Importation of Sisal and Manila Hemp: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, on S. Res. 94, a Resolution Authorizing and Instructing the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry of the Senate to Investigate what Companies and Corporations are Engaged in the Imporatation of Sisal and Manila Hemp, Etc. [Feb. 17-Apr. 27, 1916] ... Printed for the Use of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Том 2

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Сторінка 1518 - A court of equity, which is never active in relief against conscience or public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his right, and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and therefore, from the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was...
Сторінка 1511 - And we do not see how a better test can be applied to the question, whether reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.
Сторінка 1515 - The statute under this view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from combination or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, whether old or new, which would constitute an interference that is an undue restraint.
Сторінка 1509 - In other words, it was held, not that acts which the statute prohibited could be removed from the control of its prohibitions by a finding that they were reasonable, but that the duty to interpret which inevitably arose from the general character of the term restraint of trade required that the words restraint of trade...
Сторінка 1509 - Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the statute, it was held in the Standard Oil Case that as the words "restraint of trade" at common law and in the law of this country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or because...
Сторінка 1511 - ... is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party can be of no benefit to either. It can only be oppressive, and, if oppressive, it Is in the eye of the law unreasonable.
Сторінка 1509 - ... restraint of trade should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce — the free movement of which It was the purpose of the statute to protect.
Сторінка 1509 - Act only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the words as used in the statute were designed to have and did have but a like significance. It was therefore pointed out that the statute did not forbid...
Сторінка 1509 - US 1, 106, but is of such an unreasonable character as to be within the authority of a long line of cases decided by this court.
Сторінка 1509 - Congress, . as construed and applied by this court . . . will depend upon the intent to be inferred from the extent of the control thereby secured over instrumentalities which such commerce is under compulsion to use, the method by which such control has been brought about, and the manner in which that control has been exerted.

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