Such is the account given of the nature of virtue in this amiable fyftem, a fyftem which has a peculiar tendency to nourish and fupport in the human heart the nobleft and the most agreeable of all affections, and not only to check the injustice of self-love, but infome measure to difcourage that principle altogether, by representing it as what could never reflect any honour upon those who were influenced by it.

As fome of the other fyftems which I have already given an account of, do not fufficiently explain from whence arifes the peculiar excellency of the fupreme virtue of beneficence, fo this, fyftem feems to have the contrary defect, of not fufficiently explaining from whence arifes our approbation of the inferior virtues of prudence, vigilance, circumfpection, temperance, conftancy, firmnefs. The view and aim of out affections, the beneficent and hurtful effects which they tend to produce, are the only qualities at all attended to in this fyftem. Their propriety and impropriety, their fuitablenefs and unfuitableness, to the cause which excites them, are difregarded altogether.

Regard to our own private happiness and intereft too, appear upon many occafions very laudable principles of action. The habits of oeconomy, industry, discretion, attention, and application of thought, are generally fuppofed to be cultivated from felfinterested motives, and at the fame time are apprehended to be very praife-worthy qualities, which deferve the esteem and approbation of every body. The mixture of a felfish motive, it is true, seems often to fully the beauty of thofe actions which ought Y 4

to

to arife from a benevolent affection. The cause of this, however, is not that felf-love can never be the motive of a virtuous action, but that the benevolent principle appears in this particular cafe to want its due degree of ftrength, and to be altogether unsuitable to its object. The character, therefore, feems evidently imperfect, and upon the whole to deserve blame rather than praise. The mixture of a benevolent motive in an action to which felflove alone ought to be fufficient to prompt us, is not fo apt indeed to diminish our sense of its propriety, or of the virtue of the perfon who performs it, We are not ready to fufpect any person of being defective in selfishness. This is by no means the weak fide of human nature, or the failing of which we are apt to be suspicious, If we could really believe, however, of any man, that, was it not from a regard to his family and friends, he would not take that proper care of his health, his life, or his fortune, to which felf-prefervation alone ought to be fufficient to prompt him, it would undoubtedly be a failing, tho' one of thofe amiable failings, which render a perfon rather the object of pity than of contempt or hatred. It would ftill, however, fomewhat diminish the dignity and refpectableness of his character. Carelessnefs and want of economy are univerfally disapproved of, not, however as proceeding from a want of benevolence, but from a want of the proper attention to the objects of felf-intereft.

Though the ftandard by which cafuifts frequently determine what is right or wrong in human conduct, be its tendency to the welfare or diforder of fociety, it does not follow that a regard to the welfare

welfare of fociety fhould be the fole virtuous motive of action, but only that, in any competition, it ought to caft the balance against all other motives.

Benevolence may, perhaps, be the fole principle of action in the Deity, and there are feveral, not improbable, arguments which tend to perfuade us that it is fo. It is not easy to conceive what other motive an independent and all-perfect being, who stands in need of nothing external, and whofe happiness is complete in himself, can act from. But whatever may be the cafe with the Deity, fo imperfect a creature as man, the support of whofe existence requires fo many things external to him, must often act from many other motives. The condition of human nature were peculiarly hard, if those affections, which, by the very nature of our being, ought frequently to influence our conduct, could upon no occafion appear virtuous, or deferve efteem and commendation from any body.

Those three fystems, that which places virtue in propriety, that which places it in prudence, and that which makes it confift in benevolence, are the principal accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue. To one or other of them, all the other descriptions of virtue, how different foever they may appear, are easily reducible,

That fyftem which places virtue in obedience to the will of the Deity, may be counted either among thofe which make it confift in prudence, or among thofe which make it confist in propriety. When it is afked, why we ought to obey the will of the Deity, this queftion, which would be impious and abfurd in the highest degree, if afked from any doubt that

we

we ought to obey him, can admit but of two different anfwers. It muft either be faid that we ought to obey the will of the Deity because he is a being of infinite power, who will reward us eternally if we do fo, and punish us eternally if we do otherwife: Or it must be said, that independent of any regard to our own happiness, or to rewards and punishments of any kind, there is a congruity and fitness that a creature fhould obey its creator, that a limited and imper-. fect being fhould fubmit to one of infinite and incomprehenfible perfections. Befides one or other of thefe two it is impoffible to conceive that any other anfwer can be given to this question. If the first anfwer be the proper one, virtue, confifts in prudence, or in the proper purfuit of our own final intereft and happiness; fince it is upon this account that we are obliged to obey the will of the Deity. If the fecond answer be the proper one, virtue must confift in propriety, fince the ground of our obligation to obedience is the fuitableness or congruity of the fentiments of humility and fubmiffion to the fuperiority of the object which excites them.

That fyftem which places virtue in utility coincides too with that which makes it confift in propriety. According to this system all thofe qualities of the mind which are agreeable or advantageous, either to the perfon himself or to others, are approved of as virtuous, and the contrary difapproved of as vicious. But the agreeableness or utility of any affection depends upon the degree which it is allowed to fubfift in. Every affection is ufeful when it is confined to a certain degree of moderation; and every affection is difadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds. According to this fyftem therefore, virtue confifts,

not

not in any one affection, but in the proper degree of all the affections. The only difference between it and that which I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not fympathy, or the correfpondent affection of the fpectator, the natural and original meafure of this proper degree.

CHA P. IV.

Of licentious fyftems.

ALL thofe fyftems, which I have hitherto given

an account of, fuppofe that there is a real and effen tial diftinction between vice and virtue, whatever thefe qualities may confift in. There is a real and effential difference between the propriety and impropriety of any affection, between benevolence and any other principle of action, between real prudence and fhort-fighted folly or precipitate rashness. In the main too all of them contribute to encourage the praife-worthy, and to difcourage the blameable dif pofition.

It may be true perhaps, of fome of them, that they tend, in fome meafure, to break the balance of the affections, and to give the mind a particular bias to fome principles of action, beyond the pro. portion that is due to them. The ancient fyftems which place virtue in propriety, feem chiefly to recommend the great, the awful, and the respectable virtues, the virtues of felf-government and felfcommand; fortitude, magnanimity, independency upon fortune, the contempt of all outward accidents, of pain, poverty, exile, and death. It is in these great