« НазадПродовжити »
given to the conscious similarity of human beings: their mental and other differences are not indeed ignored, but they continually receive scanty and inadequate notice. We are told, e.g., that the likeness of human beings is “the basis and cause of social cohesion or unity.” Now, as I need hardly say, in any analysis of human society, or history of its development, from an economic point of view, the differences in the qualities and habitual activities of human beings and in their relations to their environment must be prominent from first to last, as causes and effects of economic phenomena.
Nor is it only the economic side of social relations that tends to be thrust into the background by Mr. Giddings' undue stress on the consciousness of similarity: the strictly political aspect of society suffers a similar obscuration. He defines a society as number of likeminded individuals who know and enjoy their like-mindedness," and "cultivate acquaintance and mental agreement”: and tells us that if a number of tolerably like-minded individuals live within a "fairly defined” geographical area,-so that they “may be called a population ”—the “ habit of cultivating acquaintance and like-mindedness will extend through the population, so that the population will tend to become a single social group or “natural society.” But this altogether ignores both the cohesive and the separative forces that, in all stages of human development up to the present, have been exercised by the consciousness of membership of the same political society.
A close criticism of a book at once sô comprehensive in scope and so slight in its treatment of large and difficult questions would, I think, be out of place here: but the following brief survey will give the reader some idea of its contents.
About two-fifths of the book-Chapters V to XV—are almost entirely concerned with what may be called Sociopsychology. Chapter V gives a classification of the practical activities of socii,” distinguishing as the primary activities, (1) appreciation or valuation of things and persons, (2) utilisation-of which economic activity is a “moralised and socialised form "—(3) characterisation, which “consists in so shaping one's own character as to make it more and more nearly adapted to the kind of world in which one lives," and (4) socialisation, consisting in “the systematic development of acquaintance and of helpful social relations." Each of these activities is conceived as having its own motive or motives and its own methods,-an attempt being made to separate the motive of utilisation, as " appetite,” from the pleasures of sensation which supply the first motive of “appreciation.” The primary motive of socialisation is the pleasurableness of acquaintance, companionship, and sympathy"; the “usefulness of social relations” being strangely treated as “secondary and subordinate." The three first-mentioned activities might be carried on non-socially, but in fact, they are importantly modified by socialisation, --i.e. by the assimilation due to “ the consciousness of kind," defined as "that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy,
the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection and the desire for recognition." This, which is declared to be " the simplest of all the states of mind that can be called social,” is boldly affirmed to be “ the cause of all the social activities, and relations which men enter upon intelligently,”--the economic stimulus to communication being, as I remarked, curiously ignored. Accordingly we find that co-operation is the necessary consequence of the likemindedness and consciousness of kind which are its indispensable antecedents; and that “ all co-operation arises” from“ like-responsiveness to the same stimuli."
After the chapters on "social pleasure ” and “the social nature" a triple classification of "socii" is given (Chapter X). They are first divided according to degrees of vitality, distinguished as "high, medium, and low"; then into “personality classes," as “inventive, imitative, defective"; then into "social classes," as "social, non-social, pseudosocial, and anti-social-i.e. judicious philanthropists, average men," “congenital and habitual paupers” and “criminals.” I cannot see that this classification is likely to be of much use, and am again struck with the deliberate ignoring of leading economic differences as secondary. Moreover, Mr. Giddings' view of the “pre-eminent social class," given in the next chapter, seems to involve the false assumption that the individuals who have benefited mankind by invention or otherwise have always had their social sympathies strongly developed.
The four chapters that follow on the social mind are occupied in distinguishing different modes of like-mindedness: viz.(1) "Sympathetic like-mindedness," which results in impulsive social action : (2) “ formal or conventional likeness of mind and character, which is the effect of memory and habit,” and is manifested in popular acceptance of traditional beliefs as such : and (3) the “ rational like-mindedness that results from reflection, discussion and the creation of public opinion. The distinctions are useful, but as worked out here they have an unreal sharpness and definiteness. To contrast belief as a “ form of emotion” with knowledge is fantastic psychology: and if “ true public opinion” is held to be entirely the product of critical
“ thinking,” it is surely only to be found, as Aristotle would have said, "among the gods.”
In Chapters XVI to XIX the author passes to examine the "habitual relations of the members of a society to one another,” and the “persistent forms of co-operative activity ” which are “collectively called the social organisation." Of this the two chief forms or plans are distinguished as Social Composition and Social Constitution. The “component" groups—"counties, townships, cities, villages, families,"-are
. distinguished by the capacity of each group to have an independent life and perpetuate human society if left to itself, from the “constituent groups "such as “political parties, churches, philanthropic and scientific societies.” This classification, with the further statement that “component societies " do not aid each other by division of labour, seems
to ignore the mutual economic dependence of (e.g.) urban and rural districts: nor is it easy to see why a church should be said to lack the capacity of independent self-perpetuation which a city is supposed to possess. It is also surprising to find the State included among constituent societies, which are said to be “always artificial and purposive in origin.” I note, however, that Mr. Giddings recognises the gradual evolution of constituent out of component societies-e.g. of the household as a “purposive group out of the family" as a "genetic aggregation.” And generally speaking, these chapters contain much that is suggestive and useful, together with not a few startlingly rash generalisations.
So far the social relations analysed have been mainly those of modern civilised man ;-though with some rather capricious digressions into history, calculated somewhat to confuse the reader as to the stage in social development to which the various “laws " laid down are supposed to relate. But in the concluding portion of the book (Chapters XX to XXIV) Mr. Giddings undertakes to trace the evolution of human society, from “zoogenic" through “anthropogenic" association up to the stage of formation of tribes, and then through the successive stages of tribal society and civilised progress. And here for the first time the reader realises what a sociologist can do in the way of confident statement and bold generalisation. He is told exactly how from "endogamic metronymic hordes " totemic clans and exogamous metronymic tribes were formed; how through wife-capture and the motives supplied by pastoral industry the tribe became patronymic, adopted ancestor-worship, and ultimately established a rude kind of feudalism and the beginnings of a social organisation independent of kinship. Then, he learns, the patronymic tribal confederacies are impelled, through conquest of alien peoples, into “ an active development of the political phases of the social mind : sovereignty is revealed in its true character as the supreme expression of social will,” and “reacts vigorously upon the whole organisation of society, converting kingship and priesthood, confederacy, tribe, clan and family into positive institutions.” If the conquered territory is relatively wide in extent the previous semi-feudal organisation develops into territorial feudalism: “clear pictures" of this in a rude form are presented in the Book of Judges and in the Odyssey. Under this feudalism the local agricultural group is a village community of servile cultivators; but towns begin to grow up and the development of industry and trade weakens the tribal bonds already impaired by feudalism. It becomes evident that some other than the gentile basis must be found for the organisation of the State. In the history of Athens the successful plan finally hit upon for doing this, "associated with the name of Cleisthenes," is described with the following bold simplification:
“ Clans and tribes had long been localised . . . . the State simply decreed that all men who lived within the boundaries of any local subdivision of a tribal domain should be enrolled as members of the local
community which dwelt there : that all who dwelt within the domain of any tribe should be enrolled as members of that tribe.”
“ Animated by its enlarged ideas of ethnic and territorial unity," the State “enters upon the realisation of a positive policy." The " essential spirit of civilisation is disclosed,” which is “ nothing more or less than a passion for homogenity.” This spirit “ begins to work itself out through various means, the first of which is a career of aggression and conquest, to bring into the enlarging State all those outlying populations that are believed to be suitable components of the larger nation." When this is accomplished, the passion for homogenity manifests itself in a policy of “religious unification” and “sumptuary administration,” which “results in the creation of a homogeneous population.” But we also learn that “when through successful military operations, all formidable enemies have been subjugated, and all outlying territories have been annexed,” a “liberation of energy” occurs through which the State tends to pass from the “military-religious civilisation" just described, to the “ second stage in civic evolution,” a " liberal-legal civilisation.” For, " with no more worlds to conquer," hundreds of thousands of men perforce turn to other than military occupations. Accordingly, “at this point in the evolution of empires, it has always 1 happened that great internal changes have begun. Liberated thought and energy have turned themselves upon domestic affairs. They have scrutinised institutions and laws. They have rebelled against a further coercion of the individual . The material for the criticism of institutions has been abundant” through the comparisons afforded by "contact with other nations in military expeditions and the annexation of State after State to the growing empire.” The result is that a critical spirit arises : "protestantism, in the large sense of the word, begins to be influential, and the now fully self-conscious community” faces the “ task of achieving a social organisation that shall maintain unity and stability and guarantee liberty. With the aids of the guiding ideas of jus gentium and jus nature, "a legal constitution of society is seen to be possible": the “demand becomes insistent that governments shall cease to exercise arbitrary powers": and, through rebellions and revolutions, “if events take their natural course, the normal outcome is everywhere the same. Charters and guarantees are wrested from kings whose divine right has ceased to inspire fear," and "freedom of contract is established as the legal basis of the minor relations of life.”
If the reader should ask for the data from which this normal process is generalised, I fear that the lines of “parallel study,” which the author has usefully indicated at the end of each chapter, may not altogether satisfy him. But from this point of view he should note that “many nations that have entered upon " the liberal-legal“ stage of civic evolution have been unable to complete it,” and that of these nations Greece was the first, for though Athens was splendidly critical and philosophical, she “ failed in legal construction." And he may be interested to learn that the failure was due "to the neverending necessity of maintaining a highly efficient military organisation --with its inevitable incidents of arbitrary power-in the face of formidable enemies."
1 The italics are mine.
I have not space to describe the final transition from the “ liberallegal” stage to the third, economic-ethical or democratic stage of civic evolution: nor to discuss the attempt in the concluding chapter to connect the theory of society here laid down with a wider view of cosmic phenomena. But I have, I hope, given the reader some means of judging how far it is desirable to substitute the study of Sociology, as made easy by Professor Giddings, for the whole or part of the older and narrower study of Political Economy.
Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Von Dr. KARL THEODOR VON
INAMA-STERNEGG, Sektionschef u. Präsident der k.k. statistischen Central-Kommission, &c., &c. Dritter Band : Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte in den letzten Jahrhunderten des Mittelalters. Erster Theil. (Leipzig : Duncker u.
Humblot. 1899. Pp. xiii., 455.)
In spite of the pressure of his official duties as President of the Austrian Statistical Commission, Dr. von Inama-Sternegg has con tinued to work indefatigably at his German Economic History; and now, some twenty years, if I remember aright, since the first volume appeared, he presents us with the welcome gift of the first half of the third and concluding volume. He adds the cheering news that he expects to finish the second part, dealing with industry, trade and currency, in a year's time. The treatise when completed will be an honour to German scholarship, and invaluable to the student of economic history in every country.
The present instalment, besides a somewhat miscellaneous appendix of statistical tables, falls into four substantial sections. The first and briefest (pp. 1-35) contains a masterly survey of the German economic area and of its population. It traces the movement of colonisation in the south and north, and the immigration into neighbouring foreign lands; and then it brings together the accessible information about the density of population in the several districts, and the nature and extent of the migration townwards. The second section (pp. 36-137) shows how a system of estates or classes (Stände), resting on economic foundations, gradually superseded the old gradations based on legal status; and how each of the main classes, such as the peasants or the townsmen, itself exhibited a complicated economic stratification. Dr. von Inama, perhaps significantly, omits the nobles from his series of Berufsstände. It might have added to the interest of his story if he had pointed out how large a part status continued to play in Germany down to a very recent date ; and if, following the example of Nitzsch,