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between the most uninformed mind of the human species and the most sagacious of the brutes, than between the brightest ornaments of our race and those whose minds have received the least culture from natural or artificial education. We gain greater exactness by making the capacity of speech the criterion of distinction between man and the brute creation. Many animals are capable of acquainting others of the same, and even of a different species, with the feelings of their minds; but man alone has the power of expressing a train of ideas, and of stating the causes of those feelings.

2. Articulation furnishes the most convenient and extensive method of communication. It would be possible to form a language of signs, and in many instances this is done; but human thought would never have acquired any high degree of accuracy and extent, if there had been no other language. The most perfect language of signs is merely a representative of the language of speech. What are called the natural signs of feeling are very similar to the language of brutes, and not more extensive. To give speech all the energy of thought, the language of tone and gesture must be joined to it; but it will generally be found that those who have words for all their ideas, seldom have recourse to gesticulation, except when the warmth of feeling calls it forth. Where speech is defective in ener gy, it is usually enforced by looks, gestures, and tones: these powerfully appeal to the feelings, because they are considered as an indication that certain feelings exist in the mind of the speaker, and feeling is contagious; but our limits will not allow us to enter into the consideration of this species of language, and we shall confine ourselves to that of speech, at the same time begging our readers to refer to the article VOICE for an account of the mechanism by which speech is effected, and to WRITING, origin of, alphabetical, for the methods which men have adopted for a permanent visible denotement of speech, which latter we wish to be considered as forming one with the present article.

3. Whatever be our opinion respecting the progressive melioration of brutes, if the capacity of language were communicated to them, there can be no hesitation in admitting that there would be a progressive deterioration of the human species, if they were deprived of it. Had not man possessed this, or some other extensive power of communication, that astonishing

system which we call the human mind, would have remained in inactivity, its facul ties torpid, its energies unexcited, and that capacity of progressive improvement which forms so important a part in the mental constitution would have been unknown and given in vain. But in every part of the creation we discern an unity of design which equally proves the wisdom and benevolence of the great First Cause. The means of bringing his powers into activity are bestowed upon man, as well as the powers themselves; and it is a position which will bear a rigorous examination, that the accuracy of human thought, and the extent of human intellect, generally proceed in equal steps with the accuracy and extent of language. When we consider the influence of language upon intellect, it will not appear too much to affirm that, if those whose genius has dazzled the world with its splendour and extent, had been from the first destitute of the power of communication, they would not have risen above the level of the least cultivated of their fellow mortals. "Conceive such a one (to use the ideas of Condillac) bereft of the use of visible signs, how much knowledge would be concealed from him, attainable even by an ordinary capacity. Take away from him the use of speech, the lot of the dumb teaches you in what narrow bounds you enclose him. Finally, deprive him of the use of all kinds of signs, let him not know how to make with propriety any gesture, you would have in him a mere idiot."

4. We are far, however, from believing, with Lord Monboddo, that the human race have actually risen from the very lowest stage-that of mere brutality. His lordship supposes, on the authority of several travellers whom he quotes, (and of whose passion for the marvellous his quotations leave no room to doubt), that there have been nations without laws or any of the arts of civilized life, without even language; and that some of them (to complete their resemblance to the monkey tribe) had actually tails. This, with other opinions which display rather the credulity of the man of system, than the sober and cool judgment of the philosopher, has exposed his lordship to the lively ridicule of Mr. Horne Tooke; and though ridicule is no test of truth, we must admit that this is one of those dogmata which it is below the dignity of reason to refute.

5. We see in language a complicated whole, which we are usually accustomed to

consider as it is, without attempting to ascertain what it has been. We see all regularity and beauty, and we do not often ask ourselves the question, has language always been thus regular and beautiful? When we look back into the earlier periods of human nature, we find that this which now wears so much the appearance of art, was originally the invention of necessity, gradually perfected and brought into a systematic form by causes which have operated generally, but have received modification from the influence of local or temporary circumstances. A complete history of the origin and progress of language, would be a history of the human mind. Our direct evidence is not very extensive, and indeed we are too much obliged to have recourse to hypothesis in tracing the progress of improvement in any department of science. We are unable always to ascertain (as Mr. Stewart observes) how men have actually conducted themselves on particular occasions, and we are then led to inquire in what manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the principle of their nature, and the circumstances of their external situation. In such inquiries the detached facts which the remains of antiquity, or the narrations of travellers, or the actual appearances of language at present, afford us, serve as landmarks for our speculations." In examining the history of mankind, as well as in examining the phenomena of the material world, when we cannot trace the process by which an event has been produced, it is often of importance to be able to show how it may have been produced by natural causes. The steps in the formation of language cannot probably be determined with certainty; yet if we can show from the known principles of human nature, how all its various parts might gradually have arisen, the mind is not only to a certain degree satisfied, but a check is given to that indolent philosophy which refers to a miracle whatever appearances both in the natural and moral worlds it is unable to explain."

6. Diodorus Siculus and Vitruvius supposed, that the first men lived for some time in the woods and caves, like the beasts, uttering only confused and inarticulate sounds; till, associating for mutual assistance, they came by degrees to use articulate sounds, mutually agreed upon, for arbitrary signs or marks of those ideas in the mind of the speaker, which he wanted to communicate to the hearer. By what de

grees they proceeded from inarticulate to articulate sounds, these writers do not attempt to point out, and unless we admit that those articulate sounds were connected with certain feelings, in the same manner as what are called the natural signs, or, that they were easily produced, (which will not be allowed by any who have attended to the structure of the organs of speech) the account we have received from a better informed historian will not lose its ground. Moses leads us to understand that the rudiments of language were given to man by his Maker. Here was the first step, and here it is reasonable to believe the divine communications ceased, and that man was left to complete what he had been taught to begin. Let us then suppose the use of articulation given, and its application in some instances pointed out, in the invention of the names of animals; which, we may observe, is in fact the first step which would probably have been taken, presupposing the use of articulation, if no divine interposition had taken place.

7. Words would originally be simply the signs of things, and further, of individuals. New objects, for which necessity required a name, would receive different names from those already given; but if there were a striking similarity between a new object, and one which had already received a name, the old name would be transferred. One of the principles of association is similarity, and the new impression would recal the idea of a former object which it resembled, and consequently the word with which that object was connected; and thus, what originally was a name for an individual only, would gradually become the name of a multitude. Thus Lee Boo, who had been taught by his fellow voyagers to call a great Newfoundland dog by the name of Sailor, used to call every dog he saw Sailor. There is little or no difficulty attending the appellation and classification of sensible objects: it is an operation simple and easy, if some articulate sounds were known.

8. When several objects had received the same name, it would sometimes be necessary to distinguish them. Our procedure in such cases is to connect with the name of the object the name of a distinguishing quality, or some word of a restrictive force, or to specify some relation which it has with other objects; but this supposes that to be already done, which we must suppose is to be done. Now we must bear in mind that similarity (sensible, ex

ternal similarity) and local connection, are those principles of association which are known to be most active in the minds of the illiterate and uncultivated, and that they must also have been the most active in the minds of all men in the rude states of society. A peculiar colour (which would furnish one criterion of distinction) would, therefore, suggest the idea of some object remarkable for that colour; and the name of this second object, joined with the name which the first had in common with others, would confine this general term to the particular object which it was intended to specify. This is a procedure so simple, that we may expect to find some traces of it still remaining to us; and accordingly, among others, we have the expression, an orange ribbon, which will exemplify what has been said: if we wish to distinguish a ribbon by its colour, we are in this case able, agreeably to the custom of our language, to connect with the word ribbon, the name of an object remarkable for that colour. It must however be observed, when tracing out other examples of this contriv ance, and the application of it to other qualities, that sensible qualities were those, and those only, which would be first noticed and most requisite to be noticed. Local situation, or vicinity to some object, would furnish another ground for distinction; the fountain near the cave, for instance. Now to express this, the procedure would be simple and intelligible if, immediately preceding or following the term denoting fountain, the term denoting cave were added; in like manner as we at present use the expressions, barn-yard, &c. This juxta-position of the signs to signify the contiguity or similarity of the objects which they denote, is natural, and, in a language little extended, sufficiently adequate for all the purposes of common life: but it is obvious that it would allow of great latitude of interpretation; and hence as languages became more copious, contrivances were used to denote the nature of the connection which existed between objects denoted by the signs employed. The chief of these is the employment of preposi tions; and these, in the utset, furnish additional proof that the procedures we have spoken of were in reality those of the early framers of language, see GRAMMAR, § 41, particularly respecting from); but these were contrivances of a later date than those of which we here speak. By degrees it was by some tribes found convenient to

designate those names which were employed in connection with other names to point out some quality or restricting circumstance of the thing signified, by some note that they were so employed. They might without any disadvantage have left the inference to simple juxta-position; but this appears to have been done in few languages after improvements began to take place: and to effect such designation, words (in some cases denoting add, join, &c.) were subjoined to the particularizing names, and they then became adjectives. (See GRAMMAR, $ 22.) The Chinese, however, make no distinction between words when employed as nouns and as adnouns; the same word when placed first being an adjective, and when placed last, a substantive. We do the same in many instances; but a large proportion of our simple adjectives are formed as above, and are never employed as substantives: the Chinese, on the other hand, when a substantive is not to be used adjectively, add a designating syllable to it.

9. As far as respects sensible objects and their connections, all seems very plain: in order to express objects which were not sensible, so as to convey to others the feelings which existed in the mind of the speaker, words were used which had previously been appropriated to objects, to which those objects of the mind's eye appeared to have some resemblance or other connection. This resemblance or connection was frequently forced, and to those whose situation was different would not be at all striking: in other cases it was correct, and the justness of the application is proved by a similar procedure of unconnected inventors. We may derive great light here from the hieroglyphics; for there cannot be a doubt that where the visible sign, which originally represented only a sensible object, was applied to denote some quality discovered by reasoning and observation, that the audible sign or word was applied in like manner. Several instances will be adduced when we come to consider the hieroglyphical mode of communication: at present we shall adduce one or two examples as illustrations of the principles here stated. The term used to denote the mouth would also denote speech; this connected with the word dog, would signify the dog's voice; and this compound the Egyptians employed to signify lamentation, and the sorrow which produced it. In the uncultivated periods of society grief is loud and clamorous; and we need not be

surprised to find the term howl employed to denote the exclamations of pain, and even of sorrow. By a similar, but more obvious procedure, the words dog, field, placed together, denoted hunting. Our readers will be able, even in the present refined period of our language, to trace numerous instances in which the names of intellectual things have been obviously transferred from sensible things; and to those who have attended to the subject it will not appear too much to affirm, that in every instance where a word is not the name of a sensible object, it has acquired its present force by a gradual transition from its primary application to sensible objects. In every known language the transition has been begun; but it is only among the more refined that it has been complete: in our own, we find abundance of instances in almost every intermediate stage of the progress, as well as in its termination.

10. Language would proceed but awkwardly without those wheels which have been gradually made for it; but all which can be thought necessary for communication, are the noun and the verb; and even of the latter the necessity may be justly doubted. We think it next to certain that the whole of what is now (by association) implied or denoted by the verb, beyond what is denoted by the acknowledged noun, was originally mere inference from the juxta position of the verb-noun with another noun. Men fight are names, and are still acknowledged as such; placed together, especially if accompanied by distingnishing tones of voice, it would be naturally inferred that the speaker intended to raise in his hearer's mind that belief which exists in his own; in other words, to direct his hearer to make a connection which circumstances has formed in his own mind. By degrees, at least in some nations, some of those names which were frequently thus employed with the inference of affirmation, became somewhat appropriated to convey this inference, and the inference would then be inade whenever such a word was employed; but in the earliest stages of language, the great body of verbs must have been merely nouns, and in the more simple languages many of those words which are employed as verbs (i. c. conveying the inference of affirmation) are still immediately, recognised as nouns. In the Chinese very few names are appropriated as verbs, but are used indiscriminately, and without any change of form, either as nouns or as verbs: in the Hebrew,

the root (which does not, like every part of the indicative in the Greek and Latin verbs, include a pronoun) is a simple name, and is in many cases used as a noun; and in our own language many names are used either as nouns or as verbs. When we have advanced to the frequent use and gradual appropriation of some names to convey the inference of affirmation, the rest is easy and almost certain. With respect to the simple affirmation, the subject of it would, in the case of the first and second persons, always be a pronoun, and, in the same district, the same pronoun. This, where spoken language made material progress, would gradually coalesce with the verb; and the word so formed would be completely invested with the verbal character, and never be employed but with the inference of affirmation. The same might also be the case respecting the third person, but the coalescence would in this instance be more slowly formed, and in some languages where the coalescence took place in the other persons it did not in this it must however be admitted that in others the contrary is the fact. But we have already enlarged on these points as much as our limits will permit; and we therefore beg our readers to refer to GRAMMAR, § 29, 33, for some additional remarks respecting those changes which the verb has undergone in order to make it more expressive.

10. We do not think it necessary to enter any farther into the subject of the origin of oral language. It can scarcely be doubted by those who have studied the nature of the other parts of speech by means of the light which the researches of Mr. Tooke have afforded, that all have been derived from the noun and the verb: and admitting this, all that is incumbent upon those who profess to show the original causes of language is to present a probable origin of those classes of words. In those procedures which have been here stated, there is nothing which supposes metaphysical research or much observation; and to render any procedure probable, it must wear the marks of simplicity. In the present period of the language, we see the grammarian pointing out the analogies which are found to exist in language, and thence proceeding to the formation of new words upon those analogies: this is art; but the early formers of language, in their inventions followed only the dictates of circumstances, and whatever regularity we may perceive in their inventions, must be

attributed to the similarity of those circumstances. We see the philosopher inventing a new term, agreeably to prevailing analogies, to express some power of the mind, or some emotion which had not received any denomination; but those who originally gave names to mental feelings derived them simply from some analogy, fancied or real, between the internal and an external object; and those names which now suggest to us ideas the most subtle and refined, were originally only the names of objects obvious to the senses. The reasoner when he uses a word whose meaning has not been accurately ascertained, defines the ideas which he intends to attach to it, and uses it accordingly in the early, and even in the more refined periods of language, the ideas connected with words have been the result of casual associations, produced by local circumstances, by the customs of the age, or the appearances of nature in particular situations.

11. In languages in which the coalescence between the verb and its adjuncts has taken place, and also the coalescence between nouns and its connective words, (GRAMMAR, § 19), much greater liberty of inversion is practicable than in those in which such coalescence has not at all occurred, or but incompletely. In other words, where the noun, adnoun, and verb, admit of flexion, there the arrangement depends in many instances more upon the sound than upon the sense; and nearly in all cases may be made subservient to the former. This gives such languages considerable advantage over those which admit of but few changes, so far as respects their modulation; and further the coalescence renders them much more forcible where emphasis on any of the fractional parts is not required. Whenever flexion increases perspicuity, the advantage is decisive and obvious: with respect to modulation, though an object of some consequence, (since we may sometimes find the way to the head and heart by pleasing the ear) yet all cultivated languages will be found to possess sufficient power of pleasing the native ear; and among those who made sound so much 、an object, sense was often sacrificed to it: with respect to force, it may fairly be doubted whether the advantage of greater precision by means of more accurate emphasis, does not counterbalance it. We are willing to admit on the whole, that the advantage is somewhat in favour of those languages in which flexion is extensively

adopted; but we can by no means admit the opinion of those who think it necessary to a perfect language. That language is not the most perfect, which enables us to express one thought in a great variety of ways, but that which enables us to express any thought with precision and perspicuity: and contemptible as our own uninflected language may appear to those who can think nothing good but what accords with the objects of their early taste, we are disposed to believe that in its real powers it rises beyond all the ancient languages, and beyond most of the moderns.

12. Before we leave the subject of oral language, we shall pay some attention to the three following inquiries; whether words were originally imitative; whether they were long; and of what kind of articulations they were composed. The latter of these are of importance in tracing the gradation from hieroghyphical to alphabetical writing. Words, in their present state, are simply arbitrary marks. The sound of some appears to be " an echo of the sense;" but in the greater number of instances in which there is supposed to be this resemblance, very much may be attributed to the fancy of the observer. It is obvious, however, that some words are truly imitative, such e. g. as denote the various sounds of animals. When we carry our inquiries farther back, we are led to suppose that the original words would be formed upon some resemblance, real or supposed, between their sound and the thing signified. What else, at first, could induce men to fix upon one sound rather than another? Sensible objects were the first which obtained names; and of these the number is considerable which either emit some imitable sound, or perform such motions as are generally accompanied with sound. These would probably be denoted by words imitative of the sound, in the same manner as the Otaheitans gave to the gun the appellation of tick-tick-boo, evidently imitating the cocking and report of the gun, and as we give the cuckow its name from its note. With respect to qualities totally unconnected with sound, particularly mental qualities, this principle of imitation is not directly applicable: we immediately see the incongruity of sound and colour, for instance, when we call to mind the idea of the blind man, that a scarlet colour was very much like the sound of a trumpet. Yet there can scarcely be a doubt that fancied resemblances would as much as real ones, direct

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