1842.] Contrasts British and American Seamen. 191 exhibitions of nautical skill on record; Captain Byron, also, in the Belvidera, gained great credit for the active manner in which he saved his ship." About a month after occurred the first frigate action, that of the Constitution and Guerrière, and we witness with pain the suffering which this brings upon our author, and his various struggles to palliate, this unexpected defeat. The latter, mingled as they are with much indecent, or rather criminal abuse, we read with perfect composure, regarding them as exposures made in the unrestrained bitterness of anger. We intend, in the course of this paper, to consider the frigate actions together, but shall first convict Mr. James of one or two misstatements in relation to American frigates, which will help to show the value of his record. He falsely states, that "landsman" is a "rating unknown on board an American man-of-war;" misrepresents the height of the Constitution's main deck to be eight feet, and leaves the reader to infer that her "main deck battery was upwards of ten feet from the water." He gives the broadside of American frigates at twenty-eight guns instead of twenty-six.* Mr. James knew these statements to be incorrect when he made them. It is curious to remark also, that on occasions of defeat the English crews are styled jail-birds and raw-hands; boys not worth ship-room; Irishmen who had never smelt salt water; disaffected wretches, the gatherings of press-gangs and prison-ships; whilst the American seamen were picked crews, expert marksmen, altogether the finest set of men ever seen collected or ship-board, and of such extraordinary size that the usual manacles would not fit them. Now we hear nothing previously of the deterioration of English seamen from the battle of Trafalgar to the period of the war with the United States; but if it was true, why does it not apply as well to the English seamen serving, according to Mr. James, on board American ships, as to others? or, if this difference existed between the great mass of British seamen at home, and the few who had crept, under false Mr. James does not always consider the difference of two guns in a broadside, even when that broadside is mounted upon two covered decks, and brought to bear against a frigate, as creating such a decided overmatch." See the action of the Romney and Sybille, vol. i., p. 209. names, and a false origin, into our navy, the fact is more dishonorable to the British nation, and the character of British seamen, than any event of the war, not excepting the conduct of the crew of the Alert, or the refusal of the Phebe to engage the Essex in single combat. It is utterly incredible that in every instance of defeat the special disadvantage should have existed on the side of the English; and possessing no means of distinction, we must reject them as altogether fabulous. After all, this strange argument of the unskilfulness, negligence, and moral and physical inferiority of the British crews, is a simple admission of the fact which the result of the last war sufficiently proved, the decided superiority at that time of American tactics and naval economy, a superiority which we shall presently see that other English authorities besides Mr. James are forced to admit. We incline, however, to regard our author's abuse of his countrymen as a scandalous outrage upon brave men who have done their duty, though unfortunately; and, if they have not merited special praise, are at least entitled to respect and humanity. A word of English seamen on board American ships of war, which is a favorite topic of consolation-if English seamen assisted us to gain the victories of the last war, it would seem that they were better trained to their duties in the navy of the United States, thus establishing the superiority of American officers, or that when a crew composed partly of Englishmen and partly of Americans were successfully opposed to a crew made up entirely of Englishmen, the greater merit of the Americans created the advantage which resulted in victory. We leave to such romance writers as Captain Hall, and Captain Marryatt, the choice in this dilemma. It further appears that Americans on board of English men-of-war repeatedly left their guns when about to engage a vessel of their own country. But Mr. James, while he advances this as a remarkable trait of generosity in British captains, and at the same time tells us that English seamen fought our guns, is too intent upon his apologies to perceive what honorable testimony he bears to the patriotic character of Americans, and how discreditable, by the side of it, stands out the imputed treason of British subjects. It excites in us something of that shame which arises unbidden at the sight of vulgar exposures, to witness the weak and self-reproachful excuses made by British authorities for 1842.] Frigate Actions. 193 their naval reverses. The most impolitic of these is calumny of the victors. "Tanto el vencedor es mas honrado is the wise sentiment which Cervantes puts in the mouth of el Caballero del Basque. The habitual violation of it is in Mr. James a pleasant vice, the scourging inflictions of which excite our pity. If in private life we unhesitatingly withhold our assent from the man who utters his propositions in the language of intemperate rage, how much more will this be the case in history, in preparing which, time is given for passion to subside, and for reflection and a sense of duty inseparable from the undertaking, to exert their influence. When he charges Commodores Hull, Bainbridge, and Decatur, and American officers generally, with repeated falsehoods, he pays them as high a compliment as they can receive from a man of Mr. James's character and condition. But to return to the frigate actions; the Constitution and Guerrière, the United States and Macedonian, and the Constitution and Java. We shall for the present allow to Mr. James the full benefit of his apologies, confessions, excuses, and misstatements, and after doing so, we say that the damage sustained in each action by the two ships, was altogether disproportioned to their relative force even as he states it. It would be sufficient to adduce the facts that the Guerrière and Java were so thoroughly riddled that it was impossible to take them into port, and that the numbers of killed and wounded on board the Guerrière, Macedonian, and Java were, even according to Mr. James, seventy-eight, one hundred and four, and one hundred and twenty-four, whilst on board the Constitution and United States, the corresponding numbers were thirty, eleven, and fifty-eight. On board Admiral Nelson's ship at the battle of the Nile, which lasted between ten and twelve hours, the number of killed and wounded was a hundred and six, but two more than on board the Macedonian, and eighteen less than on board the Java. In the action of St. Vincent, the "Captain," Nelson's ship, in which he achieved such wonders, had only seventy-six killed and wounded, and in the celebrated frigate engagement of the Nymphe and Cleopatra, fifty men only were killed and wounded on board the British ship. Further than this, the American frigates were in every case so slightly injured, as to be soon ready again for action. In the engagement of the Constitution and Java, the former did not lose a spar! She went into action with her royal yards across, and came out with all of them in their places. We are aware that an attempt has lately been made by a high authority* to account for this difference of execution so greatly disproportioned to the disparity in force, but with such signal failure, that we will resort to other British writers for a better explanation. And first we shall take from Mr. James himself the following avowal of the superiority of American gunnery during the war, a superiority of which we possess so many material testimonies, that the undertaking to prove it reminds us of some of Mr. Stewart's supererogatory demonstrations of mathematical axioms. "Highly to the credit of the naval administration of the United States, the crews of their ships were taught the practical rules of gunnery; and ten shot, with the necessary powder, were allowed to be expended in play, to make one hit in earnest." "With respect to a British ship of war, her case was widely different." (p. 95.) "There was another point in which the generality of British crews, as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient-skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamen were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some ships could be named, on board of which not a shot had been fired in this way for upwards of three years. As the generality of French crews were equally inexperienced with their British opponents, the unskilfulness of the latter in gunnery was not felt or remarked: we shall now have to adduce some instances in quick succession, (actions with American men-of-war,) that will clearly show how much the British navy at length suffered by having relaxed in its attention to that most essential point in the business of war, the proper use of the weapons by which it was to be waged." "Many captains never put a shot in the guns, until an enemy appeared; they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails and decorating the ship." (p. 96.) etc. Shortly after the peace, an unscrupulous apologist appeared in the guise of a "British naval officer on the American station," who undertook a synopsis of the principal naval events of the war. We will summon him, though a prejudiced wit Edin. Rev., No. 143. ་་ 1842.] Sir Howard Douglas's Testimony. 195 ness; the cause must be a good one that can be sustained by the evidence of the adverse party. "Had the Guerrière's men been half as well skilled in the use of the great guns as the Constitution's were, the proportion of killed and wounded would not have been so great as fourteen to seventy-eight, nor one ship made a complete wreck of while the other suffered no material injury in hull or rigging." Again; "The relative execution done in this frigate action, (United States and Macedonian,) was still more disproportionate than the former one," - and in relation to the Hornet and Peacock, "never was there a finer specimen of marine gunnery than the Americans displayed in this engagement.' Finally in the affair of the Wasp and Avon, "miserable gunnery on one side was evident enough, which may perhaps be partly attributable to a difference of opinion about the manner of loading a carronade to produce the best effect; but above all, to not drilling the men at firing the guns, a practice the Americans never neglect, as we have felt [italics by the writer,] too often.” But as one of the authorities we have just cited, if we may judge from his own preface, and that of his editor, enjoys no untarnished name even in the profession he has dishonored himself to serve, and as the other, more fortunately for himself, has no name at all, we shall resort to a higher seat of judgment, one from whose decisions, however mortifying and severe they may be found, there is no convenient appeal. In 1819-20, Major-General Sir Howard Douglas published a "Treatise on Naval Gunnery, with the approbation and permission of the Lords Commissioners of the Adiniralty ;"* and as their lordships had the manuscripts some time under their consideration, and deliberately consented to its publication, we have sufficient reason to conclude that they adopted the opinions it expresses. Part fifth of this work consists of observations on some recent naval operations, and on the tactics of single actions, in which, as well as in the section on the pointing of naval ordnance, it is flattering to remark the constant and almost exclusive reference to American example and authority, as the most perfect standard of practice. But the following passages are more pertinent to the matter in hand. "As a display of courage, the character of the service, and of the country, was nobly upheld; but it would + Title page. Introduction to 1st Edition. |