1842.] Schmucker's Psychology. 4S9 his own unaided resources in the search after intellectual truth. A Bacon or a Descartes, as they actually did, may do it, and the world will admire and follow them; but then it is because they dug deep and brought up to view much unknown truth. "Francis Bacon thought in this manner," is not the prologue for every metaphysical tyro. Nor can all afford to cast away, as Descartes did, the wisdom of all who had gone before him, and build up the temple of philosophy anew with a Cogito, ergo sum." If any such there be in our days, Professor Schmucker, at least, is not, as we think, the man. 66 The truth is, we hold this work to be naught: what in it is true is not novel, and what is novel is not true. Nor is either truth adorned in it or error enlivened by either brilliancy of fancy or acuteness of thought. It is one of those works, in short, on which, as critics, we feel ourselves more peculiarly bound to speak forth fully our judgment, as being on a subject where the public at large are not competent judges. On many subjects readers are as good judges as professed critics, and there is no danger of mistake in the public assigning to the author and his work their fair rank. But in metaphysics it is otherwise, and the public we here hold to be gullible, and very apt to mistake novelty for genius and incomprehensibility for profundity. We protest, therefore, in the name of Plato and Aristotle, and of all American students of them, against all such jejune and superficial teaching as this before us, of the deepest and noblest of human sciences; and, above all, do we raise our voice against the introduction of this volume as a textbook into our learned seminaries. No, let them be taught to think, (for that, after all, is the great value of this reflex science,) and that by the great masters of human thought; let them learn to soar with Plato-to analyse with Aristotle to muse with Wordsworth — or even to transcendentalize with Coleridge; and then will they learn something of their spiritual nature, and how best it may be awakened within them. Such are the masters demanded by the student in this science—“ non cuivis libet." It is not every one that can lead the way in that dark path. Power of introspection, that rarest of all forms of genius, alone stamps the leader, and we know him by feeling that power in its mastery over our minds; we try him as the Jewish prophets did the idols of the land"Yea, let them do good or let them do evil that we may know they are gods." Now, in this judgment of the work before us, may deem us harsh and illiberal - we think not. sophy, we hold, is either gold or worthless dross. it admits not of mediocrity "Mediocrem esse Non homines, non Di NO. XX.-VOL. X. - non concessere columnæ." 62 some readers Mental philoLike poetry, Of what class this specimen is, we have already indicated our opinion, and in closing our notice, would by a few brief extracts justify it. For Professor Schmucker's barbarous nomenclature take such needless coinage as "methodology," "memorizing," "ential," " duodicadal," etc., etc. For his philosophic classification of" entities," the following, namely, "solids, (!) liquids, (!) gases, (!) light, caloric, electric fluid, magnetic principle, space, number, time, mind, spirit, glorified bodies, (!) Deity."- p. 39. (Those who seek to know what Professor Schmucker can add to revelation on the subject of glorified bodies," will find it treated of in connexion with the gases, at p. 50.) 66 For a specimen of acute analysis, the following may suffice, to which we take the liberty to append our notes of advancing admiration. "Every idea of the speaker is succeeded by the following operations before it accomplishes its design: "1. The idea of the speaker himself! (Quere- a bull.) "2. The speaker's recollections of the idea of the sound formerly associated with that idea by himself!! "3. His volition to articulate a similar sound!!! "4. The articulating action of his organs on the expiring breath to produce a similar sound!!!! 66 5. The hearer's idea of the sound produced by the speaker's voice!!!!! "6. The hearer's recollection of the similar sound which he himself has often made!!!!!! "7. The recurrence of the idea which he formerly connected with the similar sound made by himself."!!!!!!! — p. 155. Of such philosophy we can express our admiration but by the dominie's exclamation- 66 - pro-di-gi-ous!" - and only trust that there will be good sense enough in our schools and colleges, not to allow such solemn trifling to creep into their course of intellectual studies, under the imposing title of a new system of mental philosophy. illustrative of By CHARLES New York: 3. Latin Grammar. Part II. An Introduction to Latin Prose Composition, with a Complete Course of Exercises all the important Principles of the Latin Syntax. ANTHON, LL.D., Professor etc., Columbia College. 1842. Harper and Brothers. 12mo. pp. 327. ANOTHER able work from the pen of this indefatigable and prolific scholar. We know, indeed, of few names in our country more 1842.] Anthon's Latin Grammar. 491 worthy of envy than Dr. Anthon's, in their literary course, as touching either the utility or success of their labors. He early entered on a wide field, and with many competitors, and has already distanced them all. He now "leads" the field, and that, be it in what it may, is no small praise or pleasure; or, rather, it is the highest of both. To an author, it is his literary reward. It is the "palm of victory" of which all young aspirants dream. Nor is this all. This foremost place is gained in the supply of no factitious want; the professor is engaged in building up no airy castles-no "chateaux in Spain," but he is adding solid work to his country's greatness-laying deep the corner-stone of classical learning, and strengthening and maturing the mind of the rising generation the " twenty years hence" ruling men of our country, by the discipline of sound learning and all the generous sympathies that it awakens. In our all-levelling democracy, this, (second only to religion,) is to be the redeeming element of our national character; and wo to our country-wo to the age in which shall be lost its invigorating and conservative influence. But this thought reminds us of the language of one of England's greatest and most far-sighted living statesmen, (the Marquis of Wellesley,) as contained in a recent letter from him to a friend in this country, touching upon the article on Demosthenes, in a late number of the New York Review, which, as germane to the matter, we take the liberty of introducing here. The article on the character of Demosthenes must be approved by every admirer of that unrivalled genius; having been educated in the school of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, and having passed all my early years in their society, I am not ashamed to declare myself an enthusiastic, devoted friend to the study of that mighty orator, whom, during the whole course of a long and most active public life, I have read, again and again, with increased admiration and, I trust, with advantage to the public service. For who can read him, and not feel the inspiration of virtue, and honor, and national glory?" Such are the meditative reflections which we would gladly hear from the lips of our retiring statesmen; for if ever they are to rise, in their political life, above the base trammels of party, and lead instead of being led by it, they are to learn that high-born skill of their vocation, and acquire that generous confidence in the power of truth and virtue from that school whence all great statesmen have drawn it-the school of heroic antiquity. The Marquis of Wellesley's administration in India practically exhibited it; it was pre-eminently a government of lofty opinion, and the pillars of that opinion were PERFECT JUSTICE and PERFECT FEARLESSNESS, and, as he himself here admits, the enthusiasm with which he trusted to these noble principles was enkindled by the fire of Demosthenes. But in our eulogium on classical learning, we must not forget that which has awakened it the work of the learned professor before us. - This volume forms, as its title indicates, the second part of the Latin lessons, and is intended to elucidate particularly all the important principles and rules of the Latin syntax, The rule is first laid down, its principles then stated, and exercises given illustrative of the same; so that the two parts of this work, taken together, form a complete grammar of the Latin tongue, accompanied, moreover, by a full course of continuous exercises. Now, it is in this light we see most clearly its practical value. That is, we mean, in turning "Syntax" into "Praxis," or rather combining the two parts into one. We hold this work, therefore, to be the pleasing and profitable substitute for that most wearisome and unprofitable part of the old Latin grammars-the bare Syntax the very name of which brings back upon us the horrors of our youth, condemned, as we then were, for the want of some such work as the present, to commit to memory rules incomprehensible, with exceptions innumerable, and a long list of excepted exceptions, to make the matter clearer to the poor boys' puzzled understanding. All that waste of time, and labor, and patience, may now, we think, be saved. The Latin Grammar is now to be learned verbally, in its "accidence" only; that is, in its settled forms and inflexions of words. In its "Syntax," it is to be learned practically, and thus intellectually a point of improvement we deem to be one, not in degree, but in essence, and as such, we esteem and recommend it, and the work before us, as the best aid we know in its application. That confidence is to be placed in the scholarship of this work, the public need not our testimonial to be satisfied of; but, for the satisfaction of such as may pretend to doubt, we add, that its author has sought in it the praise of accuracy rather than of novelty, and has, therefore, drawn his principles and rules mainly from such unquestioned authorities as Zumpt, Weissenborn, Reissig, Billroth, etc., and the exercises chiefly from Henrick, Ellis, Hottenroth, and the Gymnasium of Crombie. We doubt not, therefore, either the speedy success or the permanent usefulness of this volume. It will both take its place and hold it, as its predecessors have done, without the help of friends and in spite of the opposition of rivals, and so to its hereditary good fortune we leave it. 4. War and Peace. The Evils of the first, and a Plan of preserving the last. By WILLIAM JAY. New York: 1842. Wiley and Putnam. ALL high philanthropy anticipates its own age, and aims at conquests beyond its own reach. To make men happy, as they are, is a low benevolence compared with seeking to make them happier 1842.] Jay's War and Peace. 493 by making them wiser and better. But of the utility of pursuing such prospective results, the mass of the community are not, in general, competent judges, and still less frequently are they charitable judges of those who are peculiarly earnest in advancing them. If their motives are not to be impugned, their judgment and prudence, at least, may be assailed, and enthusiast and zealot become the popular distinctive appellations of men whom a following age adorns with the title of patriot and philanthropist. Now, without claiming for Mr. Jay such proud distinctions, we may yet confidently assert that he approximates to this class, and that his zealous labors will one day be rated more highly by his countrymen than in general they now are or have been. Whatever prudential modifications we may have been inclined to make in one, at least, of his former schemes of good, we have no such drawbacks touching the question before us. We go for it heart and hand, and in the cause of " peace," as critics, are willing to "fight" - spilling our ink we mean, not our blood, in order to persuade nations, as well as the units that compose them, “to be of one mind." How wars may be made to cease upon earth, among civilized Christian nations at least, is the high problem which Mr. Jay undertakes here to solve; and that such a thing is not to be held a thing impossible, notwithstanding all past experience against it and present obstacles, he argues both eloquently and conclusively from the unlooked-for moral victories already achieved for humanity over social evils as deeply rooted, if not more so, in the social system, than war itself. Ilavia väolŋyıç, “ All is opinion," was the lever with which the ancient stoic sought to move the little world within him; the same is Mr. Jay's organ of power, wherewith to move the greater outward world, and, as the philosopher hoped to eradicate passion by rooting out the error of opinion from which the passion sprung, so, too, does the philanthropist seek to root out war from among nations, by awakening man to a juster and deeper sense of the manifold evils of it-public, social, and private — physical, moral, and financial. These convictions, he thinks, and rightly, once deeply implanted in the individual mind, will re-act on the public, and by degrees show forth their fruits in the policy of governments, binding them voluntarily to the preservation of international peace by the strongest possible of all political arguments-that of clear and unquestioned expediency. But neither would Mr. Jay trust to this security alone for the preservation of peace, but make it binding, by mutual compact upon nations, inserting in every treaty an item to that effect, namely, That should cause of offence in future arise, it should be settled, not by war, but by amicable reference. How far such provisions by treaty, in such a popular government as ours, would be effectual to curb the popular will, we are not at present prepared to argue. "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" is, at least, a natural question, and |