523

CHAPTER LXVII.

DISPOSITIONS TOWARD SECONDARY AND TERTIARY PLEASURES AS ENDS.

§ 1. As we proceed beyond the primary pleasures and pains we always discover an increasing complexity of feelings; the pleasures there found are united and interfused, but are traceable to a plural number of sources; they are the results of compound and constructive association. Around some centre there is a gathering of a large number of representative feelings. The first group of secondary pleasures, it will be remembered, we made to embrace those of material objects around which are clustered in association the primary pleasures and pains in varying relations. Considered as ends the pleasures of this division concentrate about some material object, the acquisition and possession of which is desired for the subjective pleasure afforded by such acquisition and possession. The object desired has at some time when possessed given certain pleasures; its absence has occasioned certain pains. With the idea of the possession of that object, therefore, is associated the enjoyment and the ability to enjoy those pleasures and the ability to avoid those pains; to possess such an object, then, is an end. With its acquisition then are associated intermediate ends, all tending to the same superior end, namely, the possession of the object. But in all these cases, where the object is to be acquired, the acquisition carries with it an independent pleasure of its own, namely, the pleasure of movement and exercise; this is enjoyed in addition to the pleasures connected with the mere possession of the object sought; and sometimes, as has been before noticed in several places, becomes a greater pleasure than the end to which it first was intermediate. The possession of a hare is of some value, but that worth is not comparable to the value of the pleasures of hunting the hare, although the animal was undoubtedly first hunted for the sake of its possession. While presumably the hunting is for the end of possession, really the hunting itself is the superior end.

§ 2. From the nature of the case, primâ facie, all this class of secondary ends is made up of intermediate ends. We desire clothing that we may keep warm, weapons that we may keep our body whole and unscathed by the attacks of men or beasts; fresh air that we may enjoy breathing it; carriages that we may move

without fatigue and more rapidly; tools that we may work; food that we may eat, wine that we may drink. But by the force of association the pleasure of having the thing sometimes becomes itself sufficient without the enjoyment of those pleasures which originally made that possession valuable. The stock illustration of this truth is that found in the miser's gold; and it seems to be the best example. The mere possession of the gold is a selfsufficient end, the advantages which having it would naturally bring being all sacrificed to gratify a desire to have and hold the In this manner, therefore, some of these intermediate. ends become self-sufficient. In a similar manner, where the possession consists in participation, that participation often becomes an end in itself. The pleasures of a city, for instance, we reckon to be the pleasures of living in a city, including society enjoyments chiefly, and increased opportunities for activity; we participate in the advantages of the city; and yet we make living in the city an end in itself, though we reap none of the benefits which make such a residence a thing to be sought. If we are there we are satisfied, whatever betides. In addition to these self-sufficient ends growing out of possession, there is always in this class of ends the possibility that the acquisition may become an end in itself, as gratifying a desire for movement and exercise. § 3. As ends of acquisition, pleasures associated with material objects having close relations with the primary pleasures and pains may become principal ends. The acquisition of money frequently is a principal end; so also the getting of goods of all sorts, though generally it is the securing of wealth that is the chief end, and not any specific things that constitute wealth. In the same way the possession of money, gold, silver, or treasure is not seldom a principal end, though the same qualification should be made here also. But for the most part these ends are subordinate.

§ 4. Of course when two objects present themselves to the mind as desirable, but of unequal values, and both are not attainable, dispositions in various degrees of antagonism are formed. On the other hand, when the attainment of one object is an aid to the acquisition and possession of another which is desired, also coalescent dispositions are formed; and when a desire arises to possess two things the possession of which leads to the possession of some third thing beyond, we observe a concurrence of dispositions, as also where two compatible dispositions exist toward two things not connected with a third. I may desire clothing and

also books; if I have plenty of money I may be able to gratify both those desires, and the dispositions to do so may be concurrent. If, however, I have little money, the desire for books may be brought into antagonism with the desire for clothing or the converse, and one may operate as a deterrent upon the other. I may desire brick and lumber and may also desire a house; the disposition toward the former is then coalescent with the disposition toward the latter, and if I desire also carpets and upholstery, the latter disposition will be concurrent with the disposition toward the acquisition of brick and mortar.

§ 5. In the second group of secondary pleasures we advance a few steps in the scale of representativeness, and pass into the region of ideal pleasures. But at the outset let us remark a large number of actions and states which are direct ministers to the primary pleasures. Breathing, walking, riding, lifting, sitting, reclining, eating, drinking, all are terms carrying the mind back at once to the primary ends. We may speak of the pleasures of breathing, referring to the subjective feeling, in which case the pleasures are primary; or we may speak of the same, referring to the muscular action which produces the subjective feeling, in which case the pleasures are secondary; or again, we may speak of the pleasures of air-secondary also. All these are of the nature of intermediate ends, and some of them by repetition become ends in themselves. Beyond these ends, there is no difference which demands notice here between the second and third groups of secondary pleasures. Many of these are ends connected with actions running over an extended period, habits of action indeed. Of these latter temperance affords a fair sample. The pleasures of temperance are the pleasures attending a systematic and regular restraint of imperious appetites; pleasures which are largely representative and imply a considerable amount of forecasting. Here, as before, the end may be an intermediate one or may be self-sufficient. Temperance may be pursued as an end to health or society, or it may be by association exalted in mind to the dignity of something desirable for its own sake. Usually, it is considered in both lights, it is regarded as an advantage for the various reasons of which two have been noticed; besides, temperance is thought to be good in itself. It is hardly ever held to be a principal end, however. Dispositions toward temperance meet with powerful antagonists. The dispositions toward most of the appetitive pleasures are strong enough to carry the individual to

excess, and they are only overcome oftentimes after something of a conflict. A disposition toward temperance is often helped by one toward occupation. Gentle speech and demeanour express another collection of ends which relate to a habit of action. Dispositions toward these ends are opposed to those connected with aggression and conflict, but are concurrent and coalescent with most of the social dispositions. Occupation is an end quite similar to temperance in its character, and very often comes to be an end in itself. Dispositions toward occupation are opposed by dispositions toward repose and its associates. Another variety of these ends is exhibited by the term Security, where the end is a state from which is absent a feeling of the promixity of causes tending to produce pains. This is an important end of human volition, and is a selfsufficient as well as an intermediate end; it is highly ideal and representative, its various means are the acquisition and possession of protective articles of different sorts, and the formation of habits which experience has shown to be protective; in the broadest sense of the word, for security the maintenance of public social order is a prime means. The predatory dispositions are toward secondary ends, and many of them grouped under the head of Aggression, Conflict, and Triumph. These dispositions are readily traceable through successive generations; an appetite for killing exists very frequently in men irrespective of any end of the killing, and is sometimes very strong. Conspicuously these are ends in themselves. As before remarked, the sexual and social dispositions are the chief antagonists to those of this group. Such pleasures as those associated with a fine spectacle, as a sunset for example, are mainly æsthetic. They are consequently self-sufficient ends, for the most part, though an æsthetic delight may be a means, as for example to a high development of character. But as ordinarily sought, they are ends in themselves. The aesthetic pleasures are pleasures of the eye and the ear, and some degree of repose and leisure is requisite to their enjoyment and cultivation; accordingly dispositions toward repose favour the aesthetic dispositions, though dispositions toward those activities which secure for us such pleasures cannot be dispensed with as auxiliaries. A man will go a great way and take a great deal of trouble to enjoy a fine sunset, but his mind must be free from care and anxiety and somewhat above the ordinary toils of life to be willing to go far for such a purpose and to appreciate it fully when the view is present. Dispositions toward these and other aesthetic pleasures do not subsist

to any great extent where there is a necessity to make the attainment of things requisite to sustain life an end engrossing much attention and desire. Dispositions toward the presentative primary pleasures are antagonistic to æsthetic dispositions. Lastly, the happiness of others is an end which has been growing in importance as civilisation has progressed. With a great many and at many times it is a self-sufficient end; with some a principal end. Its intermediate characters are many, for everyone sees a thousand advantages resulting from the happiness of those near him. Dispositions toward this end, happily, often show marks of inheritance; they are, as a rule, concurrent and coalescent with the social and sexual dispositions, and antagonistic to the predatory. The operation of the economical prudent dispositions produces deterrents, and sometimes the antagonism between the two is pretty evenly balanced; oftener the economical are in the ascendant.

§ 6. Those most highly representative pleasures described in this work as the tertiary do not differ much in their character as ends from those just referred to; they are, however, much broader in their scope and include much more. The pleasures of living as opposed to dying, which constitute the first group of ends, have a strong hold upon all men. A long life, or a life to the full measure of one's days, is a prominent end with all, and as constituting that end all the pleasures experienced in living or expected to be experienced are associated in thought. To live and preserve one's life is a self-sufficient end, and yet we often hear people speak of living only to certain ends, to do certain things, as to be of service to one's family or country. It is by no means infrequent for people to say that all they care to live for is to do thus and thus. Similarly with the hero, who gives his life for a cause or an idea. In such cases the mind makes the pleasure of living in general subordinate and intermediate to some particular pleasure of living. But much allowance is to be made for extravagance of language, and ordinarily when people who make the statements just referred to have accomplished the end which they seem to make superior, they have just as strong a disposition toward life as before. And even with the hero or the martyr the disposition toward life is strong enough to make him sell his life as dearly as possible. Characteristically, therefore, living is an end in itself, though intermediate as well to certain special pleasures of living. We notice here the same condition of things we commented upon in discussing some of the primary ends. That which we constantly