derive some countenance from the name and writings of Locke. How unjustly, let this paragraph from the "Essay" determine : we quote it at length, both for the purpose of rebutting the Professor's charges, and more particularly to show how remote this great man's notions are from those of the sciolists who have misunderstood or misrepresented him.

"The same thing happens concerning the operations of the mind; namely, thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c.; which we, concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt (that is prepared) to think these the actions of some other substance we call spirit. It is plain, then, that the idea of corporeal substance, or matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of spiritual substance or spirit. And, therefore, from our not having any notion of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can for the same reason deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit." (Book II., ch. 23, Essay.)

Now, if our readers should think that Professor Sedgwick has treated Locke either unfairly or unskilfully, they will be disposed to believe us when we say that he has treated Paley much worse. We have not space left for examining his arguments in opposition to Paley's theory. But when we shall have shown that he has very materially misrepresented him, undesignedly we hope, it will easily be inferred that his refutation, being inapplicable, cannot be conclusive. He charges Paley then with attempting to prove that "actions are only to be estimated "by their general tendency." Now considering this to mean, what the line of argument in the " Discourse" clearly indicates, to be the moral estimate of actions, it is the reverse of what Paley says. He does indeed state, and who can gainsay him? that actions in the abstract must be estimated by their tendency; but he also states that "the morality of actions is to be estimated "by their design" (Moral Philosophy, p.48). An act of relieving want, he explains, is good in the abstract, whatever the motive be; but it is not virtuous, if it springs from ostentation, or any other motive than charity, prompted by obedience to the will of God.

Again, the Professor alleges that Paley "attempts to prove "that utility is the touchstone of right and wrong."—(p. 60.) Now Paley says, on the contrary," that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right.”

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The will of God, he says, is our rule. Of course, it is the conformity to that will, or the violation of it, that constitutes an action morally right or wrong, according to Paley's system. The will of God, then, is the touchstone of moral utility, of abstract right and wrong.

But we have not time to enter further into the subject, nor should we have wasted so many words over it, had we not conceived that it is connected with some projected changes in the metaphysical studies of the university, and that the authority of the Professor's name, the time and place of its delivery in "Trinity College chapel, on the annual commemoration, and "being published at the request of the junior members of the

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society," might give it an influence which its intrinsic merit is not calculated to command. The least fault of "The Dis"course" is, that it is diffuse, rambling, inconclusive, and unseasonably declamatory; and therefore as ill adapted as possible for a philosophical dissertation. But it is, moreover, full of mis-statements, which, on the most favourable supposition of their proceeding from inadvertence, are very unworthy of the author, of the place, and the occasion from which it emanated

We now revert, for a moment, to the main subject of this article; and we do it to make our appeal to the influential members of the two universities in favour of such improvements of their system, as we have ventured to suggest, and particularly for the extension of its benefits to a larger class of their fellow subjects, Dissenters included.

We know how indisposed men are to take down systems under which they have been trained and lived; how painful it is to force innovations upon interested societies, who may be disturbed by the process, but cannot benefit by the fruits, of improvement. We also know the reluctance that is felt in making concessions to parties who threaten, and parties who stigmatise, either justly or unjustly. But we are addressing ourselves, we hope, to reasonable, enlightened, and conscientious men; capable, therefore, of flinging aside selfish and sinister considerations; and we ask them whether it is either just or reasonable that the Dissenters should be excluded from the great resorts of national education; we ask them whether the temporary inconvenience of change bears any proportion of evil to the perpetuation of a vicious system; and whether

the number of students who enjoy the advantage, the incalculable advantage, we esteem it, of an academic education, bears any just proportion to the magnitude of the endowments and the number of recent graduates which the two universities contain.

We believe at this moment there are nearly as many graduates as under-graduates on the books of the different colleges. We believe not more than one-tenth of the fellows are actually engaged either in tuition or lecturing. In short, there are the means, both personal and material, for educating three times the number of students at present in residence; there are the means of greatly diminishing the expense; and there are the means of augmenting indefinitely the advantages of the university system.

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This can be effected only by rendering the inefficient colleges effective, and by extending those that are already efficient. What service, for instance, does " King's College," "Downing "College," in Cambridge, or " All Souls' College," and "New "College," in Oxford, render to the cause of academical education, and why should not their constitution be so reformed as to make their magnificent revenues as serviceable as those of "Trinity," "St. John's," "Oriel," "Christ Church," and "Brazen Nose Colleges?"

We believe that New College, with its seventy fellows, and with revenues not less than thirty thousand a year, does contrive to afford education to about a dozen gentlemen commoners. But King's College, with equal resources, does not admit any members, except fellows elect from Eton. But that these societies may display their impartiality and disinterestedness, they withhold from their own members what they refuse to others, and they claim exemption from the ordinary discipline and studies! and even from examination for their degrees. We do not know whether to express more astonishment at the societies that claim, or the universities that grant, such an immunitya privilege to be disorderly and idle in a place of education!

Very analogous to this is the admission of noblemen to degrees after but two years of residence, without examination, and the temptation held out to them to "despise authorities" by conceding to them an ostentatious precedence, not only over their fellowstudents, but over their tutors. This privilege, we need not

observe, operates most unfavourably both upon the minds and characters of the noblemen themselves, and upon the estimate and sentiments which are entertained of them by their contemporaries. In a place of education, there ought to be no distinctions or honours, but those which are earned by literary and moral desert. To impress young men, in the process of education, that they are entitled, by hereditary and indefeasible right, to public deference and respect, is to poison knowledge at its fountain-head, and to render the Universities, instead of scenes of moral and intellectual discipline, instruments of degeneracy and debasement.

It may be thought ungracious, to address ourselves, in conclusion, to the fears of the higher powers of the Universities. But there is no impropriety in appealing to their prudence and liberality. We are persuaded, that two sessions will not pass over, before a fresh and much more vigorous attack will be made upon the present policy of the Universities. We would, therefore, in all good feeling, press it upon their friends to take advantage of the interval to prove their disposition to make improvements, by removing at once some of those obstructions which now narrow their application, and to introduce such alterations, as will be an earnest of their intention gradually to adapt the pursuits of the Universities to the exigencies of society.

We should lament to see any rash and ignorant meddling with these venerable institutions; but we are so entirely convinced, that the services they at present render, considerable as they are, to the country and the world, are so small in proportion to that of which they are capable, that we shall never cease to expose their defects, till a large, liberal, and fundamental reform, both of their studies and discipline, has been accomplished from within or from without.

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ARTICLE IV.

Examen du Système Electoral Anglais comparé au Système Electoral Français. Par M. JOLLIVET, Membre de la Chambre des Députés. Paris: 1835.

The Monarchy of the Middle Classes; or, France. Second Series. By H. L. BULWER, Esq. M. P. London: 1836. Compte rendu au Roi sur les Elections municipales de 1834, par le Ministre de l'Intérieur. (Published by M.

THIERS, Jan. 1836.)

Analyse des Votes des Conseils Généraux de Departement.

1833 et 1834.

Rapport de M. de Rambuteau sur l'Administration Municipale de Paris en 1835.

Compte rendu au Roi par le Ministre du Commerce (M. d'Argout) sur l'execution des Lois relatives aux Gardes Nationales. 1832.

FEW questions have been more debated in France since 1830, than the electoral franchise. But these noisy and animated discussions, which seemed to touch the most weighty interests of the nation, have not excited a corresponding echo in the country. As is usually the case when the people are indifferent, the controversy has. been appropriated by parties, which have measured its importance by their own passions, without considering the state of public information and of public feeling. Some, viewing the question on the part of aristocracy, have affected to restrict the exercise of the electoral franchise to a single class of society; whilst others, representing the pitiless logic of democracy, have asserted the claims of the entire mass of citizens to the right of suffrage. Both these solutions were equally exclusive, and equally devoid of facts for their basis.

It is useless to inquire, with the Republicans, if the right of voting belongs to every citizen, whose name is registered to the public contributions; or if, as the Doctrinaires argue, this right is only a function, vested in the few for the benefit of the many. As long as the discussion is restricted to the abstractions of theory, it must remain without results. The laws of a people can only be understood and judged by com