sanction and support for any period it deems desirable a strike of some 7,000 or 8,000 men (the membership of the federation being taken as about three-quarters of a million), which might involve a weekly expenditure of nearly £2,000. The fourth clause of rule 8 appears to imply that once a strike is sanctioned, the federation is pledged to pay dispute benefit for eight weeks at least. This seems somewhat extraordinary.

Dispute benefit is fixed at five shillings per week on the higher scale and half-a-crown per week on the lower scale. Here is a rough estimate of the expenditure which such benefits will involve. The average annual number of working days lost in disputes in the period 1891-6 was 12,334,835; say about 10,000,000 in disputes lasting for more than five clear working days (the federation pays only in such cases), i.e., nearly 1,440,000 weeks. If half the unionists in the country belong to the federation, then, ceteris paribus, the number of weeks liable to be charged for benefit is 720,000. It would probably be more, as among those who do not join the federation will be the Unions which spend the least per head on disputes. Suppose disputes to be equally divided between unionists on the two scales, then we have—

In giving £135,000 as the maximum probable annual expenditure we are supposing that the existence of the federation will not affect the number of strikes. The maximum income has been estimated at £50,000, and working expenses will be heavy. The committee, however, are empowered to increase the subscriptions up to double the standard amounts; but if they acted to the full on their power there would still be a discrepancy of 35 per cent., not to mention working expenses.

To meet the financial difficulty an amendment was brought forward suggesting that the federation funds should not be drawn upon unless two per cent. of the members of the Unions at war were standing idle. This suggestion met with the most furious opposition. The amalgamations pointed out that they very seldom had so large a proportion under dispute, and the poorer Unions argued that conflicts of such magnitude would break them, with their present necessarily small contributions. The suggestion was negatived by 744,000 to 23,000 votes. It is somewhat remarkable that no attempt was made to obtain the result really sought by extending the period of dispute which must elapse before the federation can be called upon for funds. In fact, the very opposite was attempted; and successfully. An amendment was carried which deleted the part of a clause which declared that the first benefit should fall due on the twelfth day of dispute.

Nature of the Federation.

A federation might aim, among other things, at insuring Trade Unions against exceptional risks in disputes. In my opinion the Congress should have given careful consideration to this notion of federation. Frequently during the discussion arguments were used which pointed to the need for something to fall back upon in times of exceptional strain. Many individual Unions incline to short-sightedness, and therefore one would think that it would recommend itself as desirable to unionists that a federal institution should take over the burden of those disputes of which it approved after they had endured, say, for the normal strike period, or when they became exceptionally big: especially in view of the fact that on such occasions Trade Unions do assist one another now, although the assistance is unorganised.

Another aspect of federation, very widely current, is that of excessively centralised management of all labour disputes. Federation of this kind would emphasise horizontal social divisions, probably at the expense of overlooking the vertical; and so it would tend to embitter rather than to assuage industrial conflicts. Besides, its omnipotence would necessitate a council of omniscients, if it was not to result in chaos. On the other hand, complete decentralisation of management, such as the cotton spinners made an effort to secure, would mean not federation at all, but simply a pooling of funds; and it would certainly increase the number and duration of disputes, as all those who obtained the right to dip into the common purse at will would naturally begin to spend feverishly.

The scheme adopted goes to neither extreme. The council will manage industrial conflicts only partially. The condition of its activity is a dispute, and its duties are confined to existing disputes. It has no more power of initiating a quarrel than it has of swallowing up the individual Unions. Of course it may do much by way of management indirectly-but will it assume the vast responsibilities which such a policy would entail? Nevertheless, the federation is by no means powerless. By the method of pruning, which the right of effective disapproval ensures, it may assist in bringing dispute policies into line. And it should operate in reducing strikes, both by means of its written regulations and of the direct veto, if the managing committee proves itself strong enough to oppose the wishes of the constituent Unions to an extent sufficient to counteract the natural rush on a common purse. Societies are not entitled to dispute benefit unless they can prove that they are in a position to pay ten per cent. of their members' dispute pay for eight weeks. Again, the federation hopes to do away with all troubles arising from the demarcation of work by the rule which refers them to compulsory arbitration. It is questionable, of course, whether the Unions are not going outside their office in seeking to determine

among themselves a question of the combination of factors in production. It cannot be denied that the employer, whose business it is to give effect to the law of substitution, must have at least a word in this matter.

Will the federation endure, and will its size be respectable? These questions cannot be answered yet awhile. Is it essential to success that most of the big developed Unions should enter ?-nay, further, is it altogether desirable? I for one am not prepared to dogmatise. The scheme seems to contain the seeds of success. Its projectors have not made the mistake of inaugurating a method of pumping all the Unions of their funds, to the last penny if needful, in support of one dispute. Nor have they made the mistake of creating a strongly centralised federation to ride roughshod over the policies of particular Unions-policies shaped by their peculiar environments and by years of trial-under the impression that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the whole farm-yard. Mild as the scheme is, it is a colossal undertaking. The committee will need a full measure of virtues, and the wisdom of serpents, to cope with the tangled wilderness of detail, and the thicket of conflicting interests, in which they will constantly find themselves involved. When we consider that on an average about 900 disputes are annually reported to the Labour Department, the magnitude of the task becomes apparent, and raises grave doubts about an easy success. S. J. CHAPMAN

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

ON December 15th, 1898, the President of the Board of Trade, in receiving a deputation of trade unionists, pointed out in forcible language the grave evils resulting from the suspension of industry in strikes and lock-outs, and from the fact that industrial warfare discourages British owners of capital from employing it at home, declaring at the same time his opinion that these evils could not be remedied by any legal enactment making arbitration in labour disputes compulsory. Thereupon the Bishop of Hereford wrote to The Times to complain of this "impotent conclusion "; and his letter originated an interesting correspondence, which occupied its columns at frequent intervals during more than a month. Basing his demand upon the success, which he believes to have been achieved by the law providing for the settlement of labour disputes by compulsory arbitration in force in New Zealand, Dr. Percival pressed for the application of similar methods in this country. With respect, however, to the New Zealand law, it is to be observed that the original Act came into operation so recently as in 1895, and has been amended by several subsequent enactments, the last passed only a few months ago. Thus, even if it could with truth be alleged (which it cannot) that the conditions, political, social, and economic, obtaining in that colony were closely analogous to those

which prevail in this country, the experience of New Zealand could not well be considered to afford adequate guidance; and if we are profitably to discuss the question raised by Dr. Percival-whether we ought to provide that wages and all other conditions of employment shall be fixed, no longer by agreement between employers and employed, but by the machinery of the law-this question must be discussed on its merits, and with express reference to the political, social, and economic conditions obtaining in the United Kingdom.

For a long time past we have fixed by law some of the most important conditions of employment. How many hours in the day an employer shall employ certain classes of workpeople, how much air-space he shall give his workpeople of whatever class to work in, what provisions he shall make for their well-being in other respects (e.g., in regard to protection against injuries arising from unfenced machinery or deficient exits in case of fire)—all these matters are strictly regulated by law. So far as the principle of the thing is concerned, since contract has been abolished in regard to the relations of landlords and their tenants in Ireland, we can hardly decline to consider for a moment the proposal to abolish contract as between employers and their workpeople. "Fair" rents are fixed by law; why not "fair" wages? As a fact, we have not hesitated to fix by legal regulations the remuneration of some kinds of labour. If the law compels me to pay half-a-crown an hour to a cab-driver, why should it be deemed utterly absurd to suggest that I shall be compelled to pay one shilling an hour to a bricklayer, if I employ one? The truth is, that the consistent practice of English legislation is to maintain the sanctity of "free" contract only unless and until a section of the voters, too numerous and too well organised to be safely ignored, happens to raise a demand for the supersession of this "principle" in some particular direction by the alternative method of legal regulation.

Coming now to considerations of a practical nature, it will be obvious that, with respect to this demand for compulsory arbitration, by far the most important question requiring to be considered is, whether the adoption of a system of this nature is practically possible. It is often said that to ask a judge to settle, for example, how much an hour shall be paid for a particular kind of labour is ridiculous, because it is impossible to formulate any general principles upon which the price of labour shall in any given instance be determined with precision. Certainly, the extreme difficulty, to say the least of it, of laying down scientifically accurate principles of this nature will not be doubted by any serious student of economic problems. All the same, granting that the tribunals provided for the settlement of such matters honestly endeavour to decide the questions submitted to them in an equitable manner, it is not really of very great consequence that all their decisions shall be scientifically accurate. In all probability the awards of the Courts would give sometimes to one party, sometimes to the other, a little less than a strictly scientific judgment (if such a

thing be conceivable in these matters) would have given them. But on the whole, taking all the cases decided in a series of years "in the lump," very little net injustice would be done. In any case, supposing that the awards made by the proposed tribunals were framed on reasonable lines, and were honestly carried out by both parties, we may fairly expect that the position of both employers and employed would, on balance and in the long run, be appreciably more favourable than if they had fought out their disputes by lock-out and strike, and that the interests of capitalists and workmen, no less than the well-being of the community at large, would be materially promoted by the maintenance. of industrial peace.

When, however, we come to consider the question, whether, when the Arbitration Court had given its decision, it would be possible to secure compliance with its award, we find ourselves face to face with practical difficulties of a serious character. That compliance on the part of the employers might on the whole be satisfactorily secured, is not altogether unlikely. You cannot, of course, prevent a builder, whom an Arbitration Court has ordered to pay his bricklayers one shilling an hour, and who is firmly convinced that to pay them more than elevenpence will land him in the Bankruptcy Court, from evading compliance with that order by retiring from the business. In practice, however, it would, in a very large majority of cases, be found that an employer, rather than go out of the business, would manage to pay what the Court had ordered, the more so, since he would be effectually protected against any undercutting in the matter of wages on the part of his competitors. But whether any really practicable amount of legal coercion would induce the bricklayers, if dissatisfied with the order of the Court, not only to work for one shilling an hour, but also to do something like a shilling's worth of work in an hour, we may very well doubt. It would appear in the highest degree probable, that obedience to the awards of an Arbitration Court could be enforced upon working-men by no other compulsion than that of the strongly felt and vigorously expressed public opinion of their own class. If there were any likelihood that workmen, who failed conscientiously to carry out such an award (whether relating to wages, to working arrangements, including the liberty of the employer to employ on an equal footing unionists and non-unionists and to use to the best advantage the most improved labour-saving appliances, or to any other of the manifold and diverse matters which now give rise to strikes and lock-outs) would be treated by the general body of the working-classes, and especially by the members of the trade union organisations, as being disloyal to the cause of labour, and would, accordingly, be dealt with as "blacklegs," then it might not be unreasonable to expect that a carefully devised system of compulsory arbitration would work in a satisfactory manner. But that, under existing circumstances in this country, any such likelihood as this exists, no one possessing knowledge of the facts will think of asserting. Z.