the sheet was ready to receive any writing whatever, that is, the idea could admit of every one of the determinations of particular existences.1 I conjecture that this is the true interpretation of the tabula rasa of the ancients; and I believe that the moderns in their extreme inclination to scoff at all antiquity have not understood its meaning. The reasons of this my opinion are as follows: (1) The simile of tabula rasa conveys indeed the notion that there are no particular characters to be seen there, but at the same time it admits the tabula itself on which anything may be written. What then is this tabula perfectly plain and smooth, innate in our soul? I maintain that it is indeterminate being, capable of receiving any determinations whatever. (2) This simile can be explained by the other which Aristotle introduces, namely, of the light and the colours. There are, he says, no colours, but there is an innate light, which is per se uniform (behold the smoothness of the tablet), and fit to make us see equally all the colours of things. (3) By so interpreting the tabula rasa, we are enabled to reconcile many passages of Aristotle which would otherwise be irreconcilable. (4) Among those Schoolmen who adopted the simile we find some who say expressly that we have the idea of being innate in us. Suffice it for all to mention S. Bonaventure, or whoever be the author of the Compendium Theologica Veritatis from which I am quoting. In ch. xlvi. of Book ii. he makes use of the Aristotelian simile; and in ch. xlv. he says that all cognitions come from the senses. Nevertheless it seems certain that this writer admits as innate in man the idea of the ens actualissimum (Itin. Ment. in Deum); that is he admits more than I do, for I admit only the idea of being perfectly indeterminate. What then are we to say? That the ancients did not understand the simile in question in that wretched sense which is attributed to it by the moderns. CHAPTER V. THE INNATE IDEA OF BEING SOLVES THE GENERAL DIFFICULTY PRESENTED BY THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. ARTICLE I. Solution of the difficulty. 539. The difficulty involved in the problem of the origin of ideas, has been reduced by me to this simple question: 'How is our first judgment possible?' (41-45). On Locke's hypothesis, that all our ideas come from the senses, the difficulty was insuperable. By my admission, of which I have given the reasons, that the most universal of all ideas is in us by nature antecedently to all our sensations, the difficulty of understanding how we form the first judgment is entirely removed. ARTICLE II. Objections and replies. § I. First objection. 540. But there are objections which we must examine; and the first is this:-The judgment which I have said to be necessary for the formation of ideas, was described as coming to the same thing as the conceiving of an idea; so that judgment is the only means through which ideas are conceived. If this be true, it is of no avail to say that the most universal of all ideas is innate in us; it is an idea; and that is enough to prove that, in order to be conceived, it stands in need of a judgment, like all other ideas. The fact of its being innate does not exclude its having to be conceived by the mind; it only imports that its conception takes place from the very first moment of our existence, through a virtue or power natural to us. If, then, ideas are conceived only by means of a judgment the difficulty which I wished to avoid, returns, and the question arises, 'How is that judgment possible by which we conceive the most universal of all ideas?' Answer to first objection. 541. This objection is based entirely on a false supposition, viz. that a judgment is necessary for the conception of all ideas. The truth on the contrary is, that a judgment is necessary for ideas of our own formation, i.e. those which unite in themselves a predicate and a subject, and are therefore composed of two elements, one of which must be a universal, as, for instance, the ideas of bodies. But if there be an idea which does not consist of these two elements, and is one of them only, there is no need of a judgment in order that we may have and conceive it. A judgment is always an intellectual operation by which two terms are joined together; hence, supposing there are not two terms, but one only, no judgment of any sort will be necessary, nay, possible; there will simply be an immediate intuition, not preceded by any judgment. Now, by examining all the ideas possessed by the human mind, we discover that there is one, and one only (the idea of existence or being in general), which has this singular property, that it is perfectly simple, and not composed of a predicate and a subject; consequently, unlike all other ideas, it demands no judgment for its conception. Therefore this idea, on the one hand, cannot be formed by any operation of our own, but can only be seen by direct intuition; while on the other hand, we could not have intuition of it, unless it were present to our mind: and this is a fresh and evident proof that we have it presented to us by nature. § 2. The first objection is urged with greater force. 542. Nevertheless I feel bound to acknowledge, that it is no easy matter to understand how we can have the intuition here spoken of, without some sort of judgment being mixed up with it. Nay it seems at first sight, that the idea of being may be expressed by the proposition, 'A something is possible to exist;' which proposition is a judgment. If, then, we conceive that proposition, we judge that 'a something is possible.' And that this judgment is included in the idea of being, could be further demonstrated from the analysis I have made of the said idea (423, 424). By that analysis I found it to consist of three elements, two of which are, (1) the notion of a something, and (2) the possibility of this something. Here, it will be urged that we have a predicate and a subject, both expressed in the proposition 'a something is possible;' possibility being the predicate, and the indeterminate something the subject. This is a difficulty which deserves to be carefully considered. Continuation of answer to first objection. 543. The difficulty arises from the uncertainty presented by the concept of possibility. Let us make a more accurate analysis of this concept. In the first place, it should be observed that here we speak of logical possibility, which must not be confounded with probability, the two being totally different from each other. What, then, is logical possibility? By a possible entity is meant an entity which can subsist, can be conceived as subsistent. Whatever does not involve contradiction, is called possible. We can always think it existent, we can imagine it such as often as we please. In order that a thing may be pronounced impossible, the mind must see a necessary reason, with which the existence of that thing is incompatible; so that either the reason must be false, or the thing cannot exist. From the moment that the reason has been recognised as necessarily true, it can no longer be pronounced false; therefore the thing is pronounced impossible. The contrary of impossibility is possibility. As, then, in order to declare a thing impossible we must have a necessary reason incompatible with that thing; so for the possibility of that thing nothing is required save the absence of such concept as would make it an absurdity, a contradiction in terms; for in every case in which no such concept exists, a thing is possible. The reason why the term possibility happens to have a positive sense attached to it, lies in the nature of our mind and of language. Language expresses positive as well as negative entities by a word, i.e. by a positive sign. Hence the facility to confound them together. Thus, when we use the term nothing, we simply mean to exclude all existence, and yet we seem to be speaking of something, because we designate nothingness by a word. What I say of possibility cannot be applied to probability. If possibility signifies the absence of contradiction, probability imports some positive reason over and above the concept of the thing, on the strength of which reason we say: 'It is probable that this thing I am thinking of exists or will happen '-whether that reason consist in a number of cases in which the thing has been seen to take place, or in the knowledge we have of the existence of some special power fit to produce it. Hence it will be seen that I take possibility in a logical and absolute sense, and not in that approximative sense in which this word is often used in common discourse. We say, 'It is impossible that this tree could be here in the garden, if there had been no seed for it to spring from.' This is a case of physical impossibility, or of repugnance to the physical law that 'Every plant comes from a seed.' Again, we say, 'It is impossible that, exposing yourself as you do to so many dangers, you should not, at one time or other, meet with some serious mishap.' This impossibility |