issue for the reason that mandamus Mandamus-to compel allowance of Inspection. is not the proper remedy. The matter of obtaining evidence by inspection, or otherwise, is a matter that may arise in any case, and thus may be a matter incident to the ordinary course of procedure therein. If the Appeal-refusal of inspection. court errs in granting or refusing inspection, the party aggrieved may preserve his exception to the court's ruling, and may present it to this court on appeal after final judgment. It may be, however, that the party who feels aggrieved at the time the ruling is made may, nevertheless, be well satisfied with the result ultimately reached by the court. In such matters, while the ruling of the court may, in some instances, cause a retrial of the case, and thus cause delay in the ultimate determination of the litigation, it is not, like the other branch of this application, a refusal to proceed to try and determine the issues presented by the pleadings, and produces no more delay or inconvenience than occurs in actual practice almost daily. If writs of mandate could be obtained every time a court refuses to order the production of some evidence deemed material and relevant by one of the parties to an action, or every time a court refuses to grant inspection of certain documentary or other evidence, we would hardly have time to meet the legitimate and ever-increasing appellate work of this court. In connection with this question, plaintiff's counsel have argued various propositions, which, if the questions were properly before us, would require attention. In view, however, of the conclusion reached that mandamus is not the proper remedy, we refrain from discussing and passing upon these propositions. We are clearly of the opinion that, upon the second branch of the application stated above, mandamus is not the proper remedy. It is, therefore, ordered that peremptory writ of mandate issue, requiring the District Court of Carbon County to vacate its order or judgment dismissing the action against the Company, and to reinstate the Company as a party defendant in the action, to the same extent as though no order of dismissal had been entered, and to proceed to try and determine all the issues with regard to title, presented by the pleadings of the respective parties, whether legal or equitable, and to make such final disposition upon the merits of such issues, and to enter such judgment or judgments, as to the court may seem just and proper. Plaintiff to recover costs of this proceeding. Straup, Ch. J., and McCarty, J., concur. ANNOTATION. Inadequacy of remedy by appeal or writ of error as affecting right to mandamus to inferior court. I. General rule, 633. II. Exposition of rule, 633. On the question of mandamus to compel an inferior court to proceed with a cause, or assume jurisdiction thereof, where it has erroneously refused to do so for supposed lack of jurisdiction, see note to State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Ct. ante, 582. On mandamus to compel a court to take jurisdiction of a cause that it has erroneously dismissed for supposed insufficiency of service, see note to Speckert v. Ray, ante, 610. On mandamus to compel a court to reinstate or proceed with the hearing of an appeal that it has erroneously dismissed, see note to Floyd v. Sixth Judicial Dict. Ct. post, 655. Cases in which it appears that there was no remedy at all, by appeal or writ of error, are not within the scope of the annotation, whether mandamus was or was not issued, the adequacy of the remedy being the subject under investigation. There are numberless cases holding or assuming that the remedy by appeal or error was adequate in the particular instance, and denying mandamus on that ground. The present note, however, is confined to cases holding the remedy by appeal or writ of error inadequate. 1. General rule. The general rule that mandamus will not be allowed to compel action by an inferior court, when the applicant has, or could have had, an adequate remedy by appeal or writ of error, must be understood to relate to a specific and adequate remedy. United States.-North Alabama Development Co. v. Orman (1896) 18 C. C. A. 309, 30 U. S. App. 646, 71 Fed. 764. Alabama. (A remedy which will place the complainant in the same situation as he was before the act of which complaint is made.) Etheridge v. Hall (1838) 7 Port. 47; Ex parte King (1855) 27 Ala. 387; First Nat. Bank v. Cheney (1898) 120 Ala. 117, 23 So. 733; Ex parte Watters (1913) 180 Ala. 523, 61 So. 904. California. Merced Min. Co. v. Fremont (1857) 7 Cal. 130, 7 Mor. Min. Rep. 309; San Francisco Gas & E. Co. v. Superior Ct. (1908) 155 Cal. 30, 99 Pac. 359, 17 Ann. Cas. 933; Hill v. Superior Ct. (1911) 15 Cal. App. 307, 114 Pac. 805. Louisiana.-State ex rel. Murray v. Lazarus (1884) 36 La. Ann. 578; State ex rel. New Orleans v. Judge of Division B, Civil Dist. Ct. (1900) 52 La. Ann. 1275, 51 L.R.A. 71, 27 So. 697; State ex rel. Rogers v. Parsons (1907) 119 La. 955, 44 So. 795. Michigan.-People ex rel. Port Huron & G. R. Co. v. Judge of St. Clair Circuit (1875) 31 Mich. 456; People ex rel. Townsend v. Cass Circuit Judge (1878) 39 Mich. 407; Tawas & B. C. R. Co. v. Circuit Judge (1880) 44 Mich. 479, 7 N. W. 65; Van Norman v. Circuit Judge (1881) 45 Mich. 204, 7 N. W. 796; Detroit v. Hosmer (1890) 79 Mich. 384, 44 N. W. 622; Wayne County v. Wayne Circuit Judges (1895) 106 Mich. 166, 64 N. W. 42; Dillon v. Shiawassee Circuit Judge (1902) 131 Mich. 574, 91 N. W. 1029; Luther v. Kent Circuit Judge (1908) 151 Mich. 71, 114 N. W. 673. Missouri. Hall v. County Ct. (1858) 27 Mo. 329; State ex rel. Schonhoff v. O'Bryan (1890) 102 Mo. 254, 14 S. W. 933. Montana. State ex rel. Montana C. R. Co. v. District Ct. (1905) 32 Mont. 37, 79 Pac. 546. Texas.-Terrell v. Greene (1895) 88 Tex. 539, 31 S. W. 631; GULF, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. MUSE (reported herewith) ante, 613. Utah.-People ex rel. Pace v. Van Tassel (1896) 13 Utah, 9, 43 Pac. 625; KETCHUM COAL Co. v. DISTRICT CT. (reported herewith) ante, 619. Washington. -State ex rel. Jefferson County v. Hatch (1904) 36 Wash. 164, 78 Pac. 796; State ex rel. Nash v. Superior Ct. (1914) 82 Wash. 614, 144 Pac. 898. II. Exposition of rule. In Ingram v. Alabama Power Co. (1917) Ala., 75 So. 304, the court said: "It has been definitely settled by this court that the proper and appropriate practice is to appeal from orders, judgments, or decrees which deny or refuse applications for rehearing made under the four-months' statute, because such order or judgment is final, disposing of the application and the judgment sought to be set aside; but, if the application to set aside the judgment and grant a rehearing is erroneously made, the order is not final, because it does not dispose of the case, but restores it to the docket for a new trial. In such case there is no judgment to support an appeal, and hence errors (if such have intervened) could not be reviewed or corrected on appeal. This being true, the proper and appropriate practice and remedy are by mandamus to compel annulment of improper orders, and restoration of the judgment or decree erroneously set aside, thus preventing a rehearing or a new trial." So, in First Nat. Bank v. Cheney (1898) 120 Ala. 117, 23 So. 733, the court said: "The case comes before the court, primarily, on an application for a mandamus to compel the judge of the city court of Anniston to enter an order dismissing a suit commenced in that court by A. D. Cheney against the First National Bank of Anniston, and to vacate an order which had been entered, overruling a motion for a dismissal. At the time of the commencement of the suit, Cheney was a nonresident of the state, and failed to give security for the costs of suit. If the neglect to give the security required the dismissal of the suit, mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel it; though on appeal, after final judgment against the defendant, the refusal to dismiss, if properly presented, would be error available to reverse the judgment. As a general rule, it is true that mandamus will not be granted for the correction of an error arising in the progress of a suit, which can be revised on appeal after final judgment. Ex parte Elston (1854) 25 Ala. 72. But the appeal must be an adequate remedy. It must be capable of protecting parties from the injury immediately resulting from the error of the court. Merrill, Mandamus, § 201. While the error in refusing a dismissal for want of security for costs may be available on error for the reversal of a judgment, obviously an appeal is not an adequate remedy. The citizen is compelled into litigation with a nonresident, pending the further continuance of the suit and the appeal, without indemnity against the costs,-the evil the statute intends to avoid. Hence, it has been the uniform course of decision that mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the dismissal of such suit. Ex parte Cole (1856) 28 Ala. 50; Ex parte Robbins (1856) 29 Ala. 71; Ex parte Morgan (1857) 30 Ala. 51." And in Ex parte Watters (1913) 180 Ala. 523, 61 So. 904, the court said: "When it is sought to review and correct such rulings by mandamus, the proceeding is merely an emergency substitute for an appeal, and in fact accomplishes with greater expedition the same result, viz., the correction of judicial error. No reason can be suggested why such judicial action can be reviewed on appeal only upon a bill of exceptions, and yet on mandamus may be reviewed upon the ex parte recitals of a mere petition. And, indeed, it has been expressly held that, upon a mandamus petition to review the alleged erroneous judicial action of an inferior court, the petitioner must reserve a bill of exceptions, in the absence of which the case is not properly presented for the consideration of this court, even though the respondent admit by his answer the verity of the facts recited. Ex parte Smith (1881) 69 Ala. 528; followed in Ex parte Blalock (1896) 115 Ala. 692, 22 So. 998." And in Merced Min. Co. v. Fremont (1857) 7 Cal. 130, 7 Mor. Min. Rep. 309, where an injunction had been disobeyed during the time an appeal therefrom was pending, and the inferior court had refused to issue an attachment for contempt, the court said: "It would seem clear that, if the injunction was not affected by the appeal, there must be some remedy for its violation pending an appeal; for if there be no remedy for the wrong, the right injured does not exist. No right can exist, in contemplation of law, that cannot be injured, and there can be no injury without a remedy. Where, then, can this remedy be found, but in the district court? That court must protect the parties in their substantial rights. As to the other question, whether the remedy is by mandamus or appeal, we think there can be but little doubt. The remedy by appeal is too slow, and is not adequate. The duty to be performed is fixed by law, and certain. As to how that duty is to be performed, this court will not direct. All we can do by this writ is to direct the judge to exercise his discretion in inquiring into the acts charged, and rendering his decision upon them. The decisions of this court have fully settled some of these points. People ex rel. Smith v. Olds (1852) 3 Cal. 167, 58 Am. Dec. 398; People ex rel. McDougall v. Bell (1854) 4 Cal. 177; Russell v. Elliott (1852) 2 Cal. 245." In State ex rel. Murray v. Lazarus (1884) 36 La. Ann. 578, the court said: "Referring to that Code, the wise provisions of which have long slumbered, we find it distinctly stated that the object of the writ of mandamus is to prevent a denial of justice; that the writ should, therefore, be issued where the law has assigned no relief by the ordinary means, and where justice and reason require that some mode should exist of redressing a wrong, or an abuse of any nature whatever. It arises, says the Code, at the discretion of the court, even where a party has other means of relief, if the slowness of ordinary legal forms is likely to produce such a delay that the administration of justice may suffer from it. Code of Practice, arts. 830, 831. In cases like the present one, in which an injunction was refused in limine, after hearing on a rule nisi, it has been held that an appeal lies; but it has never been decided that such an appeal, even if allowed as a suspensive one, would operate as the desired injunction would have done, had it been granted. Indeed, it is hard, not to say impossible, to conceive how a suspensive appeal from a decree refusing an injunction can produce the effect of preventing the act which the injunction sought would have arrested had it been allowed. It would be highly It would be highly dangerous to the administration of justice to give to an appeal from an order refusing an injunction the effect of preventing the act which the injunction, if issued, would have arrested, for in all cases in which an injunction would be declined, even rightfully, lawful acts would be invariably suppressed. No doubt an appeal lies, but, if termed suspensive, it is barren of effect in that sense. So that if there be a remedy, it is not an adequate one, and, if a party entitled to an injunction is refused the same, he remains with a right, but without a remedy, at the mercy of a district judge, unless this court can interfere and relieve him from the effect of a denial of justice. Where a clear case for an injunction is presented, it is the duty of the judge to grant the relief. He has then no more discretion to exercise than when seasonable application is made and a proper bond tendered for an appeal in an appealable case. In such a case it is manifest that justice and reason require that some mode should exist of redressing at once the wrong or the abuse of power on the part of the district judge, even if there be other means of relief, or the slowness of ordinary legal forms would produce such a delay that the administration of justice may suffer from it. On this branch of the case, we, therefore, conclude that this court has jurisdiction to issue a mandamus to compel a district judge to allow an injunction in limine, whenever a proper state of facts is presented and all the requirements of the law have been complied with. In such case, this court may grant a restraining order which will operate, provisionally, as the injunction asked, but declined, would have done had it been allowed. But it does not follow that, because this court has such power to interpose its authority in cases of emergency and denials of justice, it will thus interfere, whatever be the case presented. It will issue the writ in its discretion, according to the exceptional features of each case submitted. In the present instance, the district judge has adduced satisfactory reasons, resting both on an absence of facts and a consideration of the law, for refusing the injunction asked, which are, substantially, that the petition is deficient, as it discloses no cause of action. do not propose to elaborate those reasons which are indicated in the beginning of the opinion, and which we deem amply sufficient to exonerate the respondent from the charge of an arbitrary, illegal, and wrongful denial of justice." We In Tawas & B. C. R. Co. v. Circuit Judge (1880) 44 Mich. 479, 7 N. W. 65, the court, in issuing a mandamus to compel an inferior court to dissolve an injunction, said: "The jurisdiction of this court in mandamus cases is not statutory, but plenary, and su- case, the whole business of the corporation is stopped unless the company submits to conditions which the court has no power to impose. If the officers disobey the writ they have to decide for themselves whether it can safely be done, and few persons are willing or should be compelled to act under such a pressure. An appeal always involves considerable delay, and during the interval there is room for new controversies. The case, therefore, is urgent, and, as there is no doubt of the illegality of the order complained of, it should not be continued to menace the persons engaged in the enterprise. They should not be driven to the alternative of seeming to defy the authority of the courts. We think a mandamus is a proper remedy, and should be granted, with costs against the complainants in chancery." In Detroit v. Hosmer (1890) 79 Mich. 384, 44 N. W. 622, the court said: "Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to remove an injunction which ought not to stand depends entirely on the conditions of its issue. Usually, if the mischief can be as well settled by appeal, that is the proper resort. But we have held on several occasions that where a preliminary injunction operates in such a way as to do violence to vested rights and interests, and to prevent the proper authorities from exercising their legal functions, it is such an invasion of right as entitles the aggrieved parties to a prompt redress, which, as decided in those cases, is better for the public peace and order than encouraging an open disregard of the legal tribunals, where it can be avoided. While the action of an inferior court, within its discretion, is to be reached by other appellate process, yet, when the action complained of is beyond any proper discretionary power, or is an abuse of discretion which cannot be justified on legal principles, this court may and will interfere by mandamus, if there is urgency, or pressing occasion to do so. In Port Huron & G. R. Co. v. Judge of St. Clair Circuit (1875) 31 Mich. 456, it was held that an attempt by ex parte action to devest a board of directors of a corporation of their |