quite overshadowed by the incomparable urgency of the only question-the relative power of the States and the general Government—which really was discussed in the Convention. The debates were in secret, and we have but brief notes of them; but a passage in the minutes jotted down by one of the members, Chief Justice Yates, of New York, no doubt tells the whole story:-May 31, 1787. The 3rd resolve to wit, "That the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches," was taken into consideration, and without any debate, agreed to.' To this Judge Yates adds, in brackets: N.B. As a previous resolution had already been agreed to, to have a supreme Legislature, I could not see any objection to its being in two branches.' So lightly was a step taken which has proved to be of momentous consequence to America!

Curtis, the generally accepted historian of the American Constitution, has a passage on this subject which no doubt accurately represents the average ignorance and traditional sentiment which : prevailed to establish the two Houses in America. He says: The needful harmony and completeness of the scheme, according to the genius of th

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Anglo-American liberty, required the division of the Legislature. Doubtless a single Council or Chamber can promulgate decrees and enact laws; but it had never been the habit of the people of America, as it never had been the habit of their ancestors for at least a period of more than five centuries, to regard a single Chamber asf avourable to liberty or to wise legislation. The separation into two Chambers of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons, in the English Constitution, does not seem to have originated in a difference of personal rank so much as in their position as separate estates of the realm. All the orders might have been voted promiscuously in one House, and just as effectually signified the assent or dissent of Parliament to any measure proposed; but the practice of making the assent of Parliament to consist in the concurrent and separate action of the two estates, though difficult to be traced to its origin in any distinct purpose or cause, became confirmed by the growing importance of the Commons, by their jealousy and vigilance, and by the controlling position which they finally assumed. As Parliament gradually proceeded to its present constitution, and the

separate rights and privileges of the two Houses became established, it was found that the practice of discussing a measure in two assemblies, composed of different persons, holding their seats by a different tenure, and representing different orders of the State, was in the highest degree conducive to the security of the subject and to sound legislation.'

So far as any clear impression arises from the hazy annals of the earliest parliamentary government in England, it is that the king called upon the leading noblemen of the realm to become his guests for a time for purposes of consultation, feasting them meanwhile in grand style. This was the only Parliament. To this assembly come groups of petitioners, deputations from the people; and these, in order that their requests may be presented with some kind of regularity, must needs organise their assemblies, and appoint some mouth-piece or Speaker, now represented by the most silent official bearing that name. For it is in this group of deputations that we must recognise the future Commons' House, which for a time sat in the presence of the Parliament of Peers, until the latter thought it beneath their dignity to

sit beside those of lower rank. The separation probably occurred at the time when the Commoners ceased to be a mere crowd of petitioners to their lordships, and showed signs of becoming a normal element in the government. The House of Peers represented the supremacy of the aristocratic and clerical classes, of which the Crown was the head; the Commons represented the degree to which the people had managed to extort the first point, recognition of their existence, and of the simplest rights implied in that existence.

It is a notable fact that, while the founders of the American Constitution were taking up this relic of feudalism and clothing it with formidable power, the English nation was already preparing the forces which were to reduce the House of Lords to the secondary position it now occupies.

II.

After reading the statement of the American historian, it may assist us to ponder the following from one of the ablest of recent writers on the English Constitution, Mr. Bagehot :- The evil of two coequal Houses of distinct natures is obvious. Each

House can stop all legislation, and yet some legislation may be necessary. At this moment we have the best instance of this which could be conceived. The Upper House of our Victorian Constitution, representing the rich wool-growers, has disagreed with the Lower Assembly, and most business is suspended. But for a most curious stratagem the machine of government would stand still. Most Constitutions have committed this blunder. The two most remarkable Republican institutions in the world commit it. In both the American and the Swiss Constitutions the Upper House has as much authority as the second; it could produce the maximum of impediment, the dead-lock, if it liked. If it does not do so, it is owing, not to the goodness of the legal constitution, but to the discreetness of the members of the Chamber. In both these Constitutions this dangerous provision is defended by a peculiar doctrine with which I have nothing to do now. It is said there must be in a Federal Government some institution, some authority, somebody possessing a veto, in which the separate States composing the Confederation are all equal. I confess this doctrine has to me no selfevidence, and it is assumed, but not proved. The