pected persons to wear fetters, since nobody can deny the wisdom and justice of putting madmen and murderers in chains.

Another circumstance which had considerable influence in hastening, and much more in perverting, the revolution in France, was the fixing on Versailles as the place for the states-general to meet at. Although it was impossible to foresee all the mischief which has arisen from that measure, it might naturally have occurred, that an assembly which, it was supposed, was to act with freedom and independence, would have been placed with more propriety at a greater distance from the populous and turbulent city of Paris.

This is so evident, that many have thought it could not escape M. Necker; yet he first advised the king to convoke the assembly at Paris, and did not propose Versailles, until he found the king and the ministers positively against that measure; and as it is not easy to assign a good reason for this, it has been imputed to M. Necker's fondness for popular applause, and to his thinking, that the more evident his popularity was, the greater would be his influence with the assembly. He little thought, that the very scheme which he formed for the augmentation of his own influence was, in a short time, to be a principal cause of the annihilation, not only of his influence, but of the influence of reason, justice, and humanity, and of subjugating the national assembly, and the nation itself, to the most dreadful tyranny that ever oppressed mankind.

It may be thought improper to mention the arbitrary nature of the French government as a cause of the revolution, because it has subsisted many years, and because it subsists still in other countries where no revolution has taken place but that may prove a powerful cause in certain situations, which would have remained inactive in others; in no other nation do the circumstances above enumerated occur in addition to their arbitrary government, nor did they ever before occur in France.

Perhaps all those causes together would not have produced the revolution, without the calling together of the states-general and notwithstanding the greatness of the deficit, it is the opinion of some, that this measure might have been eluded. However that may be, the disorder in the French finances was so great, some time before the year 1789, that the imposition of very considerable additional taxes was thought the only effectual remedy; but as the people thought themselves already overloaded, and were in a state of mutinous discontent, the application of this remedy required prudence and delicacy.

CHAPTER III.

The Notables-M. de Calonne-The Clergy-The Archbishop of Toulouse Minister-Abbe Vermon-A Bed of JusticeParliament of Paris refuse to register the King's Edicts—Parliament banished-Duke of Orleans-Two Counsellors of the Parliament sent to Prison.

It had been long the usage for the parliament of France to register every new imposition. The tax was indeed not considered legal by the people till the registration had taken place; and it sometimes happened, that, instead of obeying the edict, the parliament made a remonstrance, pointing out the hardship or impropriety of the tax, and praying the king to reconsider or withdraw it.

So much the kings of France themselves admitted that the parliament had a right to do; but having made the remonstrance, it was insisted that the parliamentary func tion was completed, and it remained with the king to give what weight to it he pleased. If he still insisted on the tax, it was then the duty of the parliament to register without farther resistance, on a letter from the king, called Lettre de Jussion, being addressed to them.

The friends of prerogative asserted, that this registration of taxes was a mere matter of form, and that the king's edict gave them all their efficacy, independent of

that ceremony; whereas others contended, that no tax could be legally levied till it had received the sanction of parliament.

The spirit of whig and tory had this extent and no more in France, before the American war; but soon after that period the spirit of the first became much more ardent and encroaching.

In times of difficulty, when new taxes were absolutely necessary, and yet ministers were afraid to impose them, it had on various occasions been found necessary to summon the states-general (les etats generaux), and leave it to them to point out the properest method of imposing and levying the necessary taxes.

Les etats generaux are an assembly consisting of deputies from the three orders of citizens in France,-namely, the nobility, the clergy, and the tiers etat; the last implies all the citizens of France who are neither of the nobility nor clergy.

The measure of summoning the states-general was much talked of at the time when M. de Calonne was controller general of the finances; but it required much prudence and circumspection on his part before he decided how to act in the present circumstances.

When moderate reforms only are required in a government with which the people in general are well satisfied, the sooner they are made the better; because they prevent the progress of discontent, and may be made without risk: but when great abuses have taken place, when the people are highly discontented, and demand important changes, at the very time that there is a necessity to impose new taxes, it is difficult to know how to proceed.

To attempt the imposition of taxes, without first agreeing to the reformation required, may drive the people to resistance. To yield entirely to the requisitions of the people, may be considered by them as a proof of weakness in the government, and encourage them to rise and go beyond reasonable bounds in their demands.

If it is attempted to make reformation and taxation ga

hand in hand, by committing both to the consideration of a general assembly of the states, it may be difficult afterwards to take the management of the public affairs out of the hands of such an assembly, delegated by the nation at large; because a number of men convened for such a purpose naturally create courage, and communicate a spirit of enterprise to each other; and, in a country where many oppressive privileges and invidious distinctions, or, in other words, abuses, exist, the intended reformation may very possibly turn out a revolution.

M. de Calonne seems to have been aware of this; and therefore, however solicitous he might be to avoid the odium of new and heavy impositions, he also wished to elude the calling the states-general, by adopting a less formidable expedient.

It was an established practice in France, for every municipality to elect a number of its most respectable citizens, who, on extraordinary and important occasions, being joined to the common and usual council, became the general assembly of the municipality. This last additional body was called the body of notables. It has likewise been customary for the kings of France, on certain emergencies, to summon those of their subjects of whose judgment they had a good opinion, and consult with them. These men, while their function continued, were also called notables. The most essential difference between such an assembly and the assembly of the states-general seems to be, that the latter is entirely chosen by the king; whereas the former is appointed, under particular regula tions, by the people.

M. de Calonne determined to summon an assembly of notables, in the expectation that a council summoned in the king's name, and elected by himself, would readily approve of the plans which he intended to lay before them; and as part of these plans were of a popular nature, he imagined they would render him popular also. The effect was the reverse; for people who are prejudiced against any person are more apt to conceive an ill opinion

of a good proposal, on account of the proposer, than a good opinion of the proposer on account of the proposition.

The principal tax proposed by him was the timbre or stamp tax, which it was thought would have produced a. bout thirty millions of livres annually.

Many of his other operations would have been chiefly at the expense of the clergy-which drew upon him the hatred of that body, without procuring him the love of the rest of the nation, His proposed regulations were mostly directed against the ecclesiastical droits seigneuriaux honorifiques; as their right of appointing judges, the rights respecting fishing and hunting, and some others equally unconnected with the functions of clergymen. Although these produced but a small revenue, while in the hands of ecclesiastics, who, on account of their not residing on their benefices, could not reap the full advantage of them, yet the droit honorifiques were purchased at a great price by the gentlemen of the coun try, who were all ambitious of becoming seigneurs. Ma ny people saw no injustice, but great propriety, in divesting the clergy of rights so foreign from their profession. The indifference with which men see the rights of others invaded, often forms a strong contrast with their sensibi lity when the least attack is made on their own. Many of the laity on this occasion insisted on the impropriety and injustice of the original grant, but laid no stress on the hardship of taking from men what they had possessed for ages. The clergy, on the other hand, exclaimed against the impiety of robbing the church, and the iniquity of stripping men of rights which they have long enjoyed, but left entirely out of the argument the absurdity of ever granting them such rights. Had the men's situations been reversed, their reasoning would have under, gone the same change,

By the alienation of those privileges so useless to the clergy, the government would, as I am assured, have gained an yearly revenue of four or five hundred thou