who оссиру the seat of the philosopher-who ought to be models of philosophical prudence, holding even the scales of truth amidst the headstrong and uninformed-which create the confusion.

Such a course is UNPHILOSOPHICAL in the highest

motion of the earth and the existence of antipodes so, again, it seems to teach a common origin of the human race —a common primeval language and other similar tenets. But these, we are told, are only "false conclusions deduced by its votaries ;" false interpretations, which yet are identical with the very words; fallacious conclusions, which, notwithstanding, are directly asserted in the very terms; and nevertheless, the historical authority of the passages, and their surpassing importance, are to be strictly maintained' (pp. 223, 224).

What I do say may be seen under the Third Class of Examples in Part I., at p. 104 and the following pages of this edition, which differ in no respect from the second edition but in the addition of new matter. It will there be seen, that I state that Scripture does teach, not that it seems to teach, the common origin of the human race, and other similar tenets. And my readers' are told' that Science (not Scripture), through the false teachings of some of its votaries, has been made to say the opposite to this, and therefore has been forced into apparent collision with Scripture; but that wiser men have delivered Science from this reproach by showing that these conclusions of its votaries are false; and that, in fact, Science does not, in these or any other cases, lead to results opposed to Holy Scripture. This is the reverse of what Professor Powell has made me say. This 'outrageous' treatment of my words was noticed at the time in the Quarterly Review, October 1859, p. 431,

note.

* See some excellent remarks, written in this spirit, in the chapter on the relation of Tradition to Palætiology, in Dr. Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. Also the following sensible remarks from the lips of another philosopher, Professor Stokes, when President of the British Association in 1869:

'Truth, we know, must be self-consistent, nor can one truth contradict another, even though the two may have been arrived at by totally different processes, in the one case, suppose, obtained by sound scientific investigation, in the other case taken on trust from duly authenticated witnesses. Misinterpretations of course there may be on the one side or on the other, causing apparent contradictions. Every mathematician knows that in his private work he will occasionally by

degree; and not only so, it is MISCHIEVOUS in every way. It unsettles the minds of the young; it plays into the unbelieving prepossessions of the infidel; it confirms the sceptic in his disregard of religion. On the other hand, it repels the timid from the pursuit of Science; it disunites, instead of harmonizing; it checks the progress of truth; it sets at variance things which in reality agree.

He

two different trains of reasoning arrive at discordant conclusions. is at once aware that there must be a slip somewhere, and sets himself to detect and correct it. When conclusions rest on probable evidence, the reconciling of apparent contradictions is not so simple and certain. It requires the exercise of a calm, unbiassed judgment, capable of looking at both sides of the question; and oftentimes we have long to suspend our decision, and seek for further evidence. None need fear the effect of scientific inquiry carried on in an honest, truth-loving, humble spirit, which makes us no less ready frankly to avow our ignorance of what we cannot explain than to accept conclusions based on sound evidence. The slow but sure path of induction is open to us. Let us frame hypotheses if we will: most useful are they when kept in their proper place, as stimulating inquiry. Let us seek to confront them with observation and experiment, thereby confirming them or upsetting them as the result may prove; but let us beware of placing them prematurely in the rank of ascertained truths, and building further conclusions on them as if they were.'