CONTENTS Statements by: Drell, Dr. Sidney D., Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Page 16 Garwin, Dr. Richard, T. J. Watson Research Center, IBM Corpora- 4 EFFECTS OF LIMITED NUCLEAR WARFARE THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 UNITED STATES Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS OF THE Committee ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Symington, Clark, Biden, Case, and Javits. OPENING STATEMENT Yesterday the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements released a new study dealing with the possible effects upon American society of nuclear attacks against U.S. military installations. Contained in this study are new estimates provided by the DOD which give a clearer picture of the possible cost to America of so-called counterforce attacks against military envisioned in the doctrine of flexible response-could have a devastating effect upon our society. The new analysis shows that the possible cost of "limited nuclear war" is not nearly as limited as some had previously believed. Such a war would of course be terrible at any level and whether directed at our military forces or at our people, the cost of such war would appear to be clearly unacceptable. Understanding the nature of such warfare will help us answer such questions as: What should be America's strategic policy and doctrine; what kind of war should we be prepared for; what kind of military forces and weapons do we need; what should be our goals in negotiations to limit and control nuclear arms; and how should we deal with the problem of world-wide nuclear proliferation? This Nation should be wary of pursuing strategic policies which could either undermine or destroy any prospect of meaningful arms control. America, along with the rest of the world, needs controls and limitations on strategic arms; but our present negotiations still would appear far from reaching that goal. While we and the Russians talk in Geneva about ways to limit certain weapons systems, both we and they move ahead to develop new weapons which may be impossible to control. (1) As we and the Soviets continue to arm ourselves with ever greater "overkill" capacities, other nations move steadily-one after the other-toward the acquisition of nuclear military power; yet no strong efforts have been made as yet to control such proliferation. Most Americans were not yet born when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by nuclear attack. To better understand what nuclear war-in any form-can mean would seem to be the first step toward trying to prevent such a war. Today this subcommittee continues its inquiry into the costs of the so-called “limited nuclear war." We welcome Dr. James Neel, of the Department of Human Genetics, University of Michigan, who was the Acting Director of Field Studies of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission; Dr. Richard Garwin of the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center and former member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Defense Science Board; and Dr. Sidney Drell, deputy director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and former member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, and with whom I had the pleasure of visiting at IAEA along with members of our staff last June. Dr. Neel must be excused at 11 o'clock to go to the White House to receive the National Medal of Science. We will therefore begin with him and ask Dr. Drell and Dr. Garwin to join him at the witness table. Senator CASE. I have just a brief statement. I will not hold up Dr. Neel very long. Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would say anything you would like. STATEMENT BY SENATOR CASE Senator CASE. The subject of today's hearing is the extent of the casualties and destruction the United States would experience in the event of limited nuclear war. I believe it is crucial that these casualty estimates be made available to the American public. Should it be the judgment of the American people that the destruction resulting from nuclear exchanges limited to military targets would be as unacceptable as that visited by all-out nuclear war, then this Government should not begin spending the billions of dollars necessary for converting the U.S. nuclear arsenal to fight limited wars. If the concept of limited nuclear war makes no sense, still less should the United States permit a potential aggressor to gain the impression that a nuclear attack upon this country would not result in annihilation of his own population. To my knowledge, there is no serious quarrel with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's contention that we must have some ability to respond selectively to a less than all-out nuclear attack. According to the Secretary himself, this country now possesses such a capability. What is at issue is Secretary Schlesinger's declaration this year that this country should develop weapons specifically designed to destroy hard targets such as an enemy's missile silos. Also at question is the Secretary's attendant assumption that civilian casualties resulting from attacks limited to military targets can be kept so low as not to provoke either side to attack each other's cities. I do not contend that the DOD is oblivious to, or uncaring of, the incredible destruction that even limited nuclear exchanges can visit upon U.S. civilian society. What I do contend, and this with some personal knowledge, is that the DOD only tardily began to give the subject of civilian casualties the attention it warrants. In this sense, the Defense Department first proclaimed this "counterforce" doctrine, and only after the fact began to consider in detail what the nonmilitary consequences might be to this country. Well over a year ago, when I first took on the subject, it was in connection with a remark by Secretary Schlesinger in his 1974 Defense report to the effect that nuclear attacks upon U.S. military installations might only result in "relatively few civilian casualties." Through the summer of last year, in an exchange of correspondence and a briefing I requested, the Defense Department began to develop the necessary kind of detail on these casualty estimates. Subsequently, in September 1974, at a briefing before this subcommittee which I requested, Secretary Schlesinger for the first time that I know of laid out the DOD's concept of what limited nuclear war might entail for the U.S. populace. Then transpired a remarkable, and most commendable, cooperative effort involving the Defense Department, this subcommittee, and the Office of Technology Assessment-OTA-that has, I believe, resulted in a great increase in everyone's understanding of the consequences of limited nuclear war. As will be discussed in detail at this day's hearing and as was shown in the documents released yesterday by the Foreign Relations Committee, the Defense Department, at the committee's request and upon the advice of the Ad Hoc Panel of the Office of Technology Assessment, has completed new calculations showing how under some circumstances an attack upon U.S. ICBM silos could result in casualties of between 3 and 22 million as opposed to the 800,000 previously cited by the Secretary in his briefing last fall. We all must feel horror at the enormity of these or any other similar statistics, but we cannot ignore the facts. A new generation has yet to be educated in what nuclear war can mean, and their elders might need to be reminded as to why any change in the precarious balance of terror between both sides must be made only after the most careful consideration of every consequence. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger deserves to be commended for the forthright way he has responded to this subcommittee's inquiries, and this joint effort is a truly encouraging example of constructive congressional-executive branch cooperation. But the fact remains such a fundamental question of U.S. security cannot be left to the "experts" or the "targeteers." The Congress and the public must have our rightful say in this or any other fundamental alteration to our defense posture, for the lives of us all are at stake and at peril. Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me present my statementSenator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator, for that fine statement, and may I for the record respectfully commend you for your leadership in the field we are discussing this morning. |