Fundamental Principle of his Philosophy.

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precise limitations of human thought as he. It was hardly possible to demand of him the why of a primary truth without a rebuke. We once, during an evening's discussion with him in his own study, unwittingly asked to know the why of what, in the case, was really the ultimate why. Sir William instantly exclaimed, "Stop! you have got to the end of your tether!"

Looking to the great ends of probation on earth, it is an invaluable discipline to be made to understand that inexplicable truths there are, and that we must accept them on God's authority alone, or cease to think rationally.* The great value of Hamilton's fundamental doctrine will be yet more clearly seen if we contrast with it that of his critic, Mr. Mill. In his treatise on "Liberty," Mr. Mill tells us that we can never be certain that any opinion is false. Philosophers in dealing with the question relating to the test of truth agree to exclude all merely analytical judgments. The conviction of certainty which is involved in an analytical judgment is really determined by the logical law of non-contradiction. It, in fact, amounts to nothing more than the assertion that "a thing is what it is." a thing is what it is." Even Mr. Mill would allow that if 42+2, then 2+2 4. But the question to be determined is-when by the laws of human intelligence we find ourselves compelled to think that 2 + 2 =4, does the reality correspond with our thought? According to Mr. Mill we have no means of answering this question, since it is quite conceivable that another order of intelligent beings may be obliged to judge that 2+2=5. Mr. Mill furnishes no test of certitude for any class of synthetical judgments whatever. Hence if we accept his system there is nothing for us but blank scepticism; for if we speak strictly, the law of noncontradiction is merely a test of logical consistency-it is not a test of truth at all. But we cannot further illustrate.t

*London Quarterly Review, April 1868, p. 55.

† We are aware that the proposition 2 + 2 = 4 is an analytical truth; but as Mr. Mill virtually treats it as a synthetical judgment, it suffices for the purpose of illustration. The distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments is one of great value, especially in discussions relating to the test of truth. The disregard of this distinction by British writers has been the source not merely of confusion but of serious error. The most remarkable illustration may be found in the controversies respecting Cause and Effect. It is a primary and necessary deliverance of the human intelligence, that everything which begins to be must have been produced by the power of some agent or spiritual being. But this fundamental truth is almost universally stated in the form of an analytical judgment. It is hardly possible to open a treatise on natural theology or on philosophy without meeting with such assertions as the following: an effect implies a cause," "every effect must have a cause," &c. All

Candour requires that we call attention to the fact that Hamilton too frequently allowed himself to look at the great problems of philosophy with the eye of the logician rather than with that of the psychologist. His doctrine of the Conditioned affords the most striking illustration of this. As a logician he very properly maintains that, of contradictory attributions, we can only affirm one of a thing; and that if one be explicitly affirmed, the other is implicitly denied. By the laws of identity and contradiction we are warranted to conclude from the truth of one contradictory proposition to the falsehood of the other, and by the law of excluded middle we are warranted to conclude from the falsehood of one contradictory proposition to the truth of the other. But Sir William overlooked the important psychological fact that a negation adds to our notion of an object only when the attribute denied is congruent. Let us take his own illustration. "Space is either limited or it is not limited; we cannot think it is limited, therefore space is unlimited." Now this conclusion, which according to logical laws is perfectly legitimate, may be quite true; but it is a truth absolutely destitute of significance. It adds no element to our cognition of space, since the notion of limitation applies only to body in space, but never to space itself. It was this unaccountable oversight that led Hamilton to what he viewed as an important discovery :-namely, that all positive thought lies between two extremes; which, as mutually contradictory, cannot both be true; but of which, for the same reason, one must be true; while, at the same time, neither of these extremes is, itself, conceivable. It is well known that Sir William held that by means of this principle the great problems of causality, substance, liberty, and necessity may be solved. We are constrained to confess that in this he was mistaken. We have reason to know that he became dissatisfied with the application of the doctrine in question to the problem of causality. The present writer had conversations with him on this very point. Not long before he died, in reply to certain objections which we had urged, he wrote..." but I must confess there are some difficulties in the question in relation to which I do not find your reasonings satisfactory. The same, however, I

such statements are mere truisms, and are conditioned simply upon an analysis of our notion of an effect. To say that an effect implies a cause is nothing more than saying that an effect is an effect. The terms cause and effect are strictly relative, as much so as the terms husband and wife. Those writers who are continually insisting that "every effect implies a cause" would do well to add that "every husband implies a wife !"

Relation of his Philosophy to Theology.

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would say in regard to all the arguments upon the subject with which I am acquainted. My special difficulties I do not, however, at present, feel competent to explain." While we allow that some of the great philosophical problems which occupied Sir William's attention have still to be explained, we yet believe that in his writings may be found a clear statement of the only conditions of their solution.

Hamilton always recognised the connection which exists between philosophy and theology. He did not, like Mr. Mill, suppose that it was possible to hold a given philosophical theory, and at the same time to treat the necessarily related theological doctrines as open questions. Mr. Mill, while professing to leave natural theology untouched, silently undermines its most essential principles. Thus, if we accept his hypothesis regarding the nature of causation, the argument from design can have no validity, and we are left without a single proof that God exists as first cause. Then, too, his theory of philosophical necessity sets aside every argument for the Divine existence based on man's moral nature. If we do not originate and decide our own moral activity-if motives so called are the causes of our volitions, and not simply the conditions of the will's action, it is absurd to talk of obligation and responsibility. It is true that Hamilton's doctrine of causality prevented his perceiving the full significance of the argument from design; hence the stress he laid on the reasoning founded upon the consciousness of moral agency and accountability. "An affirmation of absolute necessity is," says Sir William, "virtually the negation of a moral universe, consequently of the moral governor of a moral universe. But this is Atheism. Fatalism and Atheism are, indeed, convertible terms. The only valid arguments for the existence of a God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature; consequently, if that moral nature be annihilated, which in any scheme of thorough-going necessity it is, every conclusion, established on such a nature, is annihilated likewise." We cannot dwell here, but we venture to affirm that neither Mr. Mill nor Professor Bain can produce an argument for the existence of God as first cause or as moral ruler without virtually renouncing the fundamental principles of their own philosophical systems. It was not possible to be long in Sir William's society without perceiving that to him the unseen world was a grand reality. He had a strong faith in the existence of the supernatural. The intense cravings of his intellectual nature could not be satisfied with such objects as

were related to the soul merely through the organs of sense. Hence he could have had no sympathy with the wild theories respecting "matter and force" now so zealously promulgated by men of science. We often observed in him a tendency to account for certain phenomena of the mental and material universe by reference to the immediate agency of God. In our last interview with Sir William the conversation turned on instinct as distinguished from habit. "What is instinct," he asked, "but a Divine impulse? Can we find a better definition ?" His aspirations were truly Christian. He longed for the conciliation of reason and faith, and felt impelled to do what he could to render philosophy available for the elucidation and defence of revealed truth. To what extent he succeeded we shall not now discuss. We close with the noble words of Dean Mansel :

"In these presumptuous days, when human reason aspires to strip the veil from the hidden things of God, and to proclaim its own speculations as identical with the eternal movements of the Divine Mind determining itself in Creation, where shall we find a philosopher of such eminence and authority, to announce, as the surest ground of belief in the truth of a philosophical system, that its doctrines are in harmony with those of Revelation? . . . If ever the time shall come, when the Philosophy of the Conditioned shall occupy its fitting place as the handmaid and the auxiliary of Christian Truth, voyaging through the seas of thought with the laws of the human mind for its chart, and the Word of God for its polestar, among the fathers and teachers of that philosophy, most consulted and most revered, will stand the name of Sir William Hamilton."

Lecky's History of European Morals.

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ART. II.-History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne. By W. E. H. LECKY, M.A. In Two Volumes. London: Longman and Co.

1869.

WE can with the utmost confidence promise our readers a rich intellectual treat from the study of these volumes. They are characterised by great ability, and they embrace a wide range of religious and philosophic subjects. We consider that they will bear a very favourable comparison with the author's well-known work, The History of Rationalism. The subject is of the deepest interest. Judging from the title, the reader might imagine that the work is confined to questions of the past. He will be agreeably surprised to find that all the chief subjects discussed in this work have a most intimate bearing on the great philosophical and religious questions of the day. We feel ourselves justified in going further than merely praising its intellectual character. It is distinguished by impartiality, honesty, and a fearless carrying out of conclusions to their legitimate consequences. In a work of not less than nine hundred pages, traversing extensive fields of discussion in religion, morality, history, and philosophy, there will arise points of disagreement between the author and ourselves, to which it will be our duty to call the attention of our readers. Still we cannot doubt that the student of this work will be amply repaid by its perusal, and that will arise from it a more enlightened man.

As we have intimated, the title of the work hardly enables the reader to guess what is the real nature of its contents. We must, therefore, endeavour to supply the deficiency. The first chapter, containing one hundred and fifty pages of close reasoning, is a masterly examination and refutation of the Utilitarian and Positivist theories of morality. We are acquainted with no work in which they are stated with greater fairness, or where they have received a more crushing demolition. The second chapter opens with a discussion of the nature and character of the various philosophical systems which were influencing moral and religious thought at the period of the advent of Christianity and the early centuries of its growth, and which either retarded or facilitated the progress of the new Faith. It also contains a most interesting examination of the moral state of the Roman Empire during the same