In the consideration of this subject, it is important not to confound necessity with compulsion, as the latter implies that the choice of the mind is effected with reluctance, and in consequence of the exercise of force upon inclination; whereas, whether the conclusion be formed with the full concurrence of the affections, or after a conflicting estimate, which leaves reason completely triumphant over inclination; the mind is equally impelled by some controuling energy, and equally necessitated to the determination it adopts. It is of consequence also to the illustration of the subject, fully to comprehend the meaning of the term motive, which it is to be remembered comprehends both the bias of the mind and the end in view, and includes every thing that moves or influences the mind, and excites it to a choice or determination.

The grand argument in support of philosophical necessity is derived from the relation of cause and effect. If there be any one principle in which mankind, in all their reasonings upon natural objects, have more perfectly concurred than in any other, it is the maxim, that every effect requires a cause, or in other words, that whatever begins to be, demands some antecedent circumstances tending to its production. Of the nature indeed of causation we are completely and profoundly ignorant. But from the invariable connection between certain previous and certain subsequent circum stances in the world of matter, we infer the tendency of the former to accomplish the latter, and the indispensableness of the operation of the first to the existence of the phenomena immediately following, with the same confidence as if a perfect acquaintance with the arcana of nature had unfolded to us its necessity. The association of ideas in our minds arising from the unvarying connection between certain preceding and subsequent appearances around us, becomes at length so fixed, that the observation of the fit excites the undoubting expectation of the last; and where any effects produced

differ from what we have been used to ob serve, and consequently to expect, we instantly presume that the preceding circum stances must proportionally have varied, and without an alteration in these, an alteration in the effect is pronounced impossible. Now, though we predict the acts of moral agents with less certainty, and expect them with more hesitation than mingle in our calcula tions on natural phenomena, this difference is attributable merely to our ignorance of the tempers, characters, and situations of those agents, to the difficulty, and frequently the impossibility, which we experience of exploring the labyrinth of the human heart, and not in the slightest degree to any doubt, that volitions will always be precisely determined by preceding states of mind, and that certain volitions will inevitably be productive of certain acts. As with regard to natural objects, we are led to consider some things the causes of others, concluding them to possess over these others a necessary and causative operation from their invariable conjunction, so particular states of mind being uniformly observed to be connected with particular determinations, are equally regarded as causes of which these determinations are the effects. The generative and irresistible influence of the motive upon the determination is inferred with as much justness and conviction as that of a certain degree of heat on liquifaction, or of cold on congelation; and a change of determination in the mind, while preceding circumstances continued the same, is considered equally impossible as that iron should swim, precisely in the same circumstances in which it previously sunk; or heat congeal exactly in the same circumstances in which it has been uniformly observed to liquify. Thus in the world of mind, as well as matter, no change of event takes place without a correspondent alteration in preceding cir cumstances leading to it and operating upon it. This principle lies at the foundation of all clear reasoning and legitimate conclusion. Its denial would subvert all the forms and degrees of human knowledge. All fair inference, reasonable expectation, and judicious effort, would completely cease. Ig norance and confusion, hesitation and despair, would supersede all wise arrangement, lively hope and heroic enterprize; and the noble fabric of the universe abounding in evidences of the most wise and kind design might have started into being without any intelligent cause or preceding operation. But a position thus leading to conse

quences the most monstrous and absurd, must be totally groundless.

Every change, however minute or stupendous, however connected with unintelligent or moral nature, equally requires and possesses some cause of its existence. The steady resolves and brilliant career of virtue, as necessarily result from preceding circumstances, as the harmonious movements of the solar system; and the irregularities of vice, demand the operation of preceding impulses, equally with the wanderings of a meteor. Let any specific volition or determination be admitted at any time to exist in the mind; whence did it arise? Most certainly not uncaused; unless we are prepared by this reply to destroy all the commonly received opinions and feelings of mankind, and to admit, that though there was a period in which the order and beauty of the universe did not exist, they suddenly broke into being unconnected with any circumstances whatever tending to accomplish so glorious a result. If this volition be stated to originate in a self-determining power acting independently of motive, this self-determining power must be considered as in fact only a preceding volition, and the question therefore instead of being correctly and finally answered, is by this reply merely trifled with and evaded. Indisputably the only proper answer that can be given is, that the particular determination alluded to, necessarily originated in the views and circumstances of the mind immediately previous to its adoption. These views and circumstances resulted from other situations which preceded them, and which were the consequences of others more remote. And thus in retrograde march we travel through a long series of mental feelings and operations, finding each linked indissolubly to that by which it was preceded, and constituting part of an immense chain which soon extends beyond the reach of mortal eye, as much as it defies the control of mortal power.

Another argument for the doctrine of philosophical necessity is drawn from the divine prescience. The foreknowledge of events must inevitably preclude their contingency, for a contingent event is an event that either may or may not happen; but that which may not happen most evidently cannot be foreseen. The distinctions which have been made on this subject by the advocates of liberty, have served to exhibit the perplexity of their authors instead of contributing the slightest support to their

cause. And with respect to the nature of the supreme mind, it is impossible to prove, or reasonably to believe, that the divine knowledge, infinitely superior as it unquestionably is to that of man, can embrace those things which are not the objects of knowledge, and exist so as to involve contradictions. To know that a contingent event will take place, would be to know, that an event which is decidedly and cha. racteristically uncertain, is nevertheless certain, or in other words to know a thing to be what it is not. It is only by the expedient of limiting the divine prescience to events not dependent upon human choice, an expedient which some few have ventured to adopt, that the supporters of philosophical freedom can surmount this inconsistency; and the grossness of contradiction is thus exchanged for the flagrance of indecorum. To the believer in the absolute foreknowledge of God, the argument derived from it in support of the necessity of human actions may be considered as equally convincing with perhaps any argument, upon any subject that can be presented to the human understanding. If events are foreseen, they cannot be contingent. If they are contingent, they cannot be fores seen.

In addition to the arguments above adduced, may be added that arising from the consciousness which every man feels of being influenced by some motive in the performance of every voluntary action. If any person attempt to accomplish an act, of whatever nature, whether of importance or insignificance, without the influence of some motive to decide, he will find himself completely baffled in the enterprize, and in every instance he will be able to assign the circumstances by which he was actually influenced. He will likewise find the spirit of his exertions uniformly proportioned to the animation of his motive. Where the motive is urgent, and arising from the union of inclination and conviction, his efforts will display all the activity of enthusiasm, and all the fortitude of heroism. And in correspondence with the lessening interest of motives, his enterprizes will decline in vigour, till in the lowest instance, to adopt the language of our immortal poet, they are,

"Sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,

And lose the name of action."

The argument from consciousness, in

deed, is applied by the asserters of philosophical liberty with equal confidence in support of their system; and it is insisted, that all men imagine themselves possessed of liberty of choice, and must, therefore, if the opposite doctrine be true, labour under a gross and constant delusion. The fact however unquestionably is, that the convictions of the meanest peasant, when he is enabled perfectly to comprehend the just statement of the subject, will oblige him to decide in favour of necessity. If interrogated whether, instead of going to his daily labour on a particular occasion, he could have continued at home, he will reply, that most certainly he could if he had so pleased, alluding merely to practical liberty or freedom from 'external controul. But when asked whether he could have remained at home with the same inducements of duty and inclination to go abroad; as soon as he fully understands the question, he will answer, that he certainly could not without changing his mind; in other words, that without some alteration in his feelings of inclination and duty, some variation in mature cause or preceding circumstances, whatever term we choose to adopt, he must inevitably have proceeded to his work.

Philosophical necessity is the only theory consistent with moral discipline. An intelligent agent is the proper subject of approbation or censure, of reward or punishment, only so far as he is determined in definite circumstances to definite volitions. If he perform a virtuous action from a pure mo. tive, he is entitled to the approval and praise of all observers, and the remuneration which thus flows to him from general esteem, and also from the consciousness of benevolent dispositions, from the view of successful efforts, and the hope of future final reward, operates to confirm the disposition from which the act proceeded to establish a habit, and fix a character of pure beneficence in the agent, and to excite in beings similarly constituted the adoption of the same means for the attainment of the same satisfaction.

With respect likewise to censure and punishment, these are, with equal propriety, applied to every intelligent being, who, actuated by malignant motives, defames innocence, or oppresses penury, or commits any act tending to the production of mischief and misery. The application of popular blame or reproach, and the pain arising from a sense of impaired estimation, from the apprehension of private ven

geance, or legal conviction, or any of those numberless modes of torture which haunt and convulse the soul of guilt, are obviously calculated to produce a change of character and conduct, to excite first thoughtfulness, and subsequently reforma. tion in the mind of the offender, and to kindle a beacon by which those within observation will be influenced to shun a road which inevitably terminates in suffering and infamy. If any being can be supposed perfectly indifferent and independent with respect to motives, the application of all these moral means is obviously and absolutely superseded. The door is effectually closed to discipline. To attempt to operate on such a being by remonstrance or approval, by the erection of a statue, or the infliction of the torture, would be just as absurd as to thank the genial shower, or lash the tempestuous ocean; to applaud the soil for its fertility, or denounce the earthquake for its ravages.

The doctrine of necessity, moreover, tends to inspire that moral caution which is of the utmost importance towards the formation of habitual virtue. Those who rely on some indefinable self-determining power, by which they presume themselves able to act without a motive, where motives are equal, or in opposition to the strongest mo. tive, may expose themselves to circumstances and situations in which they have before yielded to temptation without inconsistency, though certainly not without dan ger.

The necessitarian is well aware that the same situations will ever produce the same results, that whatever be the firmness of habit, there exist temptations by which the most stable and accomplished virtue may be endangered and impaired. He will therefore sedulously avoid all unnecessary exposure, and will be particularly guarded against circumstances in which his good resolutions have already failed. For though it may be impossible for him, in a second instance, to be in a situation precisely similar to that by which he was overpowered in the first, the recollection and regret of his defeat making unquestionably some variation. This difference will by no means preclude that strong and striking similarity which must sound in his ear the trumpet of alarm, and prevent his again approaching the verge of a gulph into which he has been once miserably precipi tated.

It must further be observed that the doc. trine of the necessity of human actions

tends strongly to excite and cherish the benevolent affections. It represents human agents as merely instrumental to the views and schemes of Deity, under whose hands all intelligent creatures resemble the toys upon the chequered table, directed to his purpose, and impelled by his energy. A consideration this, admirably calculated to substitute compassion for resentment, to check the thirst of vengeance, and the severity of punishment. The propriety indeed and indispensableness of exhibiting to the mind motives or applications of a painful character, are admitted to be more clearly perceivable upon this system than on any other; and in truth are, only upon this system, perceivable at all. Authority must rebuke, law must menace, tribunals must sentence.

The accomplishment of individual refor mation, and the prevention of public corruption, must be attempted by the means best adapted to these objects, and these means, from the constitution of human nature, include a certain portion of physical evil; but this is admitted, on the doctrine of necessity, only as remedial, or preventive of greater evil. Punishment upon this system proceeds not from revenge, but from benevolence. The offender is considered as having been urged to the act of guilt by circumstances controlling his will with the most rigid and irresistible dominion; as impelled not more by voluntary determination than by necessitating motive. He is considered as requiring, indeed, inflictions of a description highly impressive and penal, to enable him to break the bands of vicious habits; but the indispensibleness of these inflictions is perceived with extreme regret, and yielded to with extreme reluctance. The persecutor is even more compassionated than his victim, and the tear of pity accompanies the lash of punishment.

It has been urged, that the doctrine of necessity tends to discourage exertion as useless, and to produce a total stagnation and torpor of the soul, since every thought and act of every individual being determined by necessary influences, and regulated by eternal laws. These can no more be counteracted by him, than he can pluck the moon from her orbit; or comprehend the ocean in a span. Whatever be the pressure of this difficulty, it is by no means peculiar to the doctrine in question, but applies with equal force to all who maintain the pre-science of the Supreme Being,

and who are, in fact, nearly all that do not deny his existence.

Foreknowledge unquestionably includes the certainty of those events which are foreknown, yet the advocates of liberty and prescience by no means regard this absolute certainty as precluding the employment of means. But necessity is merely another word for certainty, and the remonstrances and exhortations, the deliberations and efforts, which are admitted to be usefully instrumental with respect to events decidedly foreknown, must be allowed equally applicable with regard to such as are fixed by the eternal series of necessary causation and production. The events in both cases are equally certain, and, on that account merely, equally inevitable, and equally necessitated. In reality, whatever be the certainty or necessity of future events, the ignorance of man respecting them will always operate upon him as if they were actually uncertain or contingent. The conviction felt by every one that the period and circumstances of his dissolution are perfectly known to God, and consequently unalterable by prayers or efforts, does not diminish his exertions for the preservation of his life; and the farmer cnltivates his ground with equal attention and assiduity, though, he knows, it is clearly fore. seen by God whether the reaper shall gather a crop of grain or mildew. If ends are certain and necessary, so likewise are means. Those who neglect the latter, are precluded from the former. The seed deposited in the ground may not always mature into the golden harvest, but unless the seed be deposited no harvest whatever can appear. The regular application of food and air will not always preserve the human frame in vitality and vigour; but without air and food its strength and life must inevitably perish.

Voluntary action is an essential link in the chain of causes. The whole course of moral nature ascertains its necessity to the accomplishment of various objects of buman wishes, and the man who, possessing ardent desires for any particular object, declines the employment of those efforts without which it must be miraculous or impossible that he should obtain it, must be considered as exhibiting an instance of something worse than absurd reasoning, in proportion as madness is more pitiable than absurdity.

Finally, upon the principles of necessity, God is undoubtedly the author of evil: a

statement which, to the minds of some, may carry the appearance of the most irreverent, and even impious imputation, and excite against the system, which not only thus maintains, but avows it, a repulsion amounting to antipathy. The question, however, relates to truth and not to feeling, and those who pursue the former with that ardent attachment and eager research which it merits, will endeavour to divest themselves as much as possible of prejudice and prepossession, and strive to attain that point of elevation to which the fogs of pas sion never ascend, and at which the mental eye can range at once with clearness and comprehension. Every act and volition of intelligent creatures is the immediate effect of necessitating circumstances, originating in other circumstances equally necessitated, and which, through a long se ries of operation and result, must be considered as depending on that situation into which, independently of their own cousent or control, they were at first introduced by their Creator. Every reflection, deter. mination and deed, therefore, however tainted by vice, or exalted by virtue, must indisputably, upon this statement, flow from the divine appointment and energy. But to those who admit the prescience of the Deity, who do not, in order to support an hypothesis, proceed so far as to divest the Supreme Being of that foreknowledge of events, without which confusion and disappointment must apparently result to the divine mind, from occurrences neither ap pointed nor expected, the difficulty under consideration is precisely the same. All such must admit, that he who sees the end from the beginning, placed all human beings originally in situations, the most minute results of which were fully comprehended and foreknown by him. Notwithstanding his precise comprehension of all the consequences which must flow from their origination in such circumstances, in such circumstances they were actually, placed, and foreseeing that natural and moral evil would be the certain effects of his own voluntary act in man's creation, he must not only have permitted, but designed these effects. The prescience of a mere observer would by no means necessarily imply any intention than the event foreseen should be accomplished, or any thing more indeed than the absolute certainty of the event itself. But the prescience possessed by an agent of all the circumstances that will arise from any particular act, inevita

bly includes in his purpose to accomplish that act, a purpose to produce these circumstances, and renders him as much the author of the inevitable consequences as of the previous act; and if evil therefore were foreknown to be the necessary result of man's formation, the existence of evil, and the formation of man, are equally attributable to the divine appointment.

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But it is time to observe, that when God stated to be the author of evil, it is by no means meant to be understood that he approves of it in itself, that he is pleased with the infliction of pain, and like an omnipotent dæmon delights in scattering darts and firebrands, terror and agony, through a trembling and prostrate universe. The meaning is, that in the system of creation most worthy of the perfections of the Deity, because eventually most conducive to the happiness of his offspring, some portion of natural and moral evil was absolutely unavoidable, and that his object is to combine as much as possible the least evil with the greatest good. In the accomplishment of this sublime object particular beings may be exposed to a very considerable share of suf fering; but this is no imputation upon his justice or benevolence. He possesses a sovereign right over the creatures he has formed, and the utmost demand that can be made by any beings upon his equity is, that in the amount of their existence, misery should not predominate over happiness. But whatever may be the case with certain individuals, there is reason to presume and believe, that with respect to the intelligent and moral creation as a whole, suffering will at length nearly disappear in the grand mass and display of enjoyment. union of wisdom, power, and goodness, which it appears inevitable to ascribe to God, seems to guarantee an issue of his schemes and government, thus honourable to his nature, and thus happy for his offspring. With resignation therefore, and even transport, we may contemplate this glorious Being, sitting at the helm of the universe, managing all affairs, and administering the whole series of events, guiding all to his magnificent purposes, guided himself by consummate knowledge and inex. • haustible kindness, impelling every act, reflection and feeling of his intelligent creation, himself impelled by his own boundless views and eternal benevolence. For the arguments on the other side of the question, viz. the "Liberty of the Will." See WILL, liberty of.

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