The operation was protected by a line of skirmishers. About a third of the numbers in each battalion received tools. In less than half-an-hour the whole division was under shelter in suitably constructed trenches. This experiment was considered ' very conclusive.'

In the Observations sur l'instruction sommaire pour les combats,' published by the French Minister of War in 1867, the utility of shelter-trenches is recognized in the following words :

'The battalions of the first line, deployed and covered, if possible, by ridges of earth, trenches or other shelter, wait till the enemy has arrived within good range to annihilate him by volley-firing, especially at the time when the attacking columns are forming, and when these columns are advancing towards the position.

'The line should always be ready to re-form columns with rapidity, in order to resist cavalry, to profit by a failure of the enemy, or to seize a favourable opportunity for taking the offensive. It must not be forgotten that the best means of defending a position is often to attack oneself, only limiting the movement if one is not able to decidedly take the offensive.

To approach unbroken Infantry from the front, in open ground, especially if they are protected by obstacles or by cover, has always been a dangerous operation; at the present day especially, with the new arms, the defence has the advantage.

'Troops having to cross 300 or 400 mètres, under an overwhelming fire, however brave they may be, would run the risk of being destroyed before having reached the decisive point of the action, and in any case they would arrive too much weakened to fight successfully against an enemy prepared to receive them, and who would take the offensive at the last moment.'

The war of 1870-71 has confirmed this opinion. Indeed the following may be read in the 'Rapport sur les opérations du 2e Corps,' by General Frossard (page 115).

If the losses of the 2nd Corps at the battle of Gravelotte

were comparatively inconsiderable, we owed this no doubt to the precautions taken to shelter our soldiers by mounds of earth and by epaulments at important points, and we owed it also to the instructions that every hollow or excavation of the ground should be profited by, not for the purpose of keeping the troops lying on the ground there, and letting them remain inactive under cover, but so as to protect them while making them keep up their fire. We have not yet seen so marked an example of the advantages gained by this arrangement of hasty intrenchments. We commend it to the attention of those who will hold commands in years to come,'

15

CHAPTER II.

SHELTER-TRENCHES.

THE wars of 1866 and 1870 have furnished a new argument in favour of hasty intrenchments, by proving how formidable musketry has become in consequence of the progress it has made as regards range, accuracy, flatness of trajectory, and rapidity of fire.

It is, then, more than ever necessary to bear in mind this precept of Marshal Bugeaud's :-- If the time for fighting has not arrived, keep out of range or else conceal your troops.'

As the difficulty of keeping troops beyond the range of projectiles increases every day, the necessity of concealing them becomes more and more evident. Now to conceal troops, either natural cover (such as ridges of earth, woods, enclosures, deep roads, &c.) must be utilised, or else artificial shelter must be constructed. When the ground is undulating or woody, the troops may easily be shielded from the enemy's sight and fire, but it is quite different when the ground is flat and bare. The necessity too of giving tools for digging to Infantry exists principally in armies operating in level and unwooded countries. In this respect the Swiss, Italian, and Spanish troops are differently circumstanced from those of Germany, Holland, Denmark, and Belgium.

'Shelter-trenches,' says Captain Richard' of the Engineers, 'have for their chief object to protect the troops from Infantry

1 Des abris à improviser avant le combat. By M. Joachim Richard. This treatise was published in the number of the Revue militaire française for February 1869.

fire, while still offering but a small mark for Artillery. They may also ensure the following additional advantages :—

Ist. To render the enemy's fire less certain, as he can only with difficulty see the losses occasioned by it.

2nd. To permit our soldiers, placed in a comparatively safe position, to have a rest at a suitable height for their weapons, and consequently to take careful aim without hurrying. Aiming in this way, which must be encouraged not only on account of its efficiency, but also on account of the small amount of ammunition it requires, cannot be arrived at with any certainty on ground which affords no cover.'

It has lately been proposed to use the knapsack to cover the riflemen when they are lying down to fire; but we have strong reasons for thinking that this proposition will not be adopted.

In fact the knapsack is pierced by a rifle-bullet even when it is quite full, which is not always the case in war. Experiments carried out at Ghent in 1869 by Captain Charin prove that, in order to render the knapsack impenetrable by bullets, the back of it ought to be served with tow, and strengthened by iron wire-work weighing about 750 grammes (1 lb. 10 oz.)

This weight is as much as that of the steel shovel, with short handle, adopted in the Danish Army, which would certainly be of more use to the foot-soldier than the knapsack.converted into a bullet-proof. In fact, in less than a minute the rifleman would form a mound of earth which would offer greater resistance to projectiles than the knapsack placed at an angle on the ground, or propped up by the bayonet.

On the other hand, a soldier will never be induced to expose to certain destruction part of his clothing, his shoes, his linen, his reserve ammunition, and every necessary contained by his knapsack. Besides, in order to make good this enormous consumption of property, regiments would require to be followed by numerous baggage-waggons, which would obstruct the line. of march and impede operations.

Lastly, under many circumstances it would be imprudent to

make the troops take off their knapsacks in presence of the enemy; for example, when they are threatened with an immediate attack or when they are about to advance, for in both cases the men might be separated from their belongings, and prevented from regaining them.

Napoleon said, 'There are five things from which the soldier must never be separated: his gun, his ammunition, his knapsack, his rations for 4 days, and an intrenching tool.'

We must add that the use of the knapsack as bullet-proof would conduce to the immobility of the rifleman, which would be a serious evil.

In order effectually to protect Infantry, there is but one plan, that is, to throw up the earth with tools carried by the troops.

The rifle-pits constructed by the Americans were like unfinished parallels. A large number of riflemen were sheltered in them,—often entire battalions, besides Artillery.

The shelter-trenches constructed in France admit of the same end being attained with more method and in less time. They are the result of individual labour organised and perfected.

The profile of shelter-trenches should be constructed in such a way that the covering mass does not hinder offensive operations. This condition is of the greatest importance, for if defensive works had the effect of keeping one's troops stationary, or of confining them too much in one spot, they would have to be given up, since nothing is more dangerous or more opposed to the spirit of modern tactics.

To arrange shelter with a view to offensive movements is, then, the first problem to be solved.

The approaches constructed before besieged fortresses do not comply with this condition. The same must be said of the hasty intrenchments (see Pl. 1, Fig. 1) constructed in France for some years past by the Engineers, which are composed of a mound of earth, about 3 ft. 3 in. high and 9 ft. 10 in. wide at the bottom, formed out of two cuttings.

This intrenchment, which sappers construct in 35 or 40

C