scientific knowledge necessary thereto, may be seen in the works of Mersennus,

what is now called a

By adopting this system, the learner would acquire the relative value of the several notes, at the same time with their names; and, from its correspondence with the marks usually prefixed to each movement of a composition would require no further explanation, than that the upper figure indicates the quantity, and the lower the quality, of the notes contained in a bar, as two primes, two fourths, three seconds, three fourths, three eighths, six eighths, &c. The slight specimen, above exhibited, suffices to show that a reformation of this nature is not less wanted in Italy and France, than in this country; I am, therefore, not without hope that the day may arrive when this suggestion, simple as it is, and humble as its pretensions may justly be deemed, will be universally adopted.

In the mean time, I beg to solicit the ●pinions or animadversions upon this topic of my professional brethren.

Richmond Green, CLEMENT SMITH.
Jan. 21, 1812.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine. SIR,

I

WAS somewhat surprised, when in formed that a Mr. Grenville had, through the medium of your valuable Magazine, claimed any merit in the invention of my patent piano-forte. I certainly, at the time he alludes to, showed him, as well as other professors, my instrument, nor had I at that time one completed with six pedals, though many in hand.

He is quite mistaken in supposing that I could derive any information from what he suggested; nor is he correct in his conclusions about the disadvantage of substituting four instead of six pedals, as I can, whenever he pleases, prove to him.

It was, Sir, from frequent interviews with an honorable gentleman and Dr. Kemp, that I was induced and enabled to perfect my invention. As all the

gine how Mr. G. can give himself credit for what has been so long known. In fact, it is only in the mechanism that mine differs from that described by Dr. Smith; my instrument is a piano-forte, his was a harpsichord; mine has two strings to each note, his had but one; mine bas pedals to correct the false consonances, his had stops which were moved by the hand, and necessarily interrupted the performer on every sudden change of key.

Having said so much for Mr. Grenville's satisfaction, permit me to add, (that your readers may not trust to mere words,) that my instrument may be daily seen and put to the most severe trial of musical accuracy, by those who understand the subject of music; and, for mere performers, I have some of the works of Haydn and Mozart, in which the pedals are marked as they occur; and which I apprehend are the best proof of the simplicity and perfection of my instrument.

D. LOESCHMAN. Newman-street, Oxford-street.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

The English termination er, is the abbreviation of doer, he that does (any action); and the Greek termination ist, one who acts, is the abbreviation of a verb of similar import, Tomois, the deed or act, from rosw; and also ism, denoting abstract property, the act, from the same verb. The real difference of the former does not to me appear, and I think it cannot to any other person; all the nominal difference being this, some ter minations are adopted into our language from the Greek, others from the Latin, French, &c. and others are the genuine offspring of our mother tongue. Thus, in his examples, Philosophy, that is, natural or moral wisdom. English term. Philosopher, one that loves wisdom. Phil. love (one) soph. wisdom, er, he that does a thing. And, philosophism, the act of loving wisdom or philosophy, would hereby be brought to its original and true meaning.

In this manner we may see why we say methodist and methodism, baptist and baptism, deist and deism, in which instances we may notice, that the termination ist, is used to denote the material and active subject, while the termination ism, is used to denote the substantive, considered in its abstract state.

In reference to the term dissenter, we use it to denote the material and active subject; but, when we wish to denote the abstract state, we use the Latin termination ion, (similar in meaning to the above,) the state or act; thus dissention carries its obvious meaning.

Should these prove correct, I may probably send for your approval some remarks on the initials, terminations, and imperfect primitives, incorporated into our tongues. Hanley.

S. SHAW.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

SIR,

THE following sentence in Murray's Grammar is produced as an example of inaccuracy in composition: "He was more beloved, but not so much admired as Cinthio." More, he adds, requires than after it, which is no where to be found in the sentence. He then subjoins, it should be, "He was more beloved than Cinthio, but not so much admired." Now, does not so, in this corrected sentence, require as after it, as much as more requires than? Undoubtedly the latter mode of expression is equally liable to objection as the former. To clear the sentence from all exception, it should be expressed thus: "He was more beloved than Cinthio, but not so much admired as he."

It is to be wished that this author, when he favors the public with a new edition of his Grammar, would take some notice of the word as, in that pronominal sense which it often bears after such, where it supplies the place of who or which; as in the following example: "The lips of talkers will be telling such things, as pertain not unto them; but the words of such as have understanding are weighed in the balance." In the foregoing sentence, as is evidently used twice in a pronominal sense, and is the nominative case to the verbs pertain and have." To give it a place among the pronouns with a short explanation, in order to distinguish it from the conjunction as, would therefore be of great ser vice to tutors, who have much trouble in pointing it out to their pupils, and

who besides are now left without any grammatical rule or authority for its use in this sense. W. SINGLETON.

Hanslope, April 8, 1812.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

SIR,

PHYSIOLOGISTS and Metaphysi

cians appear to have pursued their inquiries in a course contrary to that of geometricians; and hence, doubtless, it is, that their investigations have been so unsatisfactory and useless. Instead of commencing their inquiries with the most simple objects in nature, and ascending by gradual steps to the most complex organizations, just as the geometricians begin with points and lines, and ascend to solids and curves, they rush at once on the study of Man-that being which combines and envelops, in his single person, the subtilties of the whole intellectual creation!

The broad and obvious analogies of

nature, and the links by which the inert is connected with the organized, the organized with the sentient, and the sentient with the reasoning, are, it would seem, too tedious in their details for the sublime geniuses who speculate on the economy of intellect, and on the subtle powers of that aggregate, called the human mind ! When the fancy is enployed in rearing systems, castles in the air, and fairy regions in philosophy, it would indicate a lack of spirit in our metaphysical inquirers, to watch the accretion of stones, to trace the analogous growth of vegetables, and to pursue the chain of being from fixed to locomotive and sentient organizations!

In all states and stages of his existence, Man has been unweariedly curious to ascertain the nature of the organization of his own mind, and there is no object of inquiry apparently so exhausted, yet with a result so unsatisfactory. At length we torn with disgust from every discussion of this nature, and conclude, that nothing can be ascertained in regard to our thinking powers, except to familiarize ourselves with the terms of philoso phers, or the dogmas of theologians. Such conclusions are, however, not just. may never be able to analyze the brain in a crucible, to reduce it to a mathematical calculus, or to view the mechanism of its functions by means of a microscope; yet, if we choose to apply to this inquiry the means indicated by nature, to follow the slow steps of observation and experi ment, and to divest ourselves of precon

We

ceived and unfounded hypotheses, there scems no reason why the science of metaphysics should not be rendered as certain as any of those which are not strictly mathematical. The mistakes which have attended this pursuit have been, the beginning where we ought to leave off; and the attempting to analyze the combined and complicated powers of intellectual man, whose mental machine is composed of a variety of involved powers, instead of making our approaches by means of the analogous but less complicated machinery of the minds of lower animals. Nature has presented us with a succession of organizations in those which simply exist, in those which grow; in those which grow and live, and in those which grow, live, and feel. To ascertain the nature of these several species, or modes of existence, we ought not to begin with the highest order of the highest class, but with the lowest and ascend to the highest.

The method of analysis seems hitherto to have been employed by metaphysicians, without their having the advantage of those tests, which add to the discoveries of the chemists; at the same time that, unlike the chemists, they have sought to decompose the most compounded object of their researches, instead of beginning with the most simple. Reason too is the test that is employed, but its application is often fanciful and arbitrary; it is besiles unlike the tests of chemistry, whose operations are denoted by the unsophisticated laws of nature, and lead to unerring results. I prefer, therefore, the method of Synthesis, and by the aid of observation and reason, to compose a mind beginning at the lowest organization, and adding faculty to faculty, observing and measuring the phenomena at every stage. Unhappily, therefore, it appears, that, if we would acquire wisdom on these subjects, we must obliterate all the past, and begin again from the foundations of nature. It is but too true, that in these inquiries we have, like many gamesters, played too forward a game and lost it; or, like some tradesmen, we have overtraded our capital and become bankrupts! My plan then of studying nature directs a commencement with simple inert matter, its chemical properties, and its mecha nical laws; a subsequent attention to the growth of minerals, arising from those ascertained principles; an investigation of the more combined arrangements of vegetable secretion and growth; and, finally, an examination of the analogous

secretions, sustenance, and growth, of locomotive beings, beginning with those of one perception, and ascending to those of many, through the various degrees of sensitive secretion and power, of perception and reason, till we arrive at that miracle of nature-MAN!

The obstacle at which Metaphysicians have hitherto stumbled, has been the want of a clear and broad analogy by which to connect fixed vegetable with moving sensitive existences. This, however, is made plain by referring to the analogous means by which each is sustained; and then by considering that the source of all the variations in the organization of both, is to be traced to the intention of the Creator, in adapting them to their respective and several spheres of exis

tence.

An animal differs from a vegetable, in the power of moving from place to place. Yet a vegetable would die were it moved-its subsistence depending on the secretions performed by its roots; and animals move about in vigour? True! and Nature has provided accordingly! Animals and vegetables have each their roots in the groundwith this difference,-that animals carry their soil about in the cavity of the stomach, and their roots act within that cavity instead of being fixed in the earth! The difference therefore betwixt vegetables and animals is, that in the former the receptacle of the roots is fixed, and in the latter it is carried about by the animal in the cavity of the stomach!--The roots of animals therefore are the absorbents and lacteals which branch from the stomach; and the stomach itself is filled with appropriate soil by eat ing, from which soil the animal roots extract the pabulum or nutriment, rejecting and ejecting the superfluities!

This is a wonderful but most evident analogy-and hence it appears, that, in certain important and essential particulars, every animal is a moving vegetable !

This is unquestionably true, so far as regards their physical organization, their growth, their sustenance, and many other common particulars; but the universal fitness of things to their purposes does not require that fixed and locomotive beings should have properties in all respects alike. A fixed organization calls for none of the perceptions or senses rendered necessary by change of locality, but is probably similar in its characters to that of an animal asleep. Vegetables therefore are to be considered as organized

existences

existences, differing in certain essentials from stones and minerals; and animals are another species of organization, having a new set of powers accommodated to their spheres of existence !

Nature, or the processes of the omnipotent Creator viewed in his works, may thus be distinctly traced from the elements of bodies which generate their solidity and extension-through vegetables which grow out of those mechanisms, and indicate new varieties of powerto animals which again subsist on those vegetables, and exhibit similar organiza tions, combined with new powers or perceptions, adapted and essential to their motions and well-being.

The animal senses are, in truth, merely a consequence of locomotion, and contrived for that special purpose; and this is evident by considering their uses to the animal, and by observing their various powers as possessed by different animals. Natural History does little more than record those phenomena. We begin with simple perception in the Hydatid and other species; and ascend to species distinguished for the perfection of each sense, finding every gradation of power, as well in the organs themselves as in the faculties of secreting ideas and appropriating experience for future use.

The powers or senses evident in vege tables and trees are, the principle of growth, the power of propagation, and the capacity of appropriating nutriment to their sustenance-all mechanical and insensitive-forming a species of exist ence like that of an animal asleep, whose mechanical functions proceed without consciousness. Its state of existence requires no further powers, and no others are evinced, or are perceptible.

re

which a wise and benevolent Creator might endow it, would be something like the following:

As a moving creature, it would be endowed with the power of VOLITION.

To distinguish other bodies and secure its own identity from destruction, it would be provided with the perception of FEELING, divisible into the peculiar perceptions derived from the organization of the senses.*

As a means of preservation, it would be supplied with the irritation of HUNGER.

That it might satisfy the irritation of hunger, it is provided with an innate capacity of EATING, or appropriating nutriment.

That it may distinguish the qualities of its food, it is provided with a faculty

for TASTING.

That it might distinguish what is noxious without contact, it is endowed with a faculty for SMELLING.

That its experience might not be wasted, and as a further and necessary means of sustaining its existence, it would be provided with MEMORY, analagous.to which is the power of association.

That experience might be applicable to classes of danger or gratification, and not be limited, to particulars, it would be provided with the faculty of ABSTRAC TION.

That abstraction might be useful, it would be provided with the capacity of applying its abstractions by the power of REASONING from ANALOGY, which would include foresight.

That it might multiply its species, it would be endowed with a modification of feeling, exciting the passion of SEXUAL

LOVE.

The same powers exist also in animals, with those additions which are quired by their forms and modes of existence; and this broad and beautiful analogy will further assist inquiries in regard to the mental phenomena of animals, by enabling us to reason, à priori, on the powers, senses, instincts, or capabilities, which ought to be inherent, or to be generated by experience, in locomotive organizations, to enable them to fulfil the purposes of their being, and to qualify them to sustain their moveable existence. It enables us to correct analysis by synthesis, and to ascend from the simple to the complex.

If then we were to suppose the faculty of LOCOMOTION to be conferred on a tre or vegetable, the inherent powers, with

That it may be able to discriminate objects at a distance, it is provided with a faculty for SEEING, or feeling rays of light, and with perceptions of beauty and deformity.

And, that it may be qualified to commu. nicate its experience to its species, by a kind of general or external abstraction, it is provided with the powers of VUICE and GESTURE.

Doubtless many other inherent capabilities, intuitive powers, orinnate faculties, may be assigned to locomotive beings, arising from other secretions,or some of those named may be only negations or variations of others. The perfection of my scheme is less insisted on than its principle; and that perfection must be the result of all the investigations which I have proposed; it forms, in truth, the whole object of metaphysical research.

The ESSENTIAL QUALITIES of locomotive beings of the highest order, appear therefore to consist of,

1. Their physical powers. 2. Their perception of feeling. 3. Their power of volition. 4. Their organs of sense,-and 5. Their intellectual powers. All I insist upon is, the principle that the broad analogy between fixed and loco

motive beings, affords peculiar data by

which to discriminate their appropriate powers; and, these being ascertained and fixed, it then becomes the proper business of metaphysical observation and reasoning to determine the kinds and degrees of inherent powers or instincts bestowed on all species of organised beings. Such is truly the use that ought to be made of this analogy, and it is, I presume, the only means by which we can ever arrive at certain conclusions, and be able, by a separate process, to correct any analysis of the aggregation and subtle amalgamation of various powers in man.

Appearances and experience seem to prove that some animals possess innate powers unknown to us, and the notion deserves investigation. Dogs return to their homes, birds to their nests, and wild animals to their dens, by powers, not easily accounted for by the conceptions of man. Fishes and insects may have powers also, to which we are strangers. On the other hand, man is endowed with an uncommon share of the powers of abstraction, memory, &c. &c. called powers of mind. Every species possesses also the same powers in different degrees, qualifying them for different

states of existence. And, in general, the perfection of the powers is in proportion to the degree of exercise or exertion bestowed on them.

It is as absurd to suppose, or require, that there should be but one or two degrees and varieties of intellect, in the animal creation, as that all animals should be of one shape, colour, or stature. The replenishing of nature requires various habits, with minds formed to correspond with those habits. Man is at the head of this locomotive world—— his senses are as numerous and perfect as those of any animal-his powers of appropriating experience are more acute, his abstractions more forcible, his combinations more various, and his reason more subtle; while revelation tells him that he possesses an immortal soul destined for a more intellectual state of existence; and he may thence be characterized as possessing the peculiar power of contemplating and worshipping his Creator, and of turning his thoughts inward, and examining himself and the world in which he is placed !*

COMMON SENSE.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

SIR,

OTWITHSTANDING so many controversial papers relative to, and in support of, each of the theories of Arches, have some time since appeared in your Magazine, and other periodical publications, yet I have not been able to discover any thing satisfactory or decisive in respect to their comparative merit, or shewing from whence their difference arises, the cause of that difference, or why any should arise at all.

I have lately seen a small tract upon the same subject by a Mr. Gwilt, a London architect, which, although it cou tains many excellent remarks, does not supply this deficiency. Yet, as there is a passage in the introductory part that very pointedly condemus La Hire's Wedge Theory, and extols that of Mr. Emerson beyond all bounds, I shall transcribe it; and, by inquiring into its merits, endeavor to make it instrumental to the above purpose. The passage is as follows: "Such was the state of the progress towards a perfect development of the true theory of arches, when our countryman, Mr. Emerson, in 1743, investigated the nature of a proper extrados for the diffe rent curves. Casting a new light upon

*To be resumed and concluded in our next.