intimately connected, to the injury of another, with the matter for which he seeks relief, as to make it inequitable to accord him such relief."

Where the parties to a suit, though both guilty of fraud in connection with the matter in litigation, are not in pari delicto, a court of equity will not apply the principle of this maxim and deny its aid to the least guilty party. Therefore where the parties to a suit arising out of a conveyance in fraud of creditors of the grantor are not in pari delicto with reference to the fraud, though in delicto, a court of equity will not apply the principle of this maxim and refuse its aid to the party guilty in the lesser degree. Conlon v. Hosier (1917) 165 N. Y. Supp. 745 (fraudulent conveyance of plaintiff to defendant was part of scheme of her attorney, to which defendant was party, to take advantage of plaintiff's fraudulent conveyance to defraud her of her property).

In Pinckston v. Brown (1857) 56 N. C. (3 Jones, Eq.) 494, wherein it appeared that the plaintiff was ignorant, "old, infirm, weak of mind, and much diseased and distressed in body, having . . been struck with paralysis." Her oldest son managed her affairs and exercised such an influence over her that "he could make her do just what he wished her to do." Being indebted and unable immediately to meet the indebtedness, the son proposed that she convey her property to a trustee to secure a fictitious indebtedness to him represented by promissory notes which he caused her to execute in his favor. The son died and his administrator sought to procure a sale of the property in satisfaction of the notes. The court held that while the mother and son were in delicto with reference to the conveyance in defraud of her creditor, she was not in pari delicto with him, and refused to apply the principle of "unclean hands," granting the mother an injunction restraining the sale of her property and the collection by her son's administrator of the amount of the said notes.

delay in protesting against a connected with the matter in

litigation, with notice of the fraud, a litigant may become estopped to plead the principle of the maxim, "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands." Gordon Tiger Min. & Reduction Co. v. Brown (1913) 56 Colo. 301, 138 Pac. 51.

In Cuba Colony Co. v. Kirby (1907) 149 Mich. 453, 112 N. W. 1133, a suit was instituted by a corporation against the promoters thereof for the cancelation of shares of the company's stock which had been issued to them. The stock had been acquired in part payment of the alleged purchase price to the defendants of certain land on which they claimed to have paid a part of such purchase price and which they, at the time of the formation of the company, agreed to sell to the latter for the amount which they falsely stated was the purchase price to them. The facts were that they had obtained an option on the land from the owner to purchase it for a sum considerably less than that for which they had disposed of it to the company, but nothing had been paid by them towards its purchase. The court held that though the company also had misrepresented the value of the land, the defense of "unclean hands" could not, on that account, be set up in the instant case to defeat its suit.

VI. Deception of public.

a. In business generally. One who is guilty of misrepresentations affecting the public in conducting his business is not entitled to the aid of a court of equity if the representations are directly connected with the subject-matter of the suit in which the aid of the court is sought. Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Co. (1865) 11 H. L. Cas. 523, 11 Eng. Reprint, 1435, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 53, 11 Jur. N. S. 513, 12 L. T. N. S. 742, 13 Week. Rep. 873, affirming (1863) 4 De G. J. & S. 137, 46 Eng. Reprint, 868, 2 New Reports, 481, 3 New Reports, 264, 33 L. J. Ch. N. S. 199, 10 Jur. N. S. 81, 9 L. T. N. S. 588, 12 Week. Rep. 289; Cropper v. Davis (1917) 156 C. C. A. 90, 243 Fed. 310.

Therefore in Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.

(1906) 74 C. C. A. 89, 142 Fed. 919,

it was held that a court of equity, in the application of the principle of the maxim, "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands," will not, if the charge is true, enjoin the publication and dissemination of circulars charging that a merchants' scale of a certain manufacture gave false weight, and that it was the purpose of its manufacturers in producing it to defraud the public on behalf of the merchant using the scale.

Misrepresentations as to the cost and value of shares of worthless mining stock and that certain personal stock sold was treasury stock, and misleading statements made to investigators sent to examine the mining property, being a part of a scheme of the plaintiff and defendant to defraud the public by inducing the purchase of the stock, have been held to be sufficient to bar the plaintiff from relief in his suit against the defendant for an accounting, etc., under the principle of this maxim. Primeau v. Granfield (1911) 114 C. C. A. 549, 193 Fed. 911, writ of certiorari denied in (1912) 225 U. S. 708, 56 L. ed. 1267, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 839, wherein it was also held that a person who was guilty, inter alia, of assisting in manipulating the stock market by fictitious bids, and of giving away shares of worthless mining stock to obtain influence in the market, was guilty of such fraudulent conduct as to preclude a recovery by him from his partner in the fraudulent enterprise of his share of the profits derived from the sale of the worthless stock.

In Fay v. Lambourne (1908) 124 App. Div. 245, 108 N. Y. Supp. 874, order affirmed without opinion in (1909) 196 N. Y. 575, 90 N. E. 1158, a business which was alleged mind-reading and the supposed telling of past as well as future events was held to be in itself a fraudulent deception of the public, justifying the application of the principle of "unclean hands" to the suit of a person seeking to enjoin the use by another of his business name used in such venture.

In Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Co. (1915) 136 C. C. A. 583, 220 Fed. 837, it was held that the author of a book which contained made-to

order advertisements for the use of dealers in pianos and player-pianos who should be licensed by the author to use them, and which contained statements which could not be true as to the business of all of the licensees, was not entitled to the protection of a court of equity in the enjoyment of his copyright for the reason that the particular advertisements were not copyrightable, being deceptive of the public, and the plaintiff was guilty of inequitable conduct. The court said: "It is a familiar maxim of equity that one who applies to a court of equity for relief should come in with clean hands; and, it may be added, he should show a clean bill of health to entitle him to its protection."

In Munn & Co. v. American Co. (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 309, L.R.A.1916D, 116, 91 Atl. 87, modifying (1913) 82 N. J. Eq. 63, 88 Atl. 330, the principle of the maxim was applied to the case of a plaintiff who was guilty of misrepresentations as to the editorship of a publication, which misrepresentations were pleaded in defense of a suit for an injunction restraining similar acts of the defendant.

One carrying on a collection and rating business was held in Cropper v. Davis (1917) 156 C. C. A. 90, 243 Fed. 310, not to be precluded from procuring the aid of a court of equity in protecting his business and copyrights in books used in connection therewith, on the theory that he was in court with "unclean hands," where he was alleged to have made certain misrepresentations with respect to the rating of his customers, the court saying: "It is said the appellee represented to his customers and to the public generally that he was carrying on a business of 'collecting by rating' when, as a matter of fact, he neither made nor published a 'rating of any individual or firm.' It is true, those who paid were not specially rated. They were treated upon the theory that the fact that a man's reputation was never called in question is a good rating. As to those who failed to pay, they were rated in accordance with a key set forth in the 'Red Guide and Credit Record.' This key showed that those marked 'B' had been reported by two

members, and those marked from 'C' to 'I' had respectively been reported by three to nine members; those marked 'z' were disputed accounts, 'y' letters returned, 'x' outlawed accounts, and 'bk' bankrupt. This was such a rating as, in the absence of fraud, would comply with the league's contracts."

Causing a deed of trust to real estate for business reasons to be executed in the name of an employee of the cestui que trust, rather than in the name of the latter, and recording the same, has been held, in an action to foreclose the deed of trust, not to be a proceeding calling for the application of the principle of "unclean hands" and the denial of the relief prayed. Brown v. Grove (1897) 25 C. C. A. 644, 42 U. S. App. 508, 80 Fed. 564. In that case the suit was to foreclose a deed of trust to property of the defendants, whose business establishment, which was uninsured, was destroyed by fire. The plaintiffs came to the assistance of the defendants in their embarrassment, agreeing to sell them goods on credit. The security which they asked and received was a deed of trust on certain realty of the defendants, which, for business reasons, was executed in favor of an employee of the plaintiffs. This deed was recorded. In defense of the suit the defendants pleaded that this arrangement was fraudulent and void, and that the plaintiffs had not come into equity with clean hands. The court held that the plaintiffs had not been guilty of any fraudulent conduct, and that the maxim invoked did not apply to the instant case.

Though one is guilty of misrepresentations or concealments, if they have no immediate connection with the subject-matter of the litigation before the court, the principle of "unclean hands" has no application and should. not preclude the guilty person from recovering the relief sought. Thus, in Mossler v. Jacobs (1896) 66 Ill. App. 571, a suit to enjoin an alleged infringement of a tradename, the court, after granting to the complainant the relief prayed, said: "Appellants insist that some of the advertisements put forth by complainants are mani

festly untrue, and that therefore they should be denied relief, invoking the maxim, 'He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.' It does not appear that the advertisements mentioned had or have any connection with appellants or their business, or the controversy with complainants."

In Shaver v. Heller & M. Co. (1901) 65 L.R.A. 878, 48 C. C. A. 48, 108 Fed. 821, affirming (1900) 102 Fed. 882, the suit was to restrain the defendants from selling as the manufactured product of the plaintiffs, and under the name by which the plaintiffs' product was known to the public, a similar product manufactured by another. In defense it was pleaded that the complainants were selling certain of their products under the denomination "Germania Ball Blue" and "Bavarian Ball Blue," in boxes having the appearance of, but not being in reality, containers of foreign products; that in so doing they were attempting to deceive the public, and were not, therefore, in court with "clean hands." In applying this maxim the court held that the charge of the defendants had no connection with the matter in litigation, and did not, therefore, affect the right to the relief prayed.

In Bradley Co. v. Bradley (1913) 165 Cal. 237, 131 Pac. 750, it appeared that an owner of real estate conveyed certain property to another to hold under a parol trust for himself, to mortgage the property, and with the money thereby procured to erect improvements on the land, and to pay the rents derived therefrom to the grantor. The deed was made absolute for the reason that the owner did not care, for business reasons, to be known as a borrower of money. The grantee in the deed performed the agreement, and the owner, and later his successor in interest, paid the taxes on the property. The successor of the said owner subsequently demanded a reconveyance by the grantee in the deed, which reconveyance was refused. He then brought suit to enforce the parol trust. Before lending the money secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee had required that the grantee in the deed should prosecute an action to estab

truth of the following statement, contained in a pamphlet advertising a preparation denominated "double

a

chloride of gold," alleged to be the basis of a system for the treatment known as the "Keeley cure," of those addicted to the habitual use of drugs and intoxicating liquor, and of those suffering from neurasthenia: "For the condition of the system, reason as well as science would indicate remedy which will have a direct and positive effect upon the nerve centers. Such an agent is found in the double chloride of gold. The remarkable therapeutical virtues of gold have long been known, but its scientific and accurate application has not been understood by the profession, and hence its disuse. By the special method of preparation employed by Dr. Leslie E. Keeley, the double chloride of gold has become the great ethical agent which, acting promptly upon the nerve centers, gives to the worn-out and diseased system renewed health, activity, and life." The court held that this statement was not true, and, in applying the principle of this maxim, denied the plaintiffs an injunction, restraining the defendants from administering the Keeley remedies at the defendant's institute.

In W. A. Gaines & Co. v. TurnerLooker Co. (1913) 123 C. C. A. 79, 204 Fed. 553, a suit to enjoin the use of a label on containers of whisky of the defendant, alleged to be an infringement of the plaintiff's trademark, it appeared that certain labels of the complainant on "free bottled whisky" contained the following: "Distilled at the Hermitage distillery, Franklin county, Kentucky, this whisky is bottled at the distillery under our personal supervision, and guaranteed absolutely pure and unadulterated." The court stated that free whisky is not bottled at a distillery, and that, the representation in the trademark being false, the plaintiff was not in court with clean hands, and therefore not entitled to the relief prayed. Certain other labels of plaintiff bore the statement that the whisky was manufactured "in the sour mash fire copper way, being singled and doubled in copper stills, over open wood fires."

This statement was held to be false, and the case to be within the rule of "unclean hands."

In Prince Mfg. Co. v. Prince's Metallic Paint Co. (1892) 135 N. Y. 24, 17 L.R.A. 129, 31 N. E. 990, it was held that the use on a label of the name "Prince's metallic paint," which it was sought to enjoin, was in itself a misrepresentation of the article so labeled, the name signifying that the paint so labeled was the product of ore from a certain mine.

In Fetridge v. Wells (1857) 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 144, protection was refused to the name "balm of thousand flowers," as applied to a liquid soap.

In Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Modox Co. (1907) 152 Fed. 493, it was held that certain advertisements as to the discovery and ingredients of a "nerve food" were so far untrue as to preclude the proprietors from protection against infringement. But in Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Modox (1907) 153 Fed. 487, affirmed in (1907) 89 C. C. A. 441, 162 Fed. 649, the evidence was held to show the truth of the same statements.

The act of labeling a blend of whiskies of different ages, "whisky," instead of "blended whisky," has been held not to be such a deception of the public as to justify the denial by a court of equity of the remedy sought by the party charged therewith, under the principle of this maxim. Bonnie & Co. v. Bonnie Bros. (1914) 160 Ky. 487, 169 S. W. 871.

In Bear Lithia Springs Co. v. Great Bear Spring Co. (1906) 71 N. J. Eq. 595, 71 Atl. 383, a false statement in advertising as to the curative properties of medicinal water was held sufficient to prevent the award of an injunction against infringement.

In Dr. Peter H. Fahrney & Sons Co. v. Ruminer (1907) 82 C. C. A. 621, 153 Fed. 735, where an advertisement claimed for a proprietary medicine the power to cure a number of diseases, it was held that, notwithstanding these claims constituted misrepresentations of facts, the case was not one for the application of the principle of this maxim, the court saying: "Upon the subject of unclean hands, it is our opinion that the conclusion of the mas