This provision was originally adopted in an act of March 3, 1825, and now appears as the concluding section of chapter 3 in title 70 of the Revised Statutes. The general title is. "Crimes." Chapter 3 is entitled, "Crimes Arising within the Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States," and its provisions are clearly confined to offenses committed (1) "within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States"; or (2) upon the high seas or in the waters "within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state." Sec. 5339. The section involved here relates to the first-mentioned class, and it is manifest, both from its terms and its context, that it intends cognizance only of crimes committed in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The strictness of construction to be applied in such case is clearly stated in U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336. The sole inquiry, therefore, on this application, is whether the place of the alleged offense has been acquired and appropriated by the United States in the manner and for a purpose which confers exclusive jurisdiction. The objection was urged at the bar, on behalf of the petitioner, that this section is unconstitutional or inoperative, because the definition and punishment of offenses was made wholly dependent upon state enactments then existing, but I deem the provision unexceptionable in that regard. The state laws thus made applicable are in effect adopted by congress for the localities respectively. Ex parte Siebold, 100

U. S. 371, 388.

The question thus presented is important, and merits careful consideration. There are decisions, in various state courts of eminence, which stand in apparent conflict respecting the character and extent of the national jurisdiction over the sites of these national homes, and the determination here is of special difficulty and delicacy by reason, on the one hand, of direct adjudication by the supreme court of Wisconsin (In re O'Connor, 37 Wis. 379) that the state jurisdiction exists over the site in question for the punishment of crimes, notwithstanding the purported cession by the legislature in chapter 275, P. & L. Laws 1867, and, on the other hand, of opinions by the highest courts of Ohio and Virginia, respectively, that the federal jurisdiction over a place vested in the same national corporation for like purpose is exclusive; and by the further fact, mentioned in the opinion filed by the commissioner herein, that jurisdiction has heretofore been exercised in this court over crimes committed on this Wisconsin site, although the question now presented does not appear to have been raised. In the Case of O'Con

nor, Mr. Justice Cole (afterwards chief justice) delivers the unanimous opinion of the supreme court of Wisconsin, which then included Chief Justice Ryan and Associate Justice Lyon, and it was held, in substance, that because the land was not purchased or acquired directly by the United States, but by this corporation, it was not within the provisions of the clause of the federal constitution under which exclusive jurisdiction must arise, and that the

legislative act of 1867, purporting to cede jurisdiction to the United States, was therefore void, as "it is not competent for the legislature to abdicate its jurisdiction over its territory, except when the lands are purchased by the United States for the specific purpose contemplated by the constitution." This decision was delivered in 1875, upon certiorari to the county court of Milwaukee county, in review of proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus to release the petitioner from prosecution in the state court for an assault committed at this national home, all the parties being inmates, and the petitioner showing that he had been tried and punished for the offense by the authorities of the home, pursuant to the rules and discipline there established. The opinion carefully reviews and distinguishes the authorities, and disapproves Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, which is recognized as conflicting. In Clarke v. Milwaukee Co., 53 Wis. 65, 9 N. W. 782, the same tribunal in effect reaffirms the doctrine of the former case.

The Ohio supreme court, in the earlier case of Sinks v. Reese, supra, had the question before it in determining an election contest which involved the legality of votes cast by inmates of the similar national home located in that state, and the conclusion is there pronounced that a legislative consent and cession of jurisdiction to the United States operated to fix "the exclusive jurisdiction of the general government over this institution, its lands, and its inmates," and that "by becoming a resident inmate of the asylum, a person, though up to that time he may have been a citizen and resident of Ohio, ceased to be such," and became "subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of another power," and could not exercise the elective franchise. The fact that the title of the grounds was vested in the corporation, and not directly in the United States, was held immaterial. The only feature of this Ohio act of cession upon which a distinction from the Wisconsin act can be noted, so far as concerns this inquiry, is that the former expressly recites that the lands are to be "acquired by donation or purchase by the managers of the national asylum" for the uses and purposes thereof, while the Wisconsin act mentions only land "acquired or purchased by the United States for the purpose."

In Virginia the supreme court of appeals considered this question of exclusive jurisdiction, in 1886, in the case of Foley v. Shriver, 81 Va. 568, respecting the national home at Hampton, in that state. That was an action of foreign attachment against Shriver, in which the corporation, the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, was sued and served as garnishee upon its indebtedness to the principal defendant. The opinion discusses the effect of the state act of cession to the United States, in connection with the fact that title was in the corporation for the purposes of the act of congress, and thereupon says: "The United States have acquired, under the federal constitution, exclusive jurisdiction over the ceded lands, and they are no longer a part of the state of Virginia, and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts;" that persons residing there are not citizens of the state; and that the suit was

therefore without jurisdiction. But it concludes with a further ruling, which seems unexceptionable and decisive, that the home and its officers are disbursing officers of the United States government, and, as such, cannot be reached by garnishee process. It is noteworthy that the act of cession upon which this opinion is founded is there described as containing, in the preamble, a recital of the purpose of the board of managers of the home to locate a branch within the state, upon which expenditures would only be made when the property was placed under the control of the general government, and in its enacting clause a grant of legislative consent and a cession of "such jurisdiction to the United States over this tract as is within the contemplation of the seventeenth clause of the eighth section of the first article of the constitution."

In the face of these conflicting adjudications the issue must be determined as one of first instance in the federal courts, so far as I am advised. The nature of the subject, involving powers and rights of the United States under the constitution and laws, demands of this court the exercise of an independent judgment. Therefore the Wisconsin decision can have persuasive force only, and is not conclusive, as the petitioner contends.

The constitutional provision under which the claim of exclusive jurisdiction is asserted declares: "Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district" as may become the seat of government, "and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legis lature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful buildings." Article 1, § 8. It is well settled that there must be an actual purchase for the purpose by the United States, and consent by the legislative authority of the state, as conditions precedent to the operation of this provision; that thereupon all jurisdiction is ceded, and passes to the general government, and, aside from an unqualified consent, no declaration or enactment of cession upon the part of the state is requisite or material; that any title of the United States acquired otherwise within a state, however long continued, and for whatever purpose employed, confers only the rights of proprietorship, and is not within the terms of this provision; that, therefore, any exclusion of state interference must depend upon powers and rights arising outside of that provision. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. 995; Railroad Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 5 Sup. Ct. 1005. The rule thus stated, whereby legislative consent operates as a complete cession, is applicable only to objects which are specified in the above provision, and cannot be held to so operate, ipso facto, for objects not expressly included therein. Whether it rests in the discretion of congress to extend the provi sion to objects not specifically enumerated, although for national purposes, upon declaration as "needful buildings," and thereby secure exclusive jurisdiction, is an inquiry not presented by this legislation; and I think it cannot be assumed by way of argument that such power is beyond question. In New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet.

662, 737, the opinion of the supreme court is expressed by Mr. Justice McLean, without dissent, as follows:

"Special provision is made in the constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction." And, in U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 390, the claim was urged that the words "other place" would include a ship of war of the United States lying at anchor in Boston Harbor, and bring it within the statute defining murder committed "within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine or in any other place or district of country under the sole jurisdiction of the United States"; but it was stated by the court, through Chief Justice Marshall, that "the construction seems irresistible that by the words 'other place' was intended another place of a similar character with those previously enumer ated"; that "the context shows the mind of the legislature to have been fixed on territorial objects of a similar character." See, also, The Federalist, No. 43, by Madison.

. But, whatever may be the rule pronounced when that question arises, it appears indisputable that all state jurisdiction is not excluded from every parcel of land purchased by the general government in a state with legislative consent, irrespective of its use; and, therefore, that if the purpose is not one of those distinctly named in this clause of the constitution, the act of congress which provides for the purchase and requires the legislative consent must in some unequivocal terms declare that exclusive jurisdiction is intended and necessary for the proposed use, or at least the purpose stated must be one of which it is manifest that any exercise of co-ordinate or other jurisdiction would be incompatible therewith. The acts of congress which provide for these homes establish a great charity, in recognition of the obligation which the nation owes to the men who came to its service in the time of greatest peril, caring for them when they have become "disqualified for procuring their own support by reason of wounds received or sickness contracted while in the line of their duty." The object, the duty, and the enactments are distinctly of national character. The board of managers are incorporated to make purchases and receive appropriations or donations, to be vested with the title to all lands and property employed, and to manage the institutions as provided in the acts. They constitute, as well described in the opinion in Re O'Connor, supra, an "eleemosynary corporation under the perpetual guardianship of the United States"; and the means for their establishment and support are furnished mainly, although not exclusively, by appropriations from the national treasury. In no sense do these enactments intend works or establishments for the public safety or defense, or for military purposes; nor do they contain any declaration, or suggestion, even, of requirement or need of exclusive legislation over the lands purchased and employed for the homes; nor is there any provision which is incompatible with the operation of the civil and criminal laws of the locality aside from the regulations mentioned. While

the acts of congress establishing national cemeteries have a declara tion (section 4882, Rev. St.) that the sites therefor shall be taken under the constitutional provision above cited, and require that cession of jurisdiction be obtained accordingly, any such reference or requirement is not found in the national home acts. Furthermore, beyond the want of affirmative showing of any congressional intention to secure exclusive jurisdiction, there are provisions which strongly tend to show that it was neither intended nor wanted, viz.: (1) In having the legal title of lands purchased for homes vested in the corporation, instead of in the United States, where it would naturally have been placed if the constitutional requisite were in view,-a feature which was held fatal to the ap: plication of that provision in the O'Connor Case, and which renders its application at least doubtful under the strict interpretation of the Ft. Leavenworth Case, supra. (2) In the congressional enact. ment of January 21, 1871 (16 Stat. 399), which promptly met the effect of the decision in Sinks v. Reese, supra, by restoring state jurisdiction under a provision that the lands of the Ohio branch "are hereby ceded to the state of Ohio and relinquished by the United States." I am therefore of opinion that this clause of the constitution, upon which the Ohio and Virginia decisions mainly rest their view of the state enactments, respectively, is not applicable to this Wisconsin case, and cannot be invoked to exclude the exercise of state jurisdiction over the crime charged against the petitioner, and this position is well fortified by the following authorities: United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet. 662, 737; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. 995; Railroad Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 5 Sup. Ct. 1005; People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225; Crook, Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604.

Another question remains for consideration which has impressed me as presenting the greatest difficulty, namely, how far the act of the Wisconsin legislature (chapter 275, P. & L. Laws 1867) can be regarded as ceding or conferring jurisdiction beyond the terms of the constitutional provision. This act provides "that jurisdiction over the several tracts hereinafter mentioned be and hereby is ceded to the United States of America." It then describes the lands, and refers to such other tracts as may be acquired, and recites that they are "purchased by the United States for the purpose of locating a national asylum," etc. In the O'Connor Case, supra, the supreme court of Wisconsin declares the act void, upon the ground that the lands were acquired by a corporation, and not by the United States as a sovereign power, and holds that "it is not competent for the legislature to abdicate its jurisdiction over its territory, except when the lands are purchased by the United States for the specific purposes contemplated by the constitution." If this proposition is considered as declaring broadly that there must be an actual purchase, as well as a use for one of the purposes specified, before the legislature could make the cession to the general government,-in other words, that it could only