and Arlington hated each other at all times, broke down, these men, so thoroughly corrupt, yet so remarkably agreeable, were turned for the time into friends. "The Lapland knots are untied," wrote Ashley to a friend," and we are in horrid storms; those that hunted together now hunt one another; but at horse-play the master of the horse must have the better." Alluding to Buckingham's appointment as master of the horse.

After the dismissal of Lauderdale and the impeachment of Arlington, Shaftesbury, whose conduct on this occasion has been defended (and it requires defence) retired to his seat at St. Giles's, Wiinborne, Dorsetshire. Here he lived with dignity and hospitality. He was one of the most fascinating men of his time, and his conversational powers were such that Charles II. delighted in his society. Therefore we may imply that his discourse was not of the most straightlaced character. In his leisure Shaftesbury occupied himself in beginning an improvement of the Liturgy for the consideration of the bishops, for he conceived that it was not so sacred "being drawn up by men the other day," that it might not be improved. Amongst the fragments of his papers there is a selection of psalms for particular services in the church, said to be admirably chosen. Such and so various was his knowledge, and so true was King Charles's remark "that Shaftesbury had more law than all his judges and more divinity than all his bishops." But the days of Shaftesbury were not destined to be passed in peaceful lucubrations. In 1676-7 he was imprisoned in the Tower with Buckingham for a breach of privilege of the House of Lords, and was confined there long after his fellow-prisoners had been released. He calls himself, in one of his letters at this time, "an infirm old man shut up in a winter's prison." And, indeed, his confinement was a most oppressive act. But he was henceforth the subject of plots, and the victim, a sturdy one nevertheless, of cabals and intrigues; and his conduct, in relation to the Bill of Exclusion, drawn by Shaftesbury, and his espousal of the cause of the Duke of Monmouth, sent him again to the Tower. This time he was followed by crowds of well

wishers among the people.

"God

bless your lordship," cried one of them, "and deliver you from your enemies." "I thank you, sir," replied the aged statesman, with a smile, "I have nothing to fear; they have. Therefore pray to God to deliver them from me.'

A few days afterwards, on receiving a visit from one of the Roman Catholic lords, he observed, in reply to a question pretending surprise at his being in the Tower, "I have been lately indisposed with an ague, and came hither to take some Jesuits' powder" (bark). He was indicted for high treason, but the grand-jury, consisting of London citizens and merchants, threw out the bill, and bonfires and bells celebrated his safety, as the safety of the Protestant religion in England. Charles, as it is well known, was greatly irritated at his defeat. "I am the last man," he remarked, bitterly, "to have law and justice in the whole nation." blinded does the moral sense become; nor did the monarch deem it beneath him to suggest to Dryden, then starving, the poem of the Medal, in which, for a hundred broad pieces, that great perverted genius penned another anathema against Shaftesbury. The Medal was dedicated to the Whigs. "Rail at me abundantly," said Dryden, in his dedication; "and not to break custom, do it without wit."

So

Shaftesbury was playing at cards with his countess when he was informed that the bill was thrown out. He then braced himself for action, and endeavoured to incite the people to an insurrection. Such were now -so mutable is human nature-the sentiments of a man who was once in the dark secrets of the Cabal. He jested upon his age and infirmities, and, offering to head the revolt, remarked that he could not run away, but could die at the head of the people better than on a scaffold. He was soon obliged to fly the kingdom, and, disguising himself as a Presbyterian minister, he took a last leave of his lady and his friends, and escaped to Harwich, and thence to Amsterdam. Here he intended to reside, but fate willed it otherwise. He was attacked by the gout, and died an exile from his country, as, unhappily, too many better men than he in those days

were obliged to do, on the 21st January, 1683. A ship, hung with mourning and adorned with streamers and escutcheons, conveyed his remains to England. Inconsistent and scheming, yet not venal, Shaftesbury has found some advocates. He was, however, a subtle, if not a bad man, of doubtful patriotism, which only sprang up when court favour deserted him, and of principles dubious in all things. That he was the friend and patron of Locke is the best eulogium; that he was the promoter of religious toleration his clearest merit. Yet it was, perhaps, too truly said of Shaftesbury that "he made the pretences of liberty the stirrup to get up, and religion the steed he rode in pursuit of his monstrous designs." To Shaftesbury we owe the Habeas Corpus Act, and an endeavour, at that time unsuccessful, to render the judges independent of the crown. His forbearance, or indifference to the satires of Dryden, who makes him the hero of his Absalom and Ahithophel, is worthy of admiration, for severe was the law of libel in those days.

In his religious opinions Shaftesbury was suspected of deism. One day, as Speaker Onslow relates, he was speaking in a low voice to a friend whilst a female relation sat in a distant part of the room. Forgetting the lady's presence, Shaftesbury at last remarked, "Men of sense are all of one religion." The lady turned round quickly, " And what religion is that?""That, madam," answered the earl, quickly, "men of sense will never tell." It is remarkable that the son of this gifted man was nearly a fool, and that nature, resting awhile, as it seemed, produced not until the next generation an intellect worthy of being akin to that of the first Earl of Shaftesbury..

Such was the Cabal. "For awhile it had sailed with a prosperous gale," so says Rapin, whom the interest of the subject has betrayed into a simile, "on a shore famous for shipwrecks without meeting any impediments.

But at last they were stopped in their course by a rock which it was not possible to avoid-I mean the parliament." The Cabal was dissolved 1672-3, when the utter shamelessness of the men who composed it was manifest. Shaftesbury, as we have seen, gave up his former associates upon pretext of patriotism; Arlington disgracefully deserted his party; Clifford resigned his office as treasurer and died; Buckingham, by all manner of treacheries and falsehoods, saved himself from impeachment. When the king and the Duke of York heard the debates in the House of Lords, at which it was then customary for the royal family to attend, the latter whispered to his royal brother while Shaftesbury was speaking, "What a rogue have you

of a lord-chancellor !" To which the king replied, "And what a fool of a lord-treasurer!"

To return to the Lauderdales, the defeat of the Cabal broke one proud heart in Ham House, and, sinking under the weight of age, vexation, and infirmities, the duke died in August 1682. He was succeeded by his brother as Earl of Lauderdale, but his English titles became extinct.

The duchess lingered at Ham, where she, too, died in 1698, during a weary widowhood, for no third claimant to her hand appeared. Her eldest son, Lionel Talmache, succeeded her; and her second, Thomas, distinguished himself at the taking of Athlow and the battle of Aghrim. He was killed, however, at Brest, four months previous to his mother's death.

A long line of the Talmache family, all named Lionel, have since been the owners of Ham House, yet the glory of the place has been in some measure diminished, for Helingham has been the chief scat of the family since the death of the Duchess of Lauderdale. James II., upon the arrival of his son-in-law the Prince of Orange, was ordered to retire to Ham House, but he deemed an abode so near the metropolis unsafe, and fled to France.

HOMER, who, in the course of his "many-wandering life, had seen many kinds of men, speaks of a surpassing thief, Autolycus by name,—

Ος ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο

Κλεπτοσύνη.-Οdyss. xix. 396 ;

and no one can doubt that the exploits of this gentleman were worthy of historic record. But Homer knew nothing of our modern literature, or he would have hesitated before awarding the kleptic palm to any Autolycus. We have brought to perfection the "art to steal." To steal? "Convey, the wise it call." There is no pillage which, in adroitness or shameless audacity, can equal that of the modern bookmaker.

And yet as the old Greeks could find excuses for the successful thief, so would we deal leniently with the successful bookmaker. So that he who robs does no great wrong to his victim, and does some good to the public, we, as the public's watchdogs, need not bark. In this category we must place Mr. Morell. Although a genuine descendant of Autolycus in the art of" conveyance," although a bookmaker utterly without conscience, yet there is so little evil in him, such calm, quiet procedure, and his purpose is so evidently the laudable one of instructing the public, that we cannot be severe. He is mildly unscrupulous; innocently, almost naïvely, ignorant of the "usages" of literature; acts dishonestly, but "means well." There is a sort of patriarchal simplicity in his tone which mitigates the censure which his procedure would otherwise suggest.

The Historical and Critical View of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century has been warmly praised by a contemporary, who rarely praises any thing; and among other merits selected are, "the extensive range of reading and extraordinary grasp of mind.' These are truly the two greatest merits such a work could

possibly possess. Unhappily, the

work has neither. It is a review

article in two bulky volumes, and not a good article. It has neither the necessary erudition, nor the necessary grasp of mind. It has not even the necessary workmanlike ability which a bookmaker should display.

These assertions we shall proceed to verify. With respect to erudition, any person at all conversant with the subject would at once detect its slender pretensions. Except the English writers, and Cousin and Jouffroy, there is no evidence whatever of the author's having any direct acquaintance with the works of the philosophers treated of in his pages,-that is to say, all the German and French philosophers of note. The Italian he does not mention. We beg the reader to observe, that we by no means assert Mr. Morell to be utterly ignorant of their writings; but we do assert that he has given no evidence of any thing more than, at the most, a superficial acquaintance with some few, and with the majority of them absolutely no acquaintance at all. For the Germans, he has taken Michelet's History of Modern Philosophy in Germany; Chalybius' Historical Developement of Speculative Philosophy; Remusat's De la Philosophie Allemande; Ott's Hegel et la Philosophie Allemande; Sainte's Vie de Kant, and Histoire du Rationalisme; and one or two other popular manuals. For the French, he has taken Damiron's Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France au XIX. Siècle; and only this one book, simply because no others were to be had! One peculiarity in Mr. Morell's work is, that he never directly quotes these his authorities— not, at least, as such. He nowhere gives the reader to understand that he is but quietly adapting from their pages such expositions as may suit his own. He once (vol. i. p. 206) acknowledges that he is indebted to Chalybäus for an illustration of Kant's views, an illustration, by the way, which is in Kant himself! as Mr. Morell would have known had

stop there. He has at least named these philosophers; but he has not even named Werder, who is supposed to have filled up the greatest logical gap in Hegel, viz. as to how the Nichts becomes Seyn; and who is from all accounts a man of mark. He has not even named Beneke, who has made the greatest discoveries in psychology of any man in our time, whose inductive psychology has been luminously applied to questions of insanity, education, and instruction, whose works are popular, and daily increasing in influence. The younger Fichte he has indeed named; but of his system no account is given, although Germans who profess an acquaintance with it speak of it in the highest terms. Nor is any view given of the great schism which has taken place in Germany, in the Hegelian school, and of the audacious speculations of Feurbach, Bruno Bauer, Arnold Ruge, &c. Doubtless brevity is the excuse!

Of Fourier, Mr. Morell speaks thus:

"Fourier bases the whole of his social theory upon certain psychological principles; the chief idea which lies at the foundation of the whole being this-That our natural impulses, or, as he terms them, attractions, are all implanted by God, and all point to our happiness as their final cause. In the present state of society, however, mankind cannot follow their attractions; to do so, would throw confusion into our whole social life. The great problem, therefore, is to frame a state of society, in which every man may follow his own attractions, and make them at the same time subservient to the general well-being. This end Fourier supposes that he has accomplished by his social system; a system which he has shown to spring from psychological principles, and which he has carried out to its remotest details. To enter into the particulars of his social Phalange,' would have no philosophical interest attaching to it. The curious reader may find every information in Chambers' Edin burgh Journal, 1839; and also in the Appendix to the work on Social Science, by Charles Bray."

There are three points to be noticed in this passage. First, its

brevity, which could be only in a review, but is consistent" with any hisecondly, its references to Journal and Charles Bray;

so recondite! evincing such an "extensive range of reading!" Thirdly, the artifice with which he absolves himself from the labour of studying a system in order that he may give an exposition of it, by saying that there" could be no philosophical interest attached to the details" of it. Now, although it is quite intelligible how German metaphysicians, occupied with the abstract problems of ontology, should despise as unphilosophical and uninteresting any speculations of Communism, Fourierism, &c.; yet it does strike us as somewhat anomalous in an historian of modern philosophy that he should imagine there was not a very great philosophical interest attached to all such speculations. False as we believe Fourierism to be, dangerous as all such anarchical attempts must ever be, their very danger fixes attention upon them. They lie too near the root of much of our social disturbance to be disregarded, and it is of great consequence to all men that such doctrines should be fully refuted. But before they can be refuted, they must be understood. But as Mr. Morell had never read Fourier, of course he could not satisfy a legitimate curiosity on that point. What he says about want of philosophical interest is trivial. Equally so his excuse for not mentioning the Italians:

"In the course of our Historical View,' we have said nothing respecting the philosophy of any of the European nations, beyond England, France, and Germany. We would not have it inferred hence, that philosophy has been entirely neglected amongst all the European people except those three. The reason why they hold no particular place in the history of philosophy is, that they have attached themselves to some of the systems we have explained, rather than originated any new methods or theories. In Italy, Giov. Batt. Vico, about the close of the last century, gave a sketch of the History of Philosophy, which has occupied a prominent place in Italian literature. In the present century, App. Buonafede has also written on the History of Philosophy. In Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, several authors have been incited to metaphysical investigations, by the study of the German philosophy. And even Portugal has produced one or two works worthy of notice. As these all, however, have a reference to some of the systems we have explained,

a

torious, at least, of modern speculators? Not a word. What account is there of that bold undertaking, l'Encyclopédie Nouvelle ? Not line. What exposition of the doctrine of that. school which calls M. Buchez its chief? Not a hint of it. What notice is taken of M. Cabet? None. Of MM. Bordas-Demoulin, Bouiller, Emile Saisset, Bautain, &c., what account is there? Not a single whisper. The truth is, M. Damiron has said nothing on these subjects, so Mr. Morell has nothing to say. The only name not mentioned by Damiron, which he has treated of, is Auguste Comte, to whom he devotes the space of five and a half pages, and those liberally adorned with blunders! Now what will the reader say to this? In two bulky volumes where twenty-three pages are bestowed on a writer so well known as Locke, who does not belong to the nineteenth century (of which the work professes to treat), only five and a half are given to a system which its admirers pronounce the most important since Bacon and Descartes! Certainly, if any where the reader would have expected in Mr. Morell's book to find something like a satisfactory account of this system, at least some indication of its leading features. Where is he to get any account of it? Mr. Mill, in his System of Logic, frequently quotes Comte, but was not called upon to give an exposition; and Mr. Lewes, in his History of Philosophy, gets out of the difficulty by pleading want of space for an outline of so vast a system. What plea has Mr. Morell? That of never having seen Comte's work!

So much for Mr. Morell's treatment of France in the nineteenth century. Germany fares little better at his hands. The names registered in Michelet and others, are, it is true, to be found in his pages. But pray consider this amusing passage which follows the account of Hegel:

With regard to those philosophers who have put forth new ideas, we might mention Suabedissen, Hillebrand, Troxler, and Krause, as the principal; always, of course, excepting those who have taken a direction in favour of mysticism. The peculiarity of these writers is, that they have all made the attempt to combine in one the subjective and the

objective branches of the modern idealism, to unite the principles of Schelling and Hegel. Suabedissen has, with peculiar care, elaborated the philosophy of religion, in which he has combated the idea, that God is the eternal process of the universe, and deduced from the bare notion of selfexistence the proper essence, spirituality, and personality of Deity. Hillebrand also has bent his chief attention upon this same theological point. His great principle is, that God, or the Absolute, has revealed himself to us immediately in our own consciousness: to prove, however, that we can trust our consciousness upon these points, must be the province of philosophy; and it is in this sense only that philosophy can give any proof of the existence of a Deity. Troxler's philosophy is of the microcosmic order. To him the source, the centre, the object of all philosophy is man. truth and all knowledge is simply the revelation of the original elements of our own reason, and the reality which is implied in them. The soul is a perfect mirror of the universe, and we have only to gaze into it with earnest attention, to discover all truth which is accessible to humanity. What we know of God, therefore, can be only that which is originally revealed to us of him in our own minds.

All

Lastly, Krause terms his philosophy a system of transcendental idealism, in which, commencing with the subjective principle of observing what exists in our own consciousness, he raises himself step by step to the acknowledgment of one, eternal, self-existent Being. To characterise these different shadings of the ideal philosophy of Germany more accurately would hardly consist with the brevity of our present plan, we shall, therefore, now take leave of this most remarkable page in the history of the world's philosophy, with a single observation."

What! inconsistent with the plan of a history of philosophy in the nineteenth century, which devotes 286 pages to a discussion of Locke, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, &c.? Inconsistent with your plan? No, Mr. Morell, you mean inconsistent with the state of your knowledge. Why not confess it frankly-you don't know what "these new ideas are; and that is why you wisely say nothing about them. But won't you generously promise that, in case any industrious German should publish a history of contemporary writers, you will willingly extract some account of them for your next edition ?

But Mr. Morell's omissions do not