A common magnifier, of an inch focus, shows that the cornea is marked by a prodigious number of minute decussating lines, giving a kind of granular appearance to the whole convexity; but with a microscope it exhibits a continued surface of convex hexagons. According to Lewenhoek there are 12,544 lenses in each eye of this animal. See Shaw's Zoology, vol. vi. LIBELLUS famosus. A contumely or reproach, published to the defamation of the government, of a magistrate, or of a private person. It is also defined to be a malicious defamation, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs, pictures, &c. tending either to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. Libels, says Blackstone, taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency. This species of defamation is usually termed written scandal, and thereby receives an aggravation, in that it is presumed to have been entered upon with coolness and deliberation; and to continue longer, and propagate wider and further than any other scandal. The important distinction between libels and words spoken, was fully established in the case of Villers v. Mousley, (2 Wils. 403.) viz. that whatever renders a man ridiculous, or lowers him in the esteem and opinion of the world, amounts to a libel; though the same expressions, if spoken, would not have been defamation: as, to call a person, in writing, an itchy old toad, was held in that case to be a libel; although, as words spoken, they would not have been actionable. And on this ground, a young lady of. quality, in the year 1793, recovered 4,000l. damages for reflections upon her chastity, published in a newspaper, although she could have brought no action for the grossest verbal aspersions that could have been nttered against her honour. An action for a libel also differs from an action for words in this particular; that the former may be brought at any time within six years, and any damages will entitle the plaintiff to full costs. To print of any person that he is a swindler, is a libel, and actionable. All libels are made against private men, or magistrates, and public persons; and those against magistrates deserve the greatest punishment: if a libel be made against a private man, it may excite the person libelled, or his friends, to revenge and to break the peace; and if against a magistrate, it is not only a breach of the peace, but a scandal to government, and stirs up sedition. Where a writing inveighs against mankind in general, or against a particular order of men, this is no libel; it must descend to particulars and individuals, to make it a libel. But a general reflection on the government is a libel, though no particular person is reflected on: and the writing against a known law is held to be criminal. Though a private person or magistrate be dead at the time of making the libel, yet it is punishable, as it tends to a breach of the peace. But an indictment for publishing libellous matter reflecting on the memory of a dead person, not alledging that it was done with a design to bring contempt on the family of the deceased, and to stir up the hatred of the King's subjects against them, and to excite his relations to a breach of the peace, cannot be supported; and judgment was in this case accordingly arrested. Scandalous matter, in legal proceedings, by bill, petition, &c. in a court of justice, amounts not to a libel, if the court hath jurisdiction of the cause. But he who delivers a paper full of reflections on any person, in nature of a petition to a committee, to any other persons except the members of parliament who have to do with it, may be punished as the publisher of a libel. And by the better opinion, a person cannot justify the printing any papers which import a crime in another, to instruct counsel, &c. but it will be a libel. 2. The communication of a libel to any one person, is a publication in the eye of the law; therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man, is as much a libel as if it were openly printed; for it equally tends to a breach of the peace. In the making of libels, if one inan dictates, and another writes a libel, both are guilty; for the writing after another shows his approbation of what is contained in the libel; and the first reducing a libel into writing may be said to be the making it, but not the composing. If one repeats, another writes, and a third approves what is written, they are all makers of the libel; because all persons who concur to an unlawful act are guilty. If one writes a copy of a libel and does not deliver it to others, the writing is no publication: but it has been adjudged that the copying of a libel, without authority, is writing a libel, and he that thus writes it is a contriver; and that he who hath a written copy of a known libel, if it is found upon him, this shall be evidence of the publication; but if such libel be not publicly known, then the mere having a copy is not a publication. When any man finds a libel, if it be against a private person, he ought to burn it, or deliver it to a magistrate; and where it concerns a magistrate, he should deliver it presently to a magistrate. The sale of the libel by a servant in a shop, is prima facie evidence of publication, in a prosecution against the master; and is sufficient for conviction, unless contradicted by contrary evidence, shewing that he was not privy, nor in any way assenting to it. It is immaterial, on a criminal prosecution with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or false; because it equally tends to a breach of the peace; and the provocation, not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally; though, doubtless, the falsehood of it may aggravate its guilt and enhance its punish ment. In a civil action, a libel must appear to be false as well as scandalous: for if the charge be true the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to demand for a compensation himself, whatever of fence it may be against the public peace; and, therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit. But in a criminal prosecution, the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public peace, is the whole that the law considers. And, therefore, in such prosecutions, the only points to be enquired into are, first, the making or publishing of a book or writing; and secondly, whether the matter be crimi. nal; and if both these points are against the defendant, the offence against the public is complete, It is not competent to a defendant charged with having published a libel, to prove that a paper, similar to that for the publication of which he is prosecuted, was published on a former occasion by other persons who have never been prosecuted for it. The punishment of libellers for either making, repeating, printing, or publishing the libel is fine, and such corporal punish ment (as imprisonment, pillory, &c.) as the court in its discretion shall inflict; regarding the quantity of the offence, and the quality of the offender. Also if booksellers, Ac, publish or sell libels, though they know not the contents of them, they are punishable. It has been held that writing a seditious libel is not an actual breach of the peace : and that a member of parliament writing such a libel is entitled to his privilege from being arrested for the same. In informations, the libel must be set out correctly, according to the words or the material sense. It has been frequently determined, that in the trial of an indictment for a libel, the only questions for the consideration of the jury are the fact of publishing, and the truth of the inuendoes; that is, the truth of the meaning, and sense of the passages of the libel, as stated and averred in the record; whether the matter be or be not a libel, is a question of law for the consideration of the court. But the statute 32 Geo. III. c. 60, after reciting that "doubts had arisen whether on the trial of an indictment or information for the making or publishing any libel, where an issue or issues are joined between the King and the defendant, on the plea of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the jury, impannelled to try the same, to give their verdict upon the whole matter in issue;" enacts, that "on every such trial, the jury, sworn to try the issue, may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, upon the whole matter put in issue, upon such indictment or information; and shall not be required or directed by the court or judge, before whom the indictment, &c. shall be tried, to find the defendant guilty, merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant, of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment." But it is provided by the said statute, that the court or judge shall, according to their discretion, give their opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue, as in other criminal cases, that the jury may also find a special verdict; and that, in case the jury shall find the defendant guilty, he may move in arrest of judgment, as by law he might have done before the passing of the act. It has, in the case of the King, r. Lord George Gordon; and the King, v. Peltier, been held that a writing tending to defame the Sovereign of a foreign country, is a libel punishable in England. The law was not questioned in the first case; in the second the punishment was not enforced. We think there are many serious arguments against the doctrine, In the case of Gilbert Wakefield, and of Hart and White, recently, although the offences were committed, and the trials had in Westminster and London, the defendants were committed to Dorchester and Gloucester gaols, to render their confinement the more irksome and severe. We have thus briefly endeavoured to select the principal authorities under the law of England, with respect to libels, and we are free to confess that unless juries boldly assert the right of judging according to the general intention and honest view of the writer, rather than upon casual expressions, and the subtle inuendoes of an information, there will be found little actual liberty of the press, excepting what is allow ed by the lenity of an attorney general. For the law is strictly, that any thing which affects the character of an individual, or reflects on the government, is a libel; and with such a restraint we hold the right of free discussion upon a frail tenure. The absolute freedom of the press can, we think, never be fully obtained while truth continues to be a libel; and it is remarkable, that in former times, libels were charged as false, scandalous, and malicious writings; in the time of Lord Coke the doctrine was laid down that the falsehood of a libel was immaterial; and very recently, the word "false," has been omitted in the informations filed by the present Attorney General Sir Vicary Gibbs. We admit that the point how far the press shall be uncontrolled is a nice question in politics, but it should be remembered that the press, that is the right of public complaint, and of exposing public delinquents to public odium, is the peoples' cheapest and best defence, and the oppressors' greatest awe. Were that right uncontrolled, no wicked government could last long; and as the press is open to all, perhaps no just and good government could long continue to be misrepresented before an enlightened and just thinking people. In England, it must be acknowledged that the practical liberty of the press has been greater than in any country in the world, but we attribute this more to the character of the government and the people, than to the law, which if rigidly exercised would be severe. We have, it is true, not had very frequently informations for libels at the suit of government, but we have never known them fail to convict, except in the case of Mr. Reeves, for a libel on the House of Commons, which was prosecuted by the popular party. We shall observe, that the law of libels is plainly derived to us from the imperial constitutions of Rome under the Constantines, not from the laws of republican Rome, and that it came recommended to us from the Star Chamber by Lord Coke. We have not here sufficient space to investigate, as a political question, what ought to be the law of libels; and we must acknowledge, that many objections may occur to admitting truth to be a justification of a writing. when it is aimed at government, and there is great difficulty in verifying charges of misconduct, even when they are confined to particular instances. It is only by long reflection, and an ardent desire for the utmost liberty that is consistent with good government, that we are led to wish that the press should be uncontrolled. Libel, in the spiritual court, the original declaration of any action in the civil law. See statute 2 Edward VI. c. 13. The libel used in ecclesiastical proceed. ings consists of three parts: 1. The major proposition, which shows a just cause of the petition. 2. The narration, or minor proposition. 3. The conclusion, or conclusive petition, which conjoins both propositions, &c.' LIBERTY, in its most general signification, is said to be a power to do as one thinks fit; unless restrained by the law of the land: and it is well observed, that human nature is ever an advocate for this liberty; it being the gift of God to man in his creation. It is upon that account the laws of England in all cases favour liberty. According to Montesquieu, liberty consists principally in not being compelled to do any thing which the law does not require; because we are governed by civil laws, and therefore we are free, living under those laws. The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually sumed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endowed him with the faculty of free will. But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws which the community has thought proper to establish. This species of legal obedience is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty, which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man, who considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontroled power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the same power; and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoy ments of life. Political or civil liberty, therefore, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws, and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public. Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind: but that every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practised by a monarch, by nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny; nay, that even laws themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference without any good end in view, are regulations destructive of liberty; whereas, if any public advantage can arise from observing such precepts, the controul of our private inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduce to preserve our general freedom in others of more importance, by supporting that state of society which alone can So that laws, secure our independence. when prudently framed, are by no means subversive, but rather introductive of liberty; for where there is no law, there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that constitution or form of government, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint. The above definition of the learned commentator is admitted by his last editor to be clear, distinct, and rational, as far as Political liberty is distinguished by Mr. The people of England have a firm reliance that this civil liberty is secured to them under the constitution of the government. First. By the great charter of liberties, which was obtained, sword in hand, from King John; and afterwards with some alterations, confirmed in parliament by King Henry III. his son; which charter contained very few new grants; but as Sir Edward Coke observes, was for the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England. Afterwards by the statute called Confirmatio Cartarum, 25 Edward I, whereby the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law: all judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered to be sent to all the cathedral churches, and read twice year to the people; and sentence of excommunication is directed to be as constantly denounced against all those who by word, deed, or counsel, act contrary thereto, or in any degree infringe it. Next, by a multitude of subsequent corroborating statutes from Edward I. to Henry IV.; of which the following are the most forcible. Statute 25 Edward III. statute 5, c. 4. None shall be taken by petition or suggestion made to the King or his council, unless it be by indictment of lawful people of the neighbourhood, or by process made by writ original at the common law. And none shall be put out of his franchises or freehold, unless he be duly brought to answer, and fore-judged by course of law; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be redressed and holden for none. Statute 42 Edward III. c. 3. No man shall be put to answer without presentment before justices, or matter of record of due process, or writ original, according to the ancient law of the land. And if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be void in law, and held for error. After a long interval these liberties were still further confirmed by the petition of right; which was a parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people, assented to by King Charles I. in the beginning of his reign. This was closely followed by the still more ample concessions made by that unhappy Prince to his parliament; (particularly the dissolution of the Star Chamber, by statute 16 Charles I. c. 10); before the fatal rupture between them; and by the many salutary laws, particularly the Habeas Corpus Act, passed under King Charles II. To these succeeded the Bill of Rights, or declaration delivered by the Lords and Commons to the Prince and Princess of Orange, February 13, 1688; and afterwards enacted in parliament, when they became King and Queen; which, as peculiarly interesting, is here inserted at length. Statute 1 William and Mary, statute 2, c. 2, § 1. Whereas the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, assembled at Westminster, representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did upon the. 13th of February 1688, present unto their Majesties, then Prince and Princess of Orange, a declaration containing that, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, being assembled in a full and free representative of this nation, for the vindicating their ancient rights and liberties; declare, that the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by legal authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal; that the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal; that the commission for erecting the late court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other commissions and courts of like nature, are illegal and pernicious. That levying money for, or to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal; that it is the right of the subjects to petition the King, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning, are illegal; that the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law; that the subjects which are protestants may have arms for their defence, suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law; that election of members of parliament ought to be free; that the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament; that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; that jurors ought to be duly impanuelled and returned, and jurors which pass upon men in trials for high treason, ought to be freeholders; that all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction, are illegal and void; and for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving of the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently; and they do claim, demand, and insist upon all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights and liberties; and that no declarations, judgments, doings, or proceedings, to the prejudice of the people in any of the said premises, ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter into consequence or example; Sect. 6. All and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said declaration are the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom, and so shall be esteemed, allowed, adjudged, and taken to be; and all the particulars aforesaid shall be firmly holden as they are expressed in the said declaration; and all officers shall serve their majesties according to the same in all times to come. Sect. 12. No dispensation by non obstante of any statute shall be allowed, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute; and except in such cases as shall be especially provided for during session of parliament. Sect. 13. No charter granted before the 23d of October, 1689, shall be invalidated by this act, but shall remain of the same force as if this act had never been made. Lastly, these liberties were again asserted at the commencement of the present century, in |
