and take only the wages, livery, meed, or salary which were accustomed to be given in the places where he oweth to serve, the twentieth year of our reign of England. Provided always that the lords be preferred before others so in their service to be retained; so that, nevertheless, the said lords shall retain no more than necessary for them. And if any man or woman being so required to serve will not do the same, and that be proved, he shall immediately be taken to the next gaol, there to remain under straight keeping, till he find surety

to serve.

If any reaper, mower, other workman or servant, retained in any man's service, do depart from the said service without reasonable cause or license, before the term agreed, he shall have pain of imprisonment; and no one, under the same penalty, shall presume to receive or retain such a one.

No one, moreover, shall pay or promise to pay to anyone more wages than was accustomed; nor shall anyone in any other manner demand or receive them, upon pain of doubling of that which shall have been so paid to him who thereof shall feel himself aggrieved; and if none such shall sue, then the same shall be applied to any one of the people that will sue. And if lords presume in any point to come against this present ordinance, then suit shall be made. against them. And if any one before this present ordinance has covenanted with any so to serve for more wages, he shall not be bound to pay more than was wont; nor, under the same penalty, shall he presume to pay more.

Also, saddlers, skinners, white tawyers, cordwainers, tailors, smiths, carpenters, masons, tilers, shipwrights, carters, and all other artificers and workmen, shall not take for their labor and workmanship above the same that was wont to be paid to such persons the said twentieth year.

Also, that butchers, fishmongers, innkeepers, brewers, bakers, poulterers, and all other sellers of all manner of victuals be bound to sell the same victuals for a reasonable price, having respect to the price that such victuals are sold at in the places adjoining, so that the said sellers shall have moderate gains; and if any sell the said victuals in any other manner, and thereof be convicted, he shall pay the double of the same that he so received to the party injured.

And because that many strong beggars, as long as they may live by begging, do refuse to labor, giving themselves to idleness and vice, and sometimes to theft and other abominations; none upon the said plan of imprisonment shall, under the color of pity or alms, give anything to such, so that thereby they may be compelled to labor for their necessary living.

76. Price-Fixing by Commission1o

BY MARTIN LUTHER

The merchants have a common rule among them, it is their motto and the bottom of all their practices: I shall sell my wares as dear as I can. This I hold to be my right. But it means making room for greed and opening the door and window of hell. What else is this than saying: I will give no heed to my neighbor, if only I may have my profit and greed full; what do I care if it brings my neighbor ten ills at once? So you see how this motto goes so straight and shamelessly against not only Christian love, but against natural law as well. What should there be in merchandising but sin where such a wrong is the motto and rule? By this token merchandising can be nothing else than stealing and plundering others of their own.

For on this ground, when the rogue's eye and the greedy-gut mark that anyone must have their ware, they make their use and gain out of it. They look not at the worth of the ware, nor at the value of their service, nor their risk, but simply at the need and want of their neighbor-not to help him, but to use these for their own advantage, and to put up their ware which they would leave at a low price if it were not for the necessity of their neighbor. And so through their greed the ware must have a price as much higher as the need of the neighbor is greater. Tell me, is not thus the poor man's need sold to him with the ware?

It should not be: I will sell my wares as dear as I can and please, but thus I will sell my wares as dear as I should, or is right and proper. For thy selling should not be a work that is within thy power and will, without all law and limit, as though thou wert a god bounden to no one; but because thy selling is a work that thou performest to thy neighbor it should be restrained within such law and conscience that thou mayest practice it without harm and injury to thy neighbor.

Asketh thou then: Well, how dear shall I sell it, then? How shall I strike what is right and just so that I may not overreach my neighbor? Answer: That is indeed framed in no speech or writing; no one hath yet undertaken to fix the price of every ware. The reason is this: Wares are not all alike; one is brought farther than another, one takes more outlay than another, so that in this manner all is uncertain and must remain so, and nothing can be fixed, as little as one can fix one certain city whence they shall be brought, or a set outlay for all, since it may happen that one and the same ware,

10 Adapted from the address on "Trade and Usury," in The Open Court, XI, 18-20. Translated by W. H. Carruth. Copyright (1524).

from one and the same city and brought on one and the same road, may cost more today than a year ago by reason of the road and the weather being worse, or some other chance that causes more outlay than at another time. But it is just that a merchant should gain so much on his wares that his outlay, his pains, and risk should be made good. Who can serve or work for nothing? This saith the Gospel: "A laborer is worthy of his hire."

But, not to pass over the matter in silence, the best and safest way would be that worldly authority should appoint and ordain in this matter sensible, honest people who might consider all wares and the outlay upon them and set accordingly the meet and limit of their value, so that the merchant might then add his service and get his decent living from it; as indeed in some places the price of wine, fish, bread, and the like is set. But we Germans are too busy with drinking and dancing to give heed to such regulation. Since, therefore, such regulation is not to be hoped for, the next best counsel is that we value the wares as the common market gives and takes, or as the custom of the country is to give and take; for in this as the saw holds good, "Do as others do, and thou'lt do no folly."

77. The Futility of Price-Fixing11

BY JOHN WITHERSPOON

If you make a law that I shall be obliged to sell my grain, my cattle, or any commodity, at a certain price, you not only do what is unjust and impolitic, but with all respect be it said, you speak nonsense; for I do not sell them at all: you take them from me. You are both buyer and seller and I am the sufferer only.

I cannot help observing that laws of this kind have an inherent weakness in themselves; they are not only unjust and unwise, but for the most part impracticable. They are an attempt to apply authority to that which is not its proper object, and to extend it beyond its natural bounds; in both which we shall be sure to fail. The production of commodities must be the effect of industry, inclination, hope, and interest. The first of these is very imperfectly reached by authority, and the other three cannot be reached by it at all. Accordingly we found in this country, and every other society which ever tried such measures found, that they produced an effect directly contrary to what was expected from them. Instead of producing

"Adapted from "An Essay on Money," in The Works of the Rev. John Witherspoon, IV, 224-226. 2d ed. (1802).

moderation and plenty, they uniformly produced dearness and scarcity. It is worth while to observe that some of our legislatures saw so far into the matter as to perceive that they could not regulate the price of commodities, without regulating the price of the industry that produced them. Therefore they regulated the price of day laborers. This, however, though but one species of industry, was found to be wholly out of their power.

There are some instances mentioned at the time when these measures went into vogue, which superficial reasoners supposed to be examples of regulating laws attended with good effects. These were the regulation of the prices of chairs, hackney-coaches, and ticket-porters in cities, public ferries, and some others. But this was quite mistaking the nature of the thing. These instances have not the least connection with laws regulating prices in voluntary commerce. In all these cases the persons who are employed solicit the privilege, obtain a license, and come under voluntary engagements to ask no higher price; so that there is as complete a free contract as in buying and selling in open shops. I am so fully convinced of the truth and justice of the above principles that I think, were it proper at this time, I could show that even in the most enlightened nations of Europe there are still some laws subsisting which work in direct opposition to the intention of the makers. Of this kind in general are the laws against forestalling and regrating. They are now indeed most of them asleep; but so far as they are executed, they have the most powerful tendency to prevent, instead of promoting full and reasonable markets. As an example of our own skill in this branch a law was passed in Pennsylvania in time of the war precisely upon this principle. It ordained that in all imported articles there should be but one step between the importer and consumer, and that therefore none of those who bought from the ship should be allowed to sell again. The makers of it considered that every hand through which a commodity passed must have a profit upon it, which would therefore greatly augment the cost to the consumer at last. But could anything in the world be more absurd? How could a family at one hundred miles distance from the seaboard be supplied with what they wanted? In opposition to this principle it may be safely affirmed that the more merchants the cheaper goods, and that no carriage is so cheap, nor any distribution so equal or so plentiful as that which is made by those who have an interest in it and expect a profit from it.

D. THE FUNCTION OF MIDDLEMEN

78. A Condemnation of Forestallers12

Especially be it commanded on the part of our lord the king, that no forestaller be suffered to dwell in any town,-a man who is openly an oppressor of the poor, and the public enemy of the whole community and country; a man who, seeking his own evil gain, oppressing the poor and deceiving the rich, goes to meet corn, fish, herrings, or other articles for sale as they are being brought by land or water, carries them off, and contrives that they should be sold at a dearer rate. He deceives merchant strangers bringing merchandise by offering to sell their wares for them, and telling them that they might be dearer sold than the merchants expected; and so by craft and subtlety he deceives his town and his country. He that is convict thereof, the first time shall be amerced and lose the things so bought, and that according to the custom and ordinance of the town; he that is convict the second time shall have judgment of the pillory; at the third time he shall be imprisoned and make fine; the fourth time he shall abjure the town. And this judgment shall be given upon all manner of forestallers, and likewise upon those that have given them counsel, help, or favor.

79. If Forestallers Had Their Deserts1

BY GEORGE WASHINGTON

It gives me great pleasure to find that there is likely to be a coalition of the Whigs in your State, and that the Assembly of it are so well disposed to second your endeavors in bringing those murderers of our cause, the monopolizers, forestallers, and engrossers, to condign punishment. It is much to be lamented that each State long ere this has not hunted them down as the pests of society, and the greatest enemies we have to the happiness of America. I would to God, that one of the most atrocious in each State was hung in gibbets upon a gallows five times as high as the one prepared by Haman. No punishment, in my opinion, is too great for the man who can build his greatness upon the country's ruin.

12 Adapted from Statutes of the Realm, I, 202 (about 1269).

13 From a letter to Joseph Reed, dated December 12, 1778, in The Writings of George Washington, VII, 282. Edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford.