ty which the law requires in such cases."

In Randolph v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (1904) 106 Mo. App. 646, 79 S. W. 1170, the court said that, while "a railroad company is only required to keep its platforms in a reasonably safe condition," a platform's "construction and maintenance as a means by which a passenger may safely board or alight from the defendant's cars on the track presents a question somewhat different. In Lafflin

v. Buffalo & S. W. R. Co. (1887) 106 N. Y. 136, 60 Am. Rep. 433, 12 N. E. 599, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 268, the court held that the space between the platform and the car was not obviously dangerous. Whether such a conclusion be right or wrong, it was not a proper test of the carrier's liability. The term, 'obviously dangerous,' means 'plainly dangerous.' It seems to us that the phraseology is misleading. The real question is, Was it unsafe? If it was obviously dangerous the carrier would be guilty of the grossest negligence, whereas he should be held to the highest degree of care commensurate with human care and foresight. We can see no good reason why the foregoing rule should not apply until the passenger reaches the platform of the carrier's station."

Some of the cases require a reasonably safe place.

Thus, "it is the duty of common carriers of passengers to furnish a reasonably safe place for passengers to alight from trains, and if such carrier negligently fails to perform this duty, and thereby proximately causes injury to a passenger in the exercise of due care, the carrier is liable for the resulting damage." Skow v. Green Bay & W. R. Co. (1909) 141 Wis. 21, 123 N. W. 138.

In New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Lincoln (1915) 139 C. C. A. 334, 223 Fed. 896, 9 N. C. C. A. 1069, the court said: "The law requires a carrier of passengers to exercise reasonable care for the protection of its passengers, and to see that its station houses are reasonably safe, including its platforms, walks, steps, and landings for use in waiting for, approaching, and

leaving trains. The principle is well settled that a carrier is bound to exercise care in securing the safety of its passengers while boarding and alighting from its cars, and the degree of care required has been held to be the care which a very prudent person would have used under the circumstances. . . . When a railroad stops its trains at a station platform, and so invites its passengers to alight, the law imposes upon it the duty of using due care to provide proper and safe means of getting from the platform of the cars to the platform of the station."

Other authorities do not seem to require a high degree of care.

Thus, in Polland v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (1914) 112 Me. 286, 92 Atl. 38, the court, in directing judgment for the defendant, said: "In such a case as the one at bar, care in the highest degree was not required of the defendant, nor was the same degree of care required as that owed to a passenger in a moving train. The defendant was not required to maintain absolutely safe conditions, but its only duty was to exercise ordinary care, and to maintain its platform in such a reasonably safe and suitable condition that passengers who were themselves in the exercise of ordinary care could safely alight from the train."

In Lafflin v. Buffalo & S. W. R. Co. (N. Y.) supra, the court said that the defendant "was not bound so to construct this platform as to make accidents to passengers using the same impossible, or to use the highest degree of diligence to make it safe, conIt was bound venient, and useful. simply to exercise ordinary care, in view of the dangers attending its use, to make it reasonably adequate for the purpose to which it was devoted."

The railroad company is not an insurer, but is only required to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Dinkelspiel v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1908) 113 N. Y. Supp. 187.

In some jurisdictions it would seem difficult for the injured plaintiff to

recover.

Thus, in Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1910) 81 N. J. L. 536, 35

L.R.A. (N.S.) 338, 80 Atl. 327, the court said: "If there was a duty imposed upon the defendant in this case, other than it had performed in the carriage and care of the plaintiff, the testimony does not present it, except upon the theory that this intervening space between platform and car step presented an obvious danger which the defendant should have guarded against in some manner. It may be said in passing that if this space presented a condition of danger which was obvious to the defendant, to a degree requiring the exercise of care in its use, and to superinduce a duty of care and foresight, it was equally obvious to the plaintiff."

In Seale v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 59, 100 N. E. 1020, where the plaintiff testified that when the door of the car was opened, before she had a chance to step, the crowd pushed her, and she fell into the space between the car and the station platform, which there curved away from the car about 2 feet, it was held that she was not prejudiced by the refusal of the trial court to permit her to show that when, before she entered the car, she hesitated, on account of the crowded condition of the car, about getting in, and that, as she was standing, after the other passengers had entered the rear door of the car, the guard put his hand behind her back and pushed her into that rear door against the crowd, so that there was just room enough for her between the crowd and the door when it was closed.

II. The question of space.

a. Must be some space. There must be some lateral space between station platforms and cars, owing to the oscillation of the cars; consequently it is not negligence to have some space. Polland v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (1914) 112 Me. 286, 92 Atl. 38 (7 to 10 inches in width, and 14 inches in height); Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1911) 81 N. J. L. 536, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 338, 80 Atl. 327; Lafflin v. Buffalo & S. W. R. Co. (1887) 106 N. Y. 136, 60 Am. Rep. 433, 12 N. E. 599, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 268;

Ryan v. Manhattan R. Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 126, 23 N. E. 1131, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 329 (8 inches on curve); Fox v. New York (1893) 70 Hun, 181, 24 N. Y. Supp. 43, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 683 (11) to 20 inches); Gabriel v. Long Island R. Co. (1900) 54 App. Div. 41, 66 N. Y. Supp. 301, 8 Am. Neg. Rep. 506 (6 inches in width, 14 inches in height); Woolsey v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (1908) 123 App. Div. 631, 108 N. Y. Supp. 16 (10 inches); Gibson v. New York Consol. R. Co. (1916) 173 App. Div. 125, 159 N. Y. Supp. 514 (5 to 7 inches); Coogan v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1906) 50 Misc. 562, 99 N. Y. Supp. 382, later appeal (1907) 53 Misc. 645, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1120 (9 inches on a curve); Wertheimer v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1907) 52 Misc. 540, 102 N. Y. Supp. 706; Dinkelspiel v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1908) 113 N. Y. Supp. 187 (5 to 11 inches); Rothchild v. Central R. Co. (1894) 163 Pa. 49, 29 Atl. 702, 6 Am. Neg. Cas. 382.

The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff who, alighting in the dark without having hold of the railing, and without looking to see the station platform, stepped out from the second step of the car and fell between it and the station platform, the space there being 26 inches wide, the space between the third step of the car and the station platform being 19 inches wide, the third step being 8 inches below the top of the platform and the second step being 4 inches below it. There was evidence that no accident of the kind had happened there before, though thousands of persons had passed from the cars to the platform. Lafflin v. Buffalo & S. W. R. Co. (1887) 106 N. Y. 136, 60 Am. Rep. 433, 12 N. E. 599, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 268, supra, where the court said: "There was no proof that the platform was not constructed in the ordinary way, nor that the space between it and the car was any greater than the exigencies of the business and the operations of the railroad required."

Where the plaintiff, in alighting, fell into a space from 7 to 10 inches wide, and the station platform was 14

inches lower than the car step, judgment was directed for the defendant. Polland v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (Me.)

supra.

Where the plaintiff, in attempting to alight, fell into a space between 7 and 9 inches wide, it was held that the mere proof that other railroads constructed car steps and platforms of a different type, without any proof of the existence of a recognized standard type, will not charge the defendant with negligence. Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1911) 81 N. J. L. 536, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 338, 80 Atl. 327, supra.

It is not negligence to leave a space of 10 inches between the station and car platforms on a bridge, though the ordinary bridge cars are broader. Woolsey v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (1908) 123 App. Div. 631, 108 N. Y. Supp. 16, supra.

b. Cases holding question for the jury. Many of the cases have held that the question of negligence as to the space left was for the jury.

United States.-New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Lincoln (1915) 139 C. C. A. 334, 223 Fed. 896, 9 N. C. C. A. 1069 (3 feet, and absence of usual porters with planks).

Illinois. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Treat (1898) 75 Ill. App. 327, affirmed in (1899) 179 Ill. 576, 54 N. E. 290 (5 inches or less); Lakin v. South Side Elev. R. Co. (1909) 148 Ill. App. 268 (16 to 20 inches); Lakin v. South Side Elev. R. Co. (1913) 178 Ill. App. 176 (16 to 18 inches); Bankwitz v. Northwestern Elev. R. Co. (1913) 182 Ill. App. 55 (8 or 9 inches).

Missouri.-Newcomb v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1904) 182 Mo. 687, 81 S. W. 1069 (7 inches); Randolph v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (1904) 106 Mo. App. 646, 79 S. W. 1170 (10 to 12 inches).

V.

New York.-Green Middlesex Valley R. Co. (1898) 31 App. Div. 412, 53 N. Y. Supp. 500 (22 inches in width and several in height); Boland v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1913) 138 N. Y. Supp. 1099 (8 inches).

Texas.-Missouri P. R. Co. v. Long (1891) 81 Tex. 253, 26 Am. St. Rep. 811, 16 S. W. 1016, 6 Am. Neg. Cas. 605 4 A.L.R.-19.

(17 inches); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Shelton (1902) 30 Tex. Civ. App. 72, 69 S. W. 653, 70 S. W. 359, affirmed in (1903) 96 Tex. 301, 72 S. W. 165 (12 or 13 inches).

Wisconsin.-Skow v. Green Bay & W. R. Co. (1909) 141 Wis. 21, 123 N. W. 138 (14 inches in width, 6 inches in height).

While the court does not seem to have exonerated the defendant as to the space in question in Boyce v. Manhattan R. Co. (1890) 118 N. Y. 314, 23 N. E. 304, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 304, where it was said that there could have been a temporary bridge, or guards, or lights, the same court later said of this case that in it "no negligence was imputed to the company for the existence of the opening." Ryan v. Manhattan R. Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 126, 23 N. E. 1131, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 329.

c. Boston cases,

The Boston cases form a separate class on account of the peculiar situation with respect to the subway. They are not always reported so as to be easily understood by those unfamiliar with the local situation. It would seem that we are to understand that the carrier is not responsible for the construction of the subway platforms. Hilborn v. Boston & N. Street R. Co. (1906) 191 Mass. 14, 77 N. E. 746; Plummer v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1907) 198 Mass. 499, 84 N. E. 849; Seale v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 59, 100 N. E. 1020; Collins v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1914) 217 Mass. 420, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1154, 105 N. E. 353.

Thus, in Hilborn v. Boston & N. Street R. Co. (Mass.) supra, the court said: "It was agreed at the trial that the subway and the stations in it were constructed by the Boston Transit Commission, and are owned by the city of Boston; that the platform at this station is now of the same width and in the same condition as constructed by the Transit Commission; that the Boston Elevated Railway Company operated its cars in the subway under a lease of the subway, and that the defendant operated its cars therein under permission of said elevated company, authorized by the legislature; that the elevated company has the en

tire management, charge, and control of the subway, the stations, and platforms, except that it can make alterations therein only by the permission of the Boston Transit Commission."

In Seale v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 59, 100 N. E. 1020, it was held that there was no error in ordering a verdict for the defendant, where the plaintiff's evidence was that she, in alighting at a subway station, "went to step" and before she "had a chance to step the crowd pushed" her, and she fell out, her leg going down between the car and a portion of the station platform which curved away from the car about 2 feet, the court citing Hilborn v. Boston & N. Street R. Co. (Mass.) supra.

In Collins v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (Mass.) supra, the court said: "The subway and its platform were designed and constructed by public authority, acting through the Boston Transit Commission, and have been leased to the defendant company. Having had no control over the plan or the size of the platform, the defendant is not responsible for the existence of space between the cars and the platform."

Probably we are so to understand the reported case (MACGILVRAY V. BosTON ELEV. R. Co. ante, 283).

It has been held that it is not negligence for a carrier operating elevated railroad trains to leave a space from 3 to 4 inches wide between its platform and cars, into which an alighting passenger fell, the oscillation of the cars requiring about 2 inches. Willworth v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1905) 188 Mass. 220, 74 N. E. 333, 18 Am. Neg. Rep. 463; Field v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1905) 188 Mass. 222, note, 74 N. E. 334. In the Field Case the station was in a subway, and the court stated that it could not be distinguished from the Willworth Case, where, however, it does not appear that the station was in a subway.

In Hilborn v. Boston & N. Street R. Co. (Mass.) supra, the plaintiff, in alighting, failed to look, and fell into a space between the steps of the defendant's surface car and the subway station platform, about 15 inches wide,

the car being the first one in the station, and stopping at the place for first cars, which was on a curve; the space in the straight part of the platform would have been slightly less. It appeared that the defendant was not responsible for the platform, and was bound, in using it, to abide by the regulations of the lessee of the subway. It was held that there was no evidence that the defendant should have used another kind of car, and that the failure to give warning of the space was not negligence, and a verdict for the plaintiff was set aside.

In Plummer v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1907) 198 Mass. 499, 84 N. E. 849, the distance between the car door and the permanent subway platform was from 14 to 20 inches, and the company had provided a movable sliding platform to bridge the gap, and the plaintiff attempted to board when the train had stopped at a point where the movable platform was not opposite all the width of the door. The court, after citing the Hilborn and Willworth Cases, said: "If there had been no movable platform installed by the defendant, it is clear that there would have been no evidence of its negligence, under the decisions of this court before cited. The case turned upon the handling of the situation with respect to the moving platform, and a verdict for the plaintiff was set aside because the trial court charged the jury that it might be negligence to allow the passengers to board by the middle door, if they could be taken at the end doors, the court holding that this was not admissible under the pleadings.

In Anshen v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1910) 205 Mass. 32, 91 N. E. 157, it was held that the failure to bridge a space of from 8 to 10 inches between the end door of an elevated railway car and a subway platform, into which a boarding passenger fell, was not negligence, the minimum clearance required being 3 inches. It appeared that there were some movable platforms, but none at the end doors of cars, and the court held that the case should be considered as if there were no movable platforms.