commands a majority at Ottawa when the criticisms appear across the border.

Mr. Goldwin Smith dislikes my occasional use of the term "the Empire" for the Queen's dominions. But it seems to me, I confess, a convenient and it is an official term, recognized by Parliament, by the War Office, by the Admiralty, by the PostOffice, and other government departments. If Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, and the Emperor of Russia should declare war on one another, that war would extend to the whole of their respective subjects, and some term is needed to express that portion of the world's surface which acknowledges the Queen, or QueenEmpress, and would be concerned on our side in such hostilities. "The Empire" is, as I have said, a convenient term, and one not more open to objection than any other that can be devised. Neither have I assumed, as I am made by Mr. Goldwin Smith to assume, that the British Empire will constitute a permanent unity. This very question forms one of those problems which I have discussed, but he would be indeed a daring man who should venture to assume for certain, or to confidently prophesy, that Australia, Canada, India, and the United Kingdom will be under one sceptre in times far distant from our own. It is a curious fact that Mr. Goldwin Smith, after quarrelling with the term "the Empire," is forced to use it in the (for so brilliant a writer) somewhat clumsy phrase, forced upon him not by his taste, but by the necessities of controversy, "this Empire, or whatever it is to be called." In his admirable article, "The Hatred of England," in the May number of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Mr. Goldwin Smith also makes use of the phrase, "Great Britain has in her empire three hundred millions of people. Read any one of the treatises on the defences of her empire."

Mr. Goldwin Smith seems to imagine that, as portions of the empire become more democratic, there is less chance of the expenditure necessary to defend its parts being encountered by its people, and he thinks that "Problems of Great Britain" proves that in Australasia "a military policy, even of a moderate kind, has brought unpopularity on its authors." No unpopularity attaches in Australia to a policy of local defence, even on a costly scale; and, on the contrary, the colonies are now engaged in devising increased measures of protection to be added to those, already in most cases ample, which their present system gives.

What is unpopular is paying Australian money in the form of what in the southern continent is called "tribute." The Soudan expedition is now unpopular in Australia, and the Naval Defence Bill is unpopular in Queensland, but Australian defence by Australian forces, on a scale sufficient to render safe for the British flag all the adjoining seas, is popular enough.

In the main portion of his Forum article Mr. Goldwin Smith appears to be arguing rather against the protective policy of the Canadian governmental party than against my views; and, as a Free-Trader, hostile to that policy, I do not feel called upon to defend it. But he comes then to Canadian defence, and admits that it is reasonable that, if Canada wants independence, she should be ready to defend it. He asks, however, how she is to afford the money necessary for armaments sufficient to protect so dangerous a frontier against a nation vastly superior in wealth and numbers. Switzerland is not defended by natural frontiers (as is popularly supposed), for her two great cities of Geneva, on the one side, and of Basle, upon the other, lie open to the invader, and the occupation of two or three points upon her railway system (which, but for her army, could be easily reached) would paralyze her defence. Switzerland is vastly inferior in wealth and in population to Germany and to France, but she is protected by her patriotism and her willingness to make sacrifices in order to keep on foot an admirable democratic army. If Canada desires to retain her independence of the United States, as a self-respecting country she should put herself in a condition of defence such as Switzerland occupies. But, as she will never be attacked by the United States if she shows a real desire to remain independent, she need not be "armed to the teeth" (to use the phrase of Mr. Goldwin Smith) or attempt to keep on foot a permanent army against a people who will not employ any such force against her, or ever attack her in a desire for the conquest of an unwilling people. I admit, however, the fairness and the weight of the main argument of Mr. Goldwin Smith, that, if Canada does not keep up a large organized defence militia, the inference may be drawn that there exists in Canada no very strong opposition to eventual union with the United States. Mr. Goldwin Smith thinks that the adoption of the French tricolor in the province of Quebec implies that the "alien nationality" is by no means a strength of British rule; but he does not controvert the

the

argument that union with the United States would swamp French Canadians, and is for that reason never likely to be sought by them.

Incidently, in the course of the same article, Mr. Goldwin Smith two or three times writes of the poverty of large parts of the Canadian soil. In this matter, he seems to me, I confess, to somewhat exaggerate. He speaks, for example, of the maritime provinces of Canada as being separated from Quebec "by a wide and irreclaimable wilderness"; and I am, therefore, the more glad to find that in his last paragraph he distinctly declares Canada to be "a country full of natural resources." That is a considerable admission for Mr. Goldwin Smith, and one which will encourage Canadians more than they will be discouraged or saddened by anything which has come from his pen.

In his article called "The Hatred of England," in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Mr. Goldwin Smith mentions one subject upon which I had written in the Canadian part of "Problems of Greater Britain," and in which we take wholly different views as to the facts of the case. He tells his readers that "Anglophobia drives British emigrants from American shores to Australia at a time when the self-governing element in this country is in danger of being swamped by alien elements." This passage clearly implies that British (that is, English and Scotch) emigration to the United States is decreasing in proportion to English and Scotch emigration to Australia. Yet so far is this from being the case that the very opposite is true. The English and Scotch emigrants to the United States have pretty steadily increased. In 1885 they were 87,000; in 1886, 99,000; in 1887, 132,000; in 1888, 130,000. On the other hand, the English and Scotch emigration to Australasia (and the deduction of New Zealand would not seriously affect the proportions) in the same years has been 33,000, 38,000, 29,000, and 27,000.

An interesting American article on "Problems of Greater Britain" was that in the Chicago Tribune, which, discussing at length my views upon the fisheries question, asked impatiently when the time might come when men should fish where they pleased and for what they pleased, and sell their products where and how they pleased, regardless of frontiers. The writer, however, failed to see that his excellent suggestion has no bearing upon the Newfoundland problem discussed by me, for the diffi

culty there consists in the existence of foreign rights on shore, such as the United States would not tolerate in her territories were Newfoundland in her possession.

As a rule, the articles, and especially when favorable, as most of them have been, contain little of that kind of criticism which can lead to useful answer. The hostile criticism which proceeds from France, and, generally speaking, from France alone, has been based upon a misconception of the author's views. Where I have quoted Prevost-Paradol's "La France Nouvelle," and shown that the twenty years which have passed over our heads since the book appeared have only confirmed the justness of his prediction as to the dwarfing of the French, the German, and the other south, west, and central European powers, by the Americans, the British, and the Russians, French writers who have not read my book, or who have read it hastily, have been inclined to think that I was not only expressing my own views, rather than those of a French patriot, but wishes entertained generally by my fellowcountrymen. The stationary position of the French, the absorption of the Germans outside Europe by the Americans and the British, are scientific facts of the highest interest, and thoroughly worthy of careful investigation; but all interest in such speculations disappears when they are approached with loss of temper. It is then only possible with advantage to repeat the statement that the arguments which bear upon the point put forward in "Problems of Greater Britain" are unaffected by personal predilection.

The most useful criticism of the work bears upon a subject which would probably be of less interest to American readers than that which might have been aroused by almost any other portion of it-namely, upon British and Indian imperial defence. The Chicago Tribune, indeed, discussed in some detail the defence of India as presented in my book, but only to assure me that a single American county with which it was acquainted, Cook County, could furnish a larger force than could British India. The Edinburgh Review, in the course of a very favorable article on the book, went out of its way to make, incidentally, an onslaught against me for want of patriotism in revealing to our possible enemies the details of our military weakness. If we could secure adequate military reform in the British Empire without talking about our weaknesses, I should be the first to deprecate the practice of discussing them; but, unfortunately, this has been found to be

impossible, and the only chance we have of obtaining any remedy for a state of things absolutely deplorable, and dangerous even to the continued existence of the fabric of the British government, is discussion. The Hartington Commission has lately brought together an enormous body of the most competent evidence upon the subject, but I understand that little except the result is to be given to the world. The consequence will, I fear, be that this most important inquiry will remain sterile, and that once more "nothing will he done." I might answer the criticism in The Edinburgh Review by pointing out that the great semiofficial newspapers of India, such as The Pioneer, single out the chapter on "Indian Defence" for special praise, and, representing, as they do, British-Indian military opinion, evidently believe that the chapter was calculated to do good, not harm, to the interests with the defence of which these journals in a peculiar degree feel themselves charged.

To us in England one of the most interesting notices which has been called out by my book is that in the Novoye Vremya, which contains these words:

"Yet a little while, and, by seizing Herat, we shall present a pistol at the very hear of English domination. The Vistula, the Bosphorus, and Herat are the thres points of the Russian strategical triangle. The English keep persisting in an unequal struggle only because they await the result of the issue on the two former points rather than that at the third position of Herat."

This passage, again, however, affects matters of interest rather to Britons than to the people of the United States.

Some naval officers in all parts of the world have objected to the views put forward in my chapter on "Imperial Defence." Those opinions, have, however, since been, as it seems to me, confirmed by the revelation of the line taken by Admiral Sir F. Richards upon the Hartington Commission. The report of that commission includes a naval protest against sailors being called upon to say beforehand what they could or could not do in case of war. The reason of their inability to do so is that our sailors have had hitherto no proper staff to work out such questions for them, for our Naval-Intelligence Department is too young and too weak. But the fact at least shows how necessary it is for the army administration to have ready in advance its system for garrisoning our colony stations, and this is plainly the opinion of even the naval member of the commission. It is difficult to