the breaks and openings between the rocks through which the best of them passed, were completely filled up, and hundreds of the heavily laden soldiers, who, besides their arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, had to carry several days' provisions in traversing these dreary and inhospitable regions, already failed and dropped down before they came in sight of the enemy. The French were found posted about the Corona, on the most commanding part of the mountain; and here it was intended that they should have been attacked on the 12th January, but the first Austrian division, which under Count Lusignan formed the flanking corps, had been unable to proceed along the upper ridges of the mountain, was forced to seek a more sheltered path, and did not arrive in time to take its proper share in the action. The consequence was, that the other corps delayed the onset: night came on,

and Joubert, learning that a large force was turning his left flank, retired before day-break, and took post at Rivoli. The Austrians followed slowly, they had lost a day, and had to fight their battle a day's march nearer the French reserves; but success was still fairly within their reach.

The position of Rivoli is one of great strength, owing less to the features of the ground than to the circumstance of its being only assailable by infantry, which can alone cross Monte-Baldo, whereas cavalry, infantry, and artillery can all be brought from the south to act in its defence.

The succession of gently elevated hill-terraces which lean on the Adige near Rivoli, and constitute the socalled plateau of that name, are separated from the lofty range of Monte-Baldo by the broad valley of Caprino, which, ascending from the

and artillery. This road ascends the hill or terrace, behind the right of the actual position, at the hamlet of Osteria, above which the French had thrown up redoubts to defend the opening. It was necessary, therefore, that the assailants should carry the hill of St. Mark, drive back the defenders beyond the opening of the road above Österia, and capture the redoubts raised there: gain a half victory, in fact, before they could bring their cavalry and artillery into action. The right of the French rested on the Adige, but the front of their position offered no particular obstacles to attack; the left, following the bend of the hill, was rather thrown back: it had no appui, and could easily be turned by a superior force, the isthmus from the river near Rivoli, to the nearest point on the Lake of Garda, being at least six miles in breadth, and the French position hardly extended three miles from the Adige.

Napoleon was at Bologna when he learned, on the 10th January, that the Austrians were advancing towards Legnano. He immediately hurried into Verona, the central post of his army, where he arrived on the 12th, just after Bayalish had fought a sharp action with Massena's advanced corps. Anxious to discover the movements of the enemy, he sent out a strong reconnoissance under General Clarke, who was, however, defeated with loss, and brought no satisfactory tidings. The reports from Legnano spoke of three strong corps as moving on that point: so far, at least, the assailants had well concealed their object. But Provera had been five days inactive, or only skirmishing, in front of a vigilant and observant foe; and on the evening of the 13th, Augereau reported that the enemy were only making a feint and trying to deceive him. At the same time when this despatch reached Verona, came a letter from General Joubert, saying, that he had been attacked by a large force at the Corona, and obliged to fall back on Rivoli, which he should also evacuate unless he received orders to the contrary. The Austrian plan of operation was now clear, but had to be quickly met, for danger was pressing, and Napoleon was certainly not slow in his measures for counteracting it.

Leaving a garrison in Verona, and directing Augereau to watch the banks of the Adige, he instantly set out for Rivoli, followed by Massena's division, the whole of the cavalry and the reserve under General Rey; in all about 22,000 men.

It was late at night and raining hard when the troops were put in motion, but they were expected to reach the plateau by day-break. Napoleon himself arrived on the ground at two o'clock in the morning, and just in time to prevent Joubert's further retreat. The night had cleared; and from the highest point of the position he saw the whole of the surrounding valleys filled with hostile watchfires. While the French commander was collecting his troops on one side, Alvinzy on the other was giving out the dispositions for next day's battle. The attack was to be made in five columns. The first, under Count Lusignan, was to march completely round the left of the French, and take possession of the hills exactly in rear of Rivoli: the second, third, and fourth divisions were to attack the front of the position, carry the hill of St. Mark, the redoubts above the Osteria, and enable the fifth division, the cavalry and artillery, to ascend from the valley of the Adige, and join in the action: the sixth division was to aid these efforts by opening a fire of artillery on the French from the left, and rather commanding bank of the river. We shall see presently what were the errors of this disposition.

The skirmishing along the front had commenced long before daybreak, and at the first dawn of morning the columns advanced to begin the work of death. The French defended the ground with their usual gallantry, but were gradually forced back at all points, except near Trombalero, where Massena was still holding part of his ground. On the right, the hill and chapel of Saint Mark were carried after a severe struggle: on the left, Lusignan was seen moving round the French position: troops were sent against him, but were defeated, and unable to check his progress. The redoubts above the Osteria were taken by storm, and the road thrown open to the march of the fifth division; while from the left bank of the river the shot of the

the breaks and openings between the rocks through which the best of them passed, were completely filled up, and hundreds of the heavily laden soldiers, who, besides their arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, had to carry several days' provisions in traversing these dreary and inhospitable regions, already failed and dropped down before they came in sight of the enemy. The French were found posted about the Corona, on the most commanding part of the mountain; and here it was intended that they should have been attacked on the 12th January, but the first Austrian division, which under Count Lusignan formed the flanking corps, had been unable to proceed along the upper ridges of the mountain, was forced to seek a more sheltered path, and did not arrive in time to take its proper share in the action. The consequence was, that the other corps delayed the onset: night came on,

and Joubert, learning that a large force was turning his left flank, retired before day-break, and took post at Rivoli. The Austrians followed slowly, they had lost a day, and had to fight their battle a day's march nearer the French reserves; but success was still fairly within their reach.

The position of Rivoli is one of great strength, owing less to the features of the ground than to the circumstance of its being only assailable by infantry, which can alone cross Monte-Baldo, whereas cavalry, infantry, and artillery can all be brought from the south to act in its defence.

The succession of gently elevated hill-terraces which lean on the Adige near Rivoli, and constitute the socalled plateau of that name, are separated from the lofty range of Monte-Baldo by the broad valley of Caprino, which, ascending from the

and artillery. This road ascends the hill or terrace, behind the right of the actual position, at the hamlet of Osteria, above which the French had thrown up redoubts to defend the opening. It was necessary, therefore, that the assailants should carry the hill of St. Mark, drive back the defenders beyond the opening of the road above Österia, and capture the redoubts raised there: gain a half victory, in fact, before they could bring their cavalry and artillery into action. The right of the French rested on the Adige, but the front of their position offered no particular obstacles to attack; the left, following the bend of the hill, was rather thrown back: it had no appui, and could easily be turned by a superior force, the isthmus from the river near Rivoli, to the nearest point on the Lake of Garda, being at least six miles in breadth, and the French position hardly extended three miles from the Adige.

Napoleon was at Bologna when he learned, on the 10th January, that the Austrians were advancing towards Legnano. He immediately hurried into Verona, the central post of his army, where he arrived on the 12th, just after Bayalish had fought a sharp action with Massena's advanced corps. Anxious to discover the movements of the enemy, he sent out a strong reconnoissance under General Clarke, who was, however, defeated with loss, and brought no satisfactory tidings. The reports from Legnano spoke of three strong corps as moving on that point: so far, at least, the assailants had well concealed their object. But Provera had been five days inactive, or only skirmishing, in front of a vigilant and observant foe; and on the evening of the 13th, Augereau reported that the enemy were only making a feint and trying to deceive him. At the same time when this despatch reached Verona, came a letter from General Joubert, saying, that he had been attacked by a large force at the Corona, and obliged to fall back on Rivoli, which he should also evacuate unless he received orders to the contrary. The Austrian plan of operation was now clear, but had to be quickly met, for danger was pressing, and Napoleon was certainly not slow in his measures for counteracting it.

Leaving a garrison in Verona, and directing Augereau to watch the banks of the Adige, he instantly set out for Rivoli, followed by Massena's division, the whole of the cavalry and the reserve under General Rey; in all about 22,000 men.

It was late at night and raining hard when the troops were put in motion, but they were expected to reach the plateau by day-break. Napoleon himself arrived on the ground at two o'clock in the morning, and just in time to prevent Joubert's further retreat. The night had cleared; and from the highest point of the position he saw the whole of the surrounding valleys filled with hostile watchfires. While the French commander was collecting his troops on one side, Alvinzy on the other was giving out the dispositions for next day's battle. The attack was to be made in five columns. The first, under Count Lusignan, was to march completely round the left of the French, and take possession of the hills exactly in rear of Rivoli: the second, third, and fourth divisions were to attack the front of the position, carry the hill of St. Mark, the redoubts above the Osteria, and enable the fifth division, the cavalry and artillery, to ascend from the valley of the Adige, and join in the action: the sixth division was to aid these efforts by opening a fire of artillery on the French from the left, and rather commanding bank of the river. We shall see presently what were the errors of this disposition.

The skirmishing along the front had commenced long before daybreak, and at the first dawn of morning the columns advanced to begin the work of death. The French defended the ground with their usual gallantry, but were gradually forced back at all points, except near Trombalero, where Massena was still holding part of his ground. On the right, the hill and chapel of Saint Mark were carried after a severe struggle: on the left, Lusignan was seen moving round the French position: troops were sent against him, but were defeated, and unable to check his progress. The redoubts above the Osteria were taken by storm, and the road thrown open to the march of the fifth division; while from the left bank of the river the shot of the

that Napoleon was destined by fate to effect some great changes in the world, and the mere diffusion of such an idea among the vulgar tended in some measure to forward its realisation.

As the French had probably lost few men on this occasion, compared to what they had done on others, the glory was of course so much the greater, and was ascribed to the masterly skill supposed to have been displayed by the general in the conduct of the battle. The historians who tell us of this science and ability are, as usual, totally deficient in their proofs of the existence of these brilliant attributes; for on examination we find nothing but the utmost gallantry on the part of the troops, and the readiness of all hands to fight bravely and to stop at no exertion capable of ensuring success; and these mighty elements of military strength are already more than sufficient to account for the victory achieved. On the other hand it may be a question whether there was not a great want of skill displayed in so placing an army, that it was within half an hour of absolute destruction, -a catastrophe from which nothing could have saved the French, had the enemy persevered with ordinary conduct much longer.

The Austrians ascribe their defeat to the imperfect state of organisation in which their army was when hurried hastily into action, as well as to the sufferings and privation the men had undergone in crossing Monte - Baldo. These circumstances may, no doubt, have produced their effect; but stress should be laid on the erroneous ideas the Austrians of that period entertained in regard to organisation. Their soldiers, already depressed by so many defeats, had nothing to fight for; the French, on the contrary, had acquired skill, confidence, and alacrity by success. The Republican army, drawn by conscription, contained in its ranks thousands of the best men that France could furnish; and many of these still believed that they fought for freedom and national independence, while the worthless-and all armies contain such characters-knew from experience that they were fighting for spoil and plunder. Alvinzy's dispositions seem also to have been

faulty in the extreme. The fifth and sixth divisions, consisting of 10,000 men, could only come into action after the battle should have been half gained, but could not help to achieve this success; and as chance happened, never took any share in the combat. The next error was the great circuitous round made by the first division, for the purpose of taking the French in reverse, by which 4500 men were prevented from joining the onset; though, as the case stood, a mere flank movement striking in with the front attack of the other divisions would here have answered just as well. Alvinzy might easily have made his first attack with 24,000 men, in which case he would have been superior to the French, and would probably have gained the battle: as it was, he only brought 14,000, exactly half his army, into action; and had not only to contend against superior numbers, but also against cavalry and artillery, of which he was totally deficient. His overthrow need not surprise us; the wonder only is, that he was not overthrown at a much earlier period of the combat.

The 14th of January proved fatal to Austria on more points than one; for Marshal Provera having lingered during six days on the left bank of the Adige, forced the passage of the river at Anghieri, between Verona and Legnano, on that unhappy day, and commenced his march towards Mantua at the very time when the real fate of the fortress was about to be decided in the fields of Rivoli. Bravely and ably as the passage of the river was effected in the face of an opposing enemy, evil fortune at least attended every other step of the enterprise. One rearguard remained on the left bank of the river, certain to be separated from the main corps; another, composed of 1500 men, was cut off near Anghieri, and forced to surrender. Provera, with about 6000 men, arrived opposite Mantua on the evening of the 15th, and immediately proceeded to attack the suburb of St. George, situated at the head of one of the causeways leading across the lake. The post having been for six months in possession of the French, was strongly fortified, and easily resisted. Marshal Wurmser though apprised