limit the discrimination" in any way that is definite and certain." 1 Within the limits set, it would seem that the Commissioners have a freer hand to work out their own ideas of relative reasonableness than ever before. By far the most striking rulings have been in the cases dealing with the rates from the eastern and central section to points near the Pacific coast. The questions at issue and the general features of the decisions are now familiar. On account of water competition, the rates from the eastern coast are highest to points some distance inland, and lower to Pacific ports. When the carriers serving Chicago and other points in the eastern half of the continent began the policy of putting these cities on a par with the seaports in competition for the western markets, they took the rates as they found them, discriminations and all. Under these rates, producers west of the Alleghenies have come to do more and more of the business, until now most of the traffic paying the rates is not subject to water competition that would of itself account for the discrimination. It seems to have been true, however, that the ocean carriers did reach inland and draw cargoes to the Pacific coast via the Atlantic from as far west, at times, as Chicago, often themselves" absorbing" the cost of the eastward haul. The Commission met this situation by dividing the country into zones, one where water competition admittedly has full force, one where it has no force, and two intermediate zones where its effect is weak or intermittent. The amount by which the intermediate rates in question might exceed the through charges was limited to 25 per cent from the eastern zone, 15 per cent 3 1 City of Spokane v. N. P. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 400, 415. R. R. Com. of Nev. v. So. Pac. Co. et al., 19 I. C. C. R. 238, 247-251. • Intermountain Rate Case, 21 I. C. C. R. 355. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 400, 423. City of Spokane v. N. P. Ry. from the next, 7 per cent from the next and none from the zone farthest west. At first sight the ruling seems logical. Yet here also disturbing questionings arise which make one doubt if this will prove a permanent solution of the problem. Indeed the Commission can hardly be said to regard it as such, since it held that it would be within its rights in refusing relief to all but the seaboard zone, as it had not been affirmatively shown that the coast-to-coast rates were unreasonably low in themselves if applied to the haul from the inland zones to the intermountain region. Such being the case, and the law placing the burden of proof on the carriers to establish the reasonableness of their intermediate charges, the Commission could legally have lowered all the intermediate rates to the level of those granted to the seaports. The fact that they gave the permission to charge more, represented an attempt to be "extremely conservative in this, the first application of the new law." Regarded as an attempt to set up the exact reasonable charge to the intermountain region (of which no pretense is made), the decision would surely be open to the objection raised by the Commerce Court in enjoining it, namely, that the Commissioners cannot say whether the intermediate rates chargeable under their order are absolutely reasonable or not, for they do not know what those rates will be. Apparently, the Commission assumed that the coast-to-coast through rates would go no lower than they were at the time a bold assumption in view of all the possibilities of the Panama Canal. If the decision had used percentages of the coast-to-coast rates as they stood at the time, its position might have been unassailable. Possibly the Commission had in mind its experience with the Texas Commission, in which its at 1 R. R. Com. of Nev. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 329, 369. tempts to prevent a discrimination by lowering an interstate rate were frustrated by lowering the competing intra-state rate still farther. Were the Commissioners afraid that an order that should merely lower these intermediate rates would be the signal for an orgy of rate cutting by the roads who are interested in seeing the Pacific seaports do as big a jobbing business as possible? As to the logic of the competitive situation, it would seem that the straight path to the end desired would be to determine, if possible, what rates from the various zones are needed, bona fide, to meet the rail-and-water competition, and to order that the only rates exempt from the long and short haul prohibition shall be rates that are not lower than the competitive rates so found. The result would be quite similar to that of the rulings of the Commission: it would level off the summit of the mountain-peak of high rates which raises its bulk so forbiddingly to the western inland rate-payer, but the method would be more direct. A rate is either determined by water competition or it is not. If not, it is not entitled to exemption; but if it is so determined, what reason is there for putting a percentage limit on the relief granted ? If the method here suggested be practicable, it would seem to offer the simplest way of separating "business" reductions of rates (made necessary by direct competition of routes) from "charitable " ones (due to market competition), and enacting that charity must begin at home. In conclusion, a few general impressions present themselves. In the first place, all cases under the fourth section cannot but be witnesses to the wide margin of tolerance for different methods of constructing tariffs that exist in our regulative machinery. Strict mileage scales, tapering scales, blanket rates of wide extent, and combinations both forward and (with the permission of the Commission) backward from a competitive terminal point, - all are allowed within the limits of this discretionary statute. All that is accomplished by rulings under the fourth section is to substitute blanket rates for rates that disregard distance still more violently. In many cases the Commission, acting under its general powers, has gone farther than this. It has limited the extent of single blanket rates when that seemed excessive, and has prescribed rates of its own making in the form of modified distance scales. But this work tho of the utmost interest, is beyond the bounds of the present study. Secondly, it seems that the Commission's ideal has much to do with the efficiency to be gained by placing the country's industries in the situations most favorable for them, and less to do with preventing the losses in transportation efficiency that come directly from wasteful carriage, in ways made familiar by Professor Ripley's analysis.1 And, thirdly, one cannot but wonder whether the shifting to the carriers of the burden of proving that rates to intermediate points are reasonable may not have been, during the months that are past, a more effective weapon in lowering these rates than it can ever be again. For the attorneys of the railroads cannot fail to learn better and better now to support this burden of proof, as the Federal Department of Justice in enforcing the Sherman Act had to learn, through the fiasco of the Knight case, how to prove to the courts that an illegal combination existed, and emerged at the end successful. J. M. CLARK. AMHERST COLLEGE. 1 Railroads: Rates and Regulation, as cited. INDUSTRY IN PISA IN THE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY SUMMARY Pisa's commercial greatness and prosperity, 339. — Her decline at the end of the thirteenth century, 340. — Industrial organization in the early fourteenth century, 341. Its mature form, 341.—The gilds, 341. The unorganized crafts, 347. The crafts, organized but dependent, 348. Industrial regulation by the gilds, 349. — By the city, 350. — Study of the woolen industry, 353. — The Curia Mercatorum, 354. The Arte della Lane, 355. — The domestic system in the shell of the old gild organization, 356. Conclusion, 358. -- 5 4 2 Up to the present time, our knowledge of Italian economic history in the early Renaissance is slight. There are the studies of Poehlmann,1 Doren, and Davidsohn for Florence, of Broglio d'Anjano ' for Venice, and of Schaube for Pisa, but practically nothing of value besides. This is not due to the lack of available printed sources; for the printed Statuti of the Italian cities contain a mass of material which will amply repay investigation. As an example of what can be done from the printed sources I have made this study from the Statuti of Pisa, a contribution toward a fuller knowledge of the industrial side of Italian economic history. 7 1 Poehlmann, R, Die wirthschaftspolitik der florenentiner renaissance und das princip der verkehrsfreiheit. 2 Doren, A, Studien aus der florentiner wirthschaftsgeschichte. * Davidsohn, R, Geschichte von Florenz. • Broglio d'Anjano, R, Die Venetianische seidenindustrie und ihre organization bis sum Ausgang des mittelalters. Schaube, A, Das Konsulat des Meeres in Pisa. The Library of Harvard University has recently acquired a large collection of Italian Statuti, numbering nearly four hundred volumes. 7 Statuti Pisani, edited by Francesco Bonaini in three volumes, Florence, 1854-70. |