Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of ..., 94-1 ..., September 18, 1976 |
Загальні терміни та фрази
airburst all-out nuclear areas Arms Control assumed assumptions atomic bases blast calculations capability casualty levels chart civil defense program civilian casualties Committee counterforce attack counterforce strikes cruise missiles damage Defense Department Department of Defense deployed deployment destroy destruction deterrence detonation discussion dose DRELL estimate evacuation fixed ICBM's flexible response Foreign Relations fuze GARWIN hard target height of burst Hiroshima Hiroshima and Nagasaki ICBM force impact limited attack limited nuclear counterforce megaton military targets million fatalities Minuteman silos MIRVS Nagasaki National Neel nuclear conflict nuclear exchange nuclear explosions nuclear weapons percent plans population protection factor questions radiation sickness radioactive fallout reentry rems result Secretary of Defense Secretary Schlesinger Secretary Schlesinger's Senator BIDEN Senator SYMINGTON September 11 shelter silo-killing force Soviet Union statement strategic forces strategic nuclear strategic policy Subcommittee on Arms survival talking testimony U.S. ICBM silos U.S. strategic warhead winds
Популярні уривки
Сторінка 53 - Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.
Сторінка 25 - No. 2, establishing an Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President, provides a logical placement of the Government-wide policy direction and review function.
Сторінка 9 - Mobilization, before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. This testimony was given on June 26, 1959, and is to be found beginning on page 843 of the volume Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War.
Сторінка 20 - Our Civil Defense Program is, and has always been, an essential element of our overall strategic deterrence posture. Hence, one would expect that the recent shift in emphasis towards a more flexible strategic response policy, which I discussed earlier in this section of the Defense Report, would be reflected in our Civil Defense Program. That is indeed the case. We are seeking to reflect in our civil defense planning the wider range of response options that we are now introducing into our military...
Сторінка 40 - USSR in central strategic systems but such equality is also important for symbolic purposes, in large part because the strategic offensive forces have come to be seen by many — however, regrettably — as important to the status and stature of a major power.
Сторінка 2 - Committee 1962-65 and 1969-72 and of the Defense Science Board 1966-69. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, and the Council on Foreign Relations.
Сторінка 25 - ... numbers and types of the nuclear explosions on both sides. However, the one technically unambiguous fact is whether or not nuclear weapons have been used at all. Therefore it is wisest for the US to adopt as a national policy the highest possible nuclear threshold. We should maintain a gap between nuclear and non-nuclear warfare that is as clear and wide as possible, and resist the temptation to develop doctrines and...
Сторінка 24 - Drell's statement is nontechnical and is in the spirit of his own article. He says, "Furthermore, the development and rehearsing of civil defense plans involving evacuation and relocation of large populations could be viewed with alarm by an opponent as preparation for executing a first strike.
Сторінка 10 - This figure is less than half of the total annual peacetime occurrence of non-fatal injuries in the...
Сторінка 31 - For typical burst altitudes in the atmosphere a human body totally and completely shielded from fallout during the first hour immediately following a nuclear explosion will still receive 45%, or almost half, of the total fallout if exposed thereafter.