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SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE

VOL. LIV

JULY, 1913

NO. 1

THE DEFENCE OF THE
PANAMA CANAL

T

BY HENRY L. STIMSON

Former Secretary of War of the United States

HE relation of the Panama Canal to the United States has two entirely different aspects. As a commercial water-way we are interested in it in the same manner, although perhaps to a different degree, as are the other nations of the world. In respect to operations of warfare, on the other hand, its relation to our country is unique. Again, in this relation of the canal to warfare, there are also two aspects which must be borne in mind. The relation of the canal to the efficiency of our own navy has been pretty thoroughly recognized by the American people ever since the voyage of the Oregon, in 1898. It is a cardinal principle of naval strategy that, wherever situated, the whole American fleet should be kept together. The construction of the canal makes the enforcement of this policy possible, and by making the fleet readily transferable from coast to coast, for certain contingencies, virtually doubles its efficiency. If the Panama Canal were not being constructed, there would doubt less be great political pressure, which, in time of threatened war, might become overwhelming, to divide the fleet and keep half of it in either ocean for the fancied protection of the respective coasts and to the real destruction of proper naval strategy.

time of war the canal should be open to our own fleet, it has not been equally appreciated how important it is that the canal should be closed to the fleet of our enemy. If we are ever unfortunate enough to be at war, either with a nation strong enough to have fleets in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, or with two nations, one in the Orient, and the other in Europe, this difference of policy as to the canal would be vital. The closure of the canal to our enemies would permit our fleet to operate on interior lines and would compel the other fleets to operate on exterior lines eight thousand miles longer than ours. It might easily make the whole difference between victory and defeat. Furthermore, the military policy of the United States, and to large extent its national character, have been controlled by its isolation from possible enemies. The long peninsula of South America, stretching far down toward the Antarctic. Ocean, is now, since the development of steam navigation, the chief remnant of that military isolation. South America. is the home of no nation likely in the near future to be one of our serious enemies. Hardly any of its harbors or coaling stations are in control of European or Oriental powers, and it thus offers a most difficult and wellnigh insuperable obstacle to the transfer of a hostile fleet from one ocean to the other in time of war. On the other hand, free passage through the canal would shorten the distance between our eastern and western coasts from thirteen thousand to five thousand miles. It would make it Copyright, 1913, by Charles Scribner's Sons. All rights reserved.

The military importance of the canal to the American nation, in a second aspect, has not been so clearly recognized by the people at large. While they have been quick to see how important it is that in

VOL. LIV.-I

possible for a hostile fleet to do what it eanfrot do now, namely, threaten both our coasts at the same time. Protection against such a contingency is an item not lightly to be disregarded in forming our national policy. To have our rich and populous Atlantic coast practically secured against a raid by an Oriental enemy, and our important Pacific cities equally protected against European attack, permits a far-reaching beneficent influence upon our military preparations at home. Our sea-coast fortifications-like any sea-coast fortifications are effective only to protect our cities from a naval bombardment; that is, they are sufficient only to compel our enemy to leave his ships and take to the land in order to harm us. Against an enemy who has sufficient force and time to land at any one of the countless unprotected places of our coast, our defence must fall back upon our land forces. The peninsula of South America by thus making only one-half of our sea-coast vulnerable at a given time permits our land forces to be concentrated on the threatened side and thus enables us to maintain a smaller army than would otherwise be necessary. The present regular army is insufficient in size even to protect one frontier. If it had to cover two, its effectiveness would be reduced by half. The three months which would be consumed by a foreign fleet or expedition in going around Cape Horn, or through the Straits of Magellan, might make the difference between a successful defence or a complete disaster on the part of those communities against which the attack was intended. Protecting the canal against the passage of a hostile fleet, therefore, instead of being a step toward militarism, is a step in the other direction. It tends to maintain our old isolation, and our consequent ability to remain comparatively disarmed at home.

It may be well to notice here one argument which has been made against fortifying the canal-that is, that the canal could and should be defended by our navy and that no further defence is necessary. Such a contention ignores all considerations, not only of naval strategy, but of national economy. The fleet is the offensive-defence of our nation. If our enemy even obtains complete control of the sea our fate will be hard indeed. No great

country is so vulnerable as we are to an enemy able to land its armies on our shore. Our fleet, therefore, must be free to meet its opponent under conditions most favorable to its success. It must have no conditions imposed upon it other than to retain control of that part of the ocean necessary to protect us from invasion. If it were tied down to the defence of the Panama Canal, its primary function would be completely destroyed. In the second place, this would be the most expensive possible method of protecting the canal. It would be using material costing nearly two hundred millions of dollars to do work which could be better done by other means at about ten per cent of that cost, for the total expense of defending the canal by fortifications and land defence, according to present estimates, is less than twenty millions.

The conclusions which American policy must draw from these military considerations affecting the canal are therefore simple and clear. A canal protected by international agreement could not possibly meet the requirements of the United States. Such an agreement would assume at the threshold that the canal was to be equally open to all in time of war-our enemies as well as ourselves. In a military sense, it would turn the canal into an international strait. It would remove the peninsula of South America from the pathway of the fleets of other nations as well as our own.

Even if it were conceivable that other nations would join in a guarantee of protection to a canal under a covenant not to use it against the United States in time of war, we could not afford to rely upon such a guarantee. For all the temptation to violate such a covenant would rest upon the other nations who were parties to it, and all the risk and loss and damage which attended its violation would fall upon us alone. We would have no right to trust to such a hazard a matter of such vital national interest as the exclusion of our enemy's fleet from the Panama Canal in time of war.

We could not afford to risk our national security upon the faith that an international guarantee would be stronger in our behalf, in some future crisis, than it was, for instance, in 1793, when Prussia, after

having guaranteed only two years before the independence of Poland, joined in the partition of Poland; or in 1807, when Great Britain entered the harbor of Copenhagen, belonging to a nation with which she was at peace and under relations of amity, and destroyed the Danish fleet; or in 1904, when Japan, after having guaranteed the independence of Korea, violated the sanctity of the harbor of Chemulpho by attacking there the Russian fleet; or in 1908, when Austria, after having signed the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, under the terms of which the political sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina was given to Turkey, turned around and herself annexed those two principalities. To insure, therefore, that the Panama Canal will always be open to our own fleet and closed to the fleet of our enemy, it must be under American control, complete and unhampered, and every step must be taken in time of peace, by the construction of fortifications and the preparation of other military defences, to make that control effective in the emergency of war.

On the other hand, the establishment of such complete American control over the canal, for the purposes of defence, is not in the slightest degree inconsistent with the neutralization of the canal for purposes of commerce. The reverse is true -complete control and responsibility may be important for the very purpose of making effective a guarantee of commercial neutrality. In a long series of national declarations, beginning with a Senate resolution in 1835, we have committed ourselves to the policy of a route across the Isthmus in which the commercial rights of transit of all nations shall be equal. During the past quarter of a century there has been simultaneously enunciated by our government, with equal distinctness, the policy of sole American control for the purpose of military defence. And for an even longer time we have been giving a practical example of the combination of the two policies in our protection and control over the railway route across the Isthmus. If any one is inclined to think that military protection over the canal is inconsistent with its commercial freedom, let him remember that during the past fifty-five years we have been compelled to intervene with our armed forces no less

than ten times to preserve the freedom of the Panama railway.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 was framed on an entirely different theory and expressly conceded to Great Britain, even if at war with us, equal rights of transit through the Isthmus for her navy. But with the settlement and development of California and our northwestern Pacific coast this error in our diplomatic policy was quickly recognized and pressure begun for the repeal of that treaty. In 1880 President Hayes, in a message to the Senate, said:

"The policy of this country is a canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any European power or to any combination of European powers. . . . An inter-oceanic canal across the American Isthmus would essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States and between the United States and the rest of the world. It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores and virtually a part of the coast line of the United States. . . . No other great power would," under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work so colossal and vitally affecting its interest and welfare."

Again, in 1881, Mr. Blaine, then secretary of state, in a letter of instructions to the American minister at London, pointed out the policy of neutralization under American military control with great clarity and force:

"The United States seeks only to use, for the defence of its own interests, the same forecast and provision which her Majesty's government so emphatically employ in defence of the interests of the British Empire. To guard her eastern possessions, to secure the most rapid transit to her troops and munitions of war, and to prevent any other nation having equal facilities in the same direction, Great Britain holds and fortifies all the strategic points that control the route to India. At Gibraltar, at Malta, at Cyprus, her fortifications give her the mastery of the Mediterranean. She holds a controlling interest in the Suez Canal, and by her fortifications at Aden and on the island of

Perin she excludes all other powers from the waters of the Red Sea and renders it a mare clausum. It would, in the judgment of the President, be no more unreasonable for the United States to demand a share in these fortifications, or to demand their absolute neutralization, than for England to make the same demand in perpetuity from the United States with respect to the transit across the American continent. The possessions which Great Britain thus carefully guards in the East are not of more importance to her than is the Pacific slope, with its present development and assured growth, to the Government of the United States. . . . If a hostile movement should at any time be made against the Pacific coast; threatening danger to its people and destruction to its property, the Government of the United States would feel that it had been unfaithful to its duty and neglectful toward its own citizens if it permitted itself to be bound by a treaty which gave the same right through the canal to a war-ship bound on an errand of destruction that is reserved to its own navy sailing for the defence of our coast and the protection of the lives of our people. And, as England insists, by the might of her power, that her enemies in war shall strike her Indian possessions only by doubling the Cape of Good Hope, so the Government of the United States will equally insist that the interior, more speedy, and safer route of the canal shall be reserved for ourselves, while our enemies, if we shall ever be so unfortunate as to have any, shall be remanded to the voyage around Cape Horn. . . . For selfprotection to her own interests, therefore, the United States in the first instance asserts her right to control the Isthmus transit. And, secondly, she offers, by such control, that absolute neutralization of the canal, as respects European powers, which can in no other way be certainly attained and lastingly assured."

Finally, in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, while the principle of commercial neutralization was reaffirmed, the restrictions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as to military defence were expressly abrogated and, in the language of Mr. Hay reporting the effect of the negotiations to the Senate, there was left in time of war "to the United States the clear right to close

the canal against the other belligerent and to protect it and to defend itself by whatever means might be necessary."

In adopting this policy we have only followed the natural course of self-preservation that has been pursued by other nations in similar cases. Germany, while opening the Kiel Canal to commerce, has fortified and securely holds for her military protection that interior line of connection between her Baltic and North Sea coasts. Mr. Blaine's letter, above quoted, forcibly points out how Great Britain has accomplished the same result in the case of the Suez Canal by fortifying and holding the various approaches to it, and the so-called neutralization of that canal in time of war affords no benefit to a belligerent against Great Britain because none of the vessels of such a belligerent could ever reach the canal so as to take advantage of its neutrality. Furthermore, Great Britain actually declined to consent to the neutralization of the Suez Canal so long as the condition of affairs in Egypt rendered it inconsistent with her own interest to do so.*

The control of the Panama Canal is far more important to our national security than is the control of the Kiel Canal to that of Germany, or the Suez Canal to that of Great Britain. Its protection is more essential than the protection of any part of our coast or any of our seaports, however important, because it is the key to the protection of many seaports and thousands of miles of coast-line. The measures and means which, in common with all other nations, we have employed for the defence of such other points of value are presumptively of even greater necessity at Panama, and there are certain features of the Panama problem which make it, to some extent, unique and peculiar.

The problem of the defence of the Isthmus divides itself, naturally, into the two great classes of defensive operations which

In spite of a previous declaration of neutrality by the Khedive as to the canal, Great Britain seized it in 1882, used Ismailia, on its bank, as a war base for her expedition against declaration stopped, for a certain definite period, all neutral Arabi Pasha, and in direct contravention of the neutrality commerce in the canal. At the Convention of Constantigates declined to commit Great Britain to the provisions of neutrality therein established, in so far as they would not be compatible with the transitory and exceptional state in which Egypt now exists, and as they might fetter the freedom of action on the part of their government during the occupation of Egypt by forces of her Britannic Majesty."

nople, of 1888, in regard to the same canal, the British dele

we find elsewhere, namely: the problem of a sea-coast defence by fortification and a land defence by a mobile garrison. In the first place, therefore, the entrances to the canal are being protected by fortifications and sea-coast artillery. At the Atlantic end these are situated on either side of Limon Bay. At the Pacific end they are situated principally on the islands which guard the entrance to the canal. These fortifications serve the following purposes:

They prevent the bombardment of the canal locks from a hostile fleet at sea, which could otherwise run in close enough to destroy those locks with their great guns.

Secondly, they enable our fleet, in case it should have to traverse the canal to meet a hostile fleet standing off the opposite entrance, to deploy on its emergence into line for battle with such enemy. Otherwise our fleet could be destroyed in detail by such an enemy as the ships emerged, one after the other, out of the mouth of the canal.

Thirdly, this sea-coast artillery, and particularly the great mortars which are being placed there, are available to prevent an enemy from landing upon the coast within a radius of six or seven miles from the mouth of the canal and within that radius can assist the mobile garrison in defending itself against the approach of an enemy by land.

The aim of the land defence of the Isthmus is to protect the locks and other destructible portions of the canal from the attack of an enemy which has landed upon the Isthmus at a distance and come up behind the sea-coast fortifications. Such an attack may be made in three ways:

In the first place, individuals or small parties may try to creep in by stealth and damage some important work with high explosives. While it is quite likely that such a method may be tried, it is the least formidable danger and should be prevented by watchfulness and care on the part of the garrison and the local police. The amount of such explosive which a single man can carry is less formidable, as against the great structures of the canal locks and gates, than is usually supposed. In the second place, a raid may be made upon the canal by marines or sailors landed

from a hostile fleet. This is perhaps the most probable way in which an attack would come. An enemy, having eluded or beaten off our fleet, may attempt to destroy or get possession of the canal by suddenly landing and attempting to rush our garrison. But the size of such a force is necessarily limited, and would probably not exceed four or five thousand men. Assuming that the American fleet has not been hopelessly destroyed, a hostile naval commander would hesitate to weaken his own force by committing too many of his men to the Panama jungle, with the choice of their destruction by disease or fighting.

In the third place, the attack may come from a substantial army, transported across the ocean, or from a smaller force assisted by Central or South American troops. This could probably not happen until the question of sea control was decided irretrievably against the American navy. A fleet of transports, even convoyed under powerful guard, is the most helpless of all seafaring expeditions, and across the immense distance of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, would hardly be attempted if there was any sting left in the American naval forces. On the other hand, if it were attempted at all it would doubtless be attempted in thorough fashion, and with adequate force. Our possible enemies have large, thoroughly organized and equipped armies, which can be moved promptly. They must be credited with. good military judgment. If their object were to capture the canal and not merely to injure it, they would send an expeditionary force of strength. Once captured by such a force, the Panama Canal could be far more easily held against us than any of the other prizes open to such an expedition of our enemy, and, at the same time, it would be a makeweight of importance for the final negotiations after the war was ended. An attempt upon it of that nature, therefore, while not so likely as a sudden raid, must be considered in our calculations of defence.

To meet such a deliberate attack, any garrison which the American nation, under its present military policy, could permanently keep at the Isthmus would probably have to be largely reinforced from home. Fortunately, the Canal Zone is unique in its possibility of reinforcement from the

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