country. When the government meditated the recall of the British troops, on the ground of the expense, he told them that the moment the French were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would of a certainty incur all risks to land an army in Great Britain. “Then, indeed,” says he, "would commence an expensive contest; then would his Majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants would be destroyed, whatever might be the immediate result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene!" A secondary but direct object, was the liberation of Portugal. On this point his Grace dwells with much earnestness, and with invariable hope, in his despatches and letters. His ultimate object was the emancipation of Europe, the eyes of which he knew to be intently fixed upon him. His views of the position of Napoleon were wonderfully clear and comprehensive. He knew that tyranny has its bounds, and that there is a limit to the endurance even of prostrate nations. He felt confident that the millions of Europe would, at a day not distant, start up in an agony of revenge, and burst their fetters. In the darkest hour, courage and hope never forsook him. Perhaps that hour was the divorce of Josephine and the marriage of Maria. On that alarming stroke of the tyrant's policy, he thus remarks: "The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great movement on the Continent for the present. Still I do not despair of seeing, at some time or other, a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent transactions in Holland show that it is all hollow within, and that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and even the existence of civilized society, that he cannot trust even

his brothers to carry it into execution." Twelve months after this, we find the great Captain still in the same mood. Writing to Lord Liverpool, "I am glad," says he, "to hear such good accounts of affairs in the North. God send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny! However, of this I am very certain, that whether true or not, at present, something of the kind must occur before long; and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved." Six months later, writing to Lord William Bentinck, he proceeds in the same strain. "I have," says he, "long considered it probable, that even we should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has passed in Spain and Portugal; and that we should be actors and advisers in these scenes and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which should be pursued, to give a chance of success." Such, on December the 24th, 1811, were the noble, the almost prophetic, sentiments of the Duke of Wellington. Such were the adversaries, and such the objects of the English commander. The question now comes, What were the means, and what were the methods, by which he prosecuted such objects, in the face of such adversaries ? These are the elements of the general question of his military and moral greatness. The answer to this question involves a multitude of considerations and inquiries. If set forth with satisfactory fulness, it would exhibit such a variety and complication of difficulties and trials, as no commander had ever to contend with. Of this, Wellington was himself aware. He repeatedly asserts it. The chief features of the great case, are the following:

The British army proved itself to be a mass of depravity. It was found next to impossible to establish order and discipline among them. The Duke says, in 1809, that it is "an excellent army on parade, an ex

cellent one to fight; but we are worse than an enemy in a country." The wickedness of the troops was wanton, and, as yet, without the apology of distress. He thus speaks, after the adoption of all possible methods to prevent crime :-"Yet there is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet, for one moment, suffered the slightest want, or the smallest privation." So alarming was the moral state and discipline of the troops, that, writing to Castlereagh, he says, "take my word for it, that either defeat or success would dissolve us." Such was the instrument with which his Grace was sent to expel the armies of Napoleon! The evil was soon increased by the neglects of the government as to pay, food, clothing, every thing. His Grace betook himself, with all energy, to the improvement of his troops.

able.

The state of the Portuguese troops was most lamentThe cool commander kindles into passion when he speaks of it. "I think it scandalous," says he, "that the Portuguese regular army should not be 100,000 instead of 50,000 men; more scandalous that they should want near 10,000 men to complete to 50,000; still more scandalous that they have not means to support even the army which they have; and, almost as bad as all the rest, that Great Britain should not have been able to send arms and clothing for men as soon as the French have been able to send in their reinforcements of made soldiers, which are now upon the frontier." The Spanish army was still worse. Their officers were a strange compound of folly and stupidity, indolence and pride. His Grace broke all terms with men in whom he found no capacity, no application, no truth, and no honour. The troops had neither the habits nor the spirit of soldiers, and the officers had not one redeeming quality. "There never was anything," says he, “like the madness, the imprudence, and the

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presumption of the Spanish officers." But, to say the truth, they were as good as the population deserved. Wellington declares, that they were starving in rich provinces." Where to get money for the expense of 20,000 Spaniards, he could not tell," excepting from England, as the patriotic gentlemen at Lisbon, now that they can buy no commissariat debts, will give us no money." Such were the mass of the population, both of Portugal and Spain. The religion and government of these countries previous to the French invasion, had all but demented the people; it had rendered them utter serfs; had divested them of every attribute of generous manhood, and prepared them for the most galling thraldom. Their spirit was quite sunk. For example, the Duke writes thus to the Earl of Liverpool :-" What do you think of empty carts taking two days to go ten miles on a good road? After all, I am obliged to appear satisfied, or they would all desert!" Again, he informs the same nobleman, that "when the whole of Castile and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!" Did mankind ever witness such prostration of spirit? Was ever general so circumstanced? Was ever nation so indifferent to liberty, and so unfit for its enjoyment? But the worst remains to be told. The government of the country had been destroyed, and, so far as the British troops had reconquered, its forms were restored under the Juntas, which were composed of fools and knaves, who proved a source of constant obstruction, and of endless torment. Many of them, and also of the upper classes of the people, thought it a great hardship to be called on even to billet the British army, who had come to shed their blood for Peninsular liberty! Such was the pride of Spain and Portugal, that multitudes preferred remaining in chains to receiving liberty at the hands of the English!

Under such circumstances the Duke, with his small British force, felt that, to assail the French army in general actions, would have been utter madness. A perfect master of all the circumstances of his extraordinary and unparalleled predicament, he saw that there was only one method of safe and successful operation,— a method the very reverse of that which he had pursued in India. At the outset, in 1809, he says, "I cannot sufficiently recommend a strict defensive position in all quarters." "The plan of operation which I should recommend to the Spanish nation, is one generally of defence. They should avoid general actions." He told Lord Liverpool that the contest must necessarily be defensive; and he continued accordingly to harass the enemy in every possible way, cutting off his supplies, and destroying his troops in detail, with the hope that some diversion on the Continent might occur to weaken the French forces in the Peninsula, or that the French themselves might become weary of the war, and dispirited. In the mean time he trusted that the British forces would be strengthened, their discipline improved, and the general spirit of the country aroused; thus leaving it to circumstances to determine the proper moment for vigorous offensive movements. Such were the enlightened and comprehensive views of Wellington, who, nevertheless, clearly foresaw that, although this was the only method of saving the country, and of effecting the other objects specified, it would inevitably encompass him with immense difficulties; and it was well that he was thus early led to anticipate them, for they speedily arose. The enthusiastic Portuguese loudly called for offensive operations. "Nothing will answer," says the Duke, "excepting to fight great battles in plains, in which their defeat is as certain as is the commencement of the battle. They will not credit the accounts I have repeatedly given them, of the superior numbers of the French." He likewise stated that,