7. Such a transaction is not void
under section 8 of the act which
declares that no transfer, not au-
thorized by a previous resolution
of the Board of Directors, shall be
made by such a corporation of any
of its effects exceeding in value
$1,000, when it appears that a re-
solution was passed authorizing the
officers to give such security as they
should think proper for those who
should lend their notes, and the
officers did in good faith, without
fraud or collusion, deliver a suitable
amount as such security, and it fur-
ther appears, in reference to the
particular notes transferred, that the
Board also resolved that the officers
proceed in liquidation of the liabili-
ties of the Company therewith...id
8. A transfer by a moneyed corpora-
tion of negotiable notes, as collateral
security to secure a present loan to
be used in due course of business,
is not a transfer with intent to give
a preference to one creditor over
others, within the act forbidding
such transfers by a moneyed corpo-
ration when insolvent. And there-
fore upon that state of facts it is
not error to reject evidence that at
the time of the loan the corporation
was insolvent.
..id
Nelson et al. v. Wellington, ....178
9. Where property of a moneyed
corporation (viz., a note made by
third persons) is wrongfully taken
by one of its officers, and all its
claims against such officer, including
its claim for the taking of such note,
are subsequently settled, and a re-
lease given to such officer on taking
his note for a balance agreed upon;
although the persons acting in be-
half of the Company, in making the
settlement and giving the release
acted without competent authority
to bind it, yet if the Company there-
after, with knowledge of such set-
tlement and of its terms, indorses
absolutely and appropriates to its
own use the note received on such
settlement, it thereby ratifies the
settlement and vests in such officer
title to the note so wrongfully ta-
ken, and he or his vendee can main-
tain an action on it against the ma-
kers. Houghton v. Dodge et al.,.326
3. Where, by the contract with the
carpenters, (in such case,) they had
agreed to construct a suitable gutter
to receive the water falling upon the
roof, and a leader running down to
the basement, where it was to be
connected with a main pipe leading
into the sewer, and the carpenters
had left the leader unfinished over
the Sabbath, not extending within
twelve or fifteen feet of the ground,
and negligently omitted to provide
effectual means of carrying off the
water, in consequence of which,
during a storm, the water flowed
through the leader to the ground,
and thence into the premises of the
plaintiff's next adjoining, and caused
injury to their goods: Held, that
the owner is not liable for the dama-
ges.
.id
4. Held, also, by the Superior Court,
that the neglect of the plumber,
who was to furnish and introduce
the main pipe leading to the sewer,
to introduce it in due season and
before the storm, was no excuse to
the carpenters for not extending the
leader down to the basement, and
did not make the owner liable. But
held, in the Court of Appeals, that
if the neglect to put in the main
pipe caused the accident, it was the
duty of the owner to cause it to be
done, and he is not excused by rea-
son of his having contracted with
the plumber to do it. ...... ..id
5. Proof that a coach driven upon
one of the piers owned by the cor-
poration of the city of New York
at the foot of one of the streets,
breaks through a plank that is de-
cayed, by means of which the plain-
tiff's trunk is thrown into the river,
and its contents damaged, is not
sufficient to sustain an action against
the city for the injury, nor to put
the defendants to proof of reasona-
ble and proper care and diligence
in keeping such pier in repair.
(WOODRUFF, J., dissented.) Garri-
son v. The Mayor, &c., of the City
of New York,
.497
6. In order to establish, even prima
facie, a right of action the plaintiff
must show affirmatively on his part
not only that the plank was decay-
ed, but that the proper officers of
the corporation had notice that it
was decayed, or show that it was
obvious to the eye without any par-
ticular examination. (WOODRUFF, J.,
dissented.)
..id
7. In an action against a Railroad
Company, to recover damages alle-
ged to have been caused by the
negligence of the defendants' driver
in the management of his team in
taking it through a public street
after it had been detached from a
car it had been drawing, a verdict
for the plaintiff will be set aside as
contrary to evidence, where the
testimony is uncontradicted that the
manner in which the team was
managed was such as had been
pursued by this and other similar
Companies for years without acci-
dent, and was considered, by those
engaged in such business, safe and
discreet, especially where it is
proved that the injury was caused
by an unexpected and wanton as-
Bosw.-VOL. V.
94
sault by a third person upon the
team, by which it was frightened
and rendered unmanageable, and
while frightened and unmanageable
ran over the plaintiff. Weldon v.
The Harlem R. R. Company,..576
8. The Company is not responsible
for such act of such third person,
though he may have been at the
time employed by it in some capa-
city, he not being at the time of such
act actually attending to any busi-
ness for which he had been employ-
ed, or acting in any matter in behalf
of the Company...
that a note of a third person for
$500 was contributed by the other
partner, and was credited to him as
so much capital, and that only $200
of it was paid, and that $300 of its
amount should be charged by the
Referee to such other partner, and
it is so charged, the judgment will
not be reversed merely because the
Referee received incompetent evi-
dence tending to prove that it had
been paid in full, as it is clear that
receiving such evidence was not
prejudicial to the defendants. Boyd
v. Foot & Cole,
4. Where, on such an accounting, a
referee erroneously refuses to allow
to the defendants the proper credit
in respect to a particular item, the
judgment will not necessarily be
reversed. If the plaintiff chooses
to stipulate to deduct the whole
amount of the defendants' claim in
respect to such item, the Court will
order the deduction made, and affirm
the judgment as to the residue.. id
5. In an action against a common
carrier to recover the value of a
horse, alleged to have been fatally
injured through the negligence of the
carrier during its transportation by
him, although the evidence in re-
spect to its value be conflicting and
proper to be submitted to the jury,
yet their verdict will be set aside, as
excessive in amount, if the verdict
be for a sum which, in the opinion
of the Court, is clearly much larger
than is warranted by the evidence.
Harris v. Panama Railroad Com-
pany,..
1. The Mayor, Aldermen and Com-
monalty of the city of New York,
since the passage of the act entitled
"An act to make permanent the
grades of the streets and avenues
of the city of New York," passed
March 4, 1852, cannot, even under
the authority of an ordinance passed
by both branches of the Common
Council and approved by the Mayor,
change the grade of any street in
said city, established by law when
said act was passed, south of Sixty-
third street, without becoming liable
to the owner of any lot or building on
the street so altered, for all damages
caused to him, as such owner, by
reason of the making of such change
3. Where, in consequence of the
breaking through a plank in one of
the piers belonging to the city, at
the foot of a street, a coach was
partially overturned, and the plain-
tiff sustained damage, proof that
the plank was decayed is not prima
facie evidence of negligence; the
plaintiff must show that the proper
officers of the corporation had notice
of the defect, or show that it was
obvious to the eye without any par-
ticular examination. (WOODRUFF, J.,
dissented.) Garrison v. The Mayor,
&c., of New York,....
1. Evidence of due diligence in
making presentment to makers of
a note, competency of answers made
to his inquiries to find makers, con-
sidered. Adams v. Leland et al., 411
(Of dissolution of Partnership.)
Holdane et al. v. Butterworth,
Vide NEGLIGENCE, 1, 2, 3, 4.
OFFICERS OF CORPORATIONS.
1. Power to accept accommodation
bills,..
....275
2. Liability of corporation for their
tort,
..293
1. Where a person (B.) is in part-
nership with another (T.), in a
business described as the business
of "The Atlantic Forge Company,"
but in which the correspondence is
conducted and all contracts made
in the name of T., (the name of B.
in no manner appearing in the busi-
ness,) and thereafter the firm is dis-
solved, and a new partnership is
formed by T., the co-partner, and a
third person, under a different name,
to conduct the same business at the
same place, and the partners in
such new firm immediately send a
notice of that fact signed by them,
by post, to all who had dealt with
the old firm, and subsequently a
vendor who had never dealt with
the old firm, makes a sale of goods
on credit, nominally, to such former
co-partner, T., in whose name the
business of the old firm had been
done, and takes a note signed by
the new firm in its true name, he
cannot charge the person, so retir-
ing, as a continuing partner, al-
though he knew by common noto-
riety that the person so retiring
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