with generosity. We never are generous except when in some respect we prefer fome other perfon to ourselves, and facrifice fome great and important intereft of our own to an equal intereft of a friend or of a fuperior. The man who gives up his pretenfions to an office that was the great object of his ambition, because he imagines that the fervices of another are better entitled to it; the man who expofes his life to defend that of his friend, which he judges to be of more importance, neither of them act from humanity, or because they feel more exquifitely what concerns that other perfon than what concerns themselves. They both confider thofe oppofite interefts not in the light in which they naturally appear to themselves, but in that in which they appear to others. To every byftander, the fuccefs or preservation of this other perfon may justly be more interefting than their own; but it cannot be fo to themselves. When to the interest of this other perfon, therefore, they facrifice their own, they accommodate themfelves to the fentiments of the spectator, and by an effort of magnanimity act according to thofe views of things which they feel, must naturally occur to any third perfon. The foldier who throws away his life in order to defend that of his officer, would perhaps be but little affected by the death of that officer, if it fhould happen without any fault of his own; and a very fmall difafter which had befallen himself might ex-. cite a much more lively forrow. But when he endeavours to act fo as to deferve applause, and to make the impartial fpectator enter into the principles of his conduct, he feels, that to every body but himself, his own life is a trifle compared with that of his officer, and that when he facrifices the one to the other, he acts quite properly and agreeably to what

would be the natural apprehenfions of every impartial bystander.

It is the fame cafe with the greater exertions of public fpirit. When a young officer expofes his life to acquire fome inconfiderable addition to the dominions of his fovereign, it is not, because the acquifition of the new territory is, to himself, an object; more defireable than the prefervation of his own life. To him his own life is of infinitely more value than the conqueft of a whole kingdom for, the ftate which he ferves. But when he compares thofe two objects with one another, he does not view them in the light in which they naturally appear to himfelf, but in that in which they appear to the nation he fights for.. To them the fuccefs of the war is of the higheft importance; the life of a private perfon of fcarce any confequence. When he puts himself in their fituation, he immediately feels that he cannot be too prodigal of his blood, if by fhedding it, he can promote so valuable a purpose. In thus thwarting, from a fenfe of duty and propriety, the strongest of all natural propenfities, confifts the heroifm of his conduct. There is many an ho neft Englishman, who, in his private ftation, would be more seriously disturbed by the lofs of a guinea, than by the national lofs of Minorca, who yet, had it been in his power to defend that fortrefs, would have facrificed his life a thousand times rather than, through his fault, have let it fall into the hands of the enemy. When the firft Brutus led forth his own fons to a capital punishment, because they had confpired against the rifing liberty of Rome, he facrificed what, if he had confulted his own breaft only, would appear to be the ftronger to the weaker

affection.

affection. Brutus ought naturally to have felt much more for the death of his own fons, than for all that probably Rome could have fuffered from the want of fo great an example. But he viewed them, not with the eyes of a father, but with thofe of a Roman citizen. He entered fo thoroughly into the fentiments of this laft character, that he paid no regard to that tye, by which he himself was connected with them; and to a Roman citizen, the fons even of Brutus feemed contemptible, when put into the balance with the fmallest interest of Rome. In thefe and in all other cafes of this kind, our admiration is not fo much founded upon the utility, as upon the unexpected, and on that account the great, the noble, and exalted propriety of fuch actions. This utility, when we come to view it, beftows upon them, undoubtedly, a new beauty, and upon that account ftill further recommends them to our approbation. This beauty, however, is chiefly perceived by men of reflection and fpeculation, and is by no means the quality which firft recommends fuch actions to the natural fentiments of the bulk of mankind.

It is to be obferved, that fo far as the fentiment of approbation arifes from the perception of this beauty of utility, it has no reference of any kind to the fentiments of others. If it was poffible, therefore, that a perfon fhould grow up to manhood without any communication with fociety, his own actions might, notwithstanding, be agreeable or disagreeable to him on account of their tendency to his happiness or disadvantage. He might perceive a beauty of this kind in prudence, temperance, and good conduct, and a deformity in the oppofite behaviour: He might view his own temper and character with

that fort of fatisfaction with which we confider a well contrived machine, in the one cafe; or with that fort of distaste and diffatisfaction with which we regard a very awkward and clumfy contrivance, in the other. As these perceptions, however, are merely a matter of taste, and have all the feebleness and delicacy of that fpecies of perceptions, upon the juftness of which what is properly called tafte is founded, they probably would not be much attended to by one in his folitary and miferable condition. Even though. they should occur to him, they would by no means have the fame effect upon him, antecedent to his connexion with fociety, which they would have in confequence of that connexion. He would not be caft down with inward fhame at the thought of this deformity, nor would he be elevated with fecret triumph of mind from the consciousness of the contrary beauty. He would not exult from the notion of deferving reward in the one cafe, nor tremble from the fufpicion of meriting punishment in the other. All fuch fentiments fuppofe the idea of fome other being, who is the natural judge of the perfon that feels them; and it is only by sympathy with the decifions of this arbiter of his conduct, that he can conceive, either the triumph of self-applaufe, or the shame of felf-condemnation.

PART

PART V.

Of the INFLUENCE of CUSTOм and FASHION upon the fentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation.

CONSISTING OF ONE SECTION.

CHAP. I.

Of the influence of custom and fashion upon our notions of beauty and deformity.

THERE are other principles befides those al

ready enumerated, which have a confiderable influence upon the moral fentiments of mankind, and are the chief causes of the many irregular and difcordant opinions which prevail in different ages and nations concerning what is blameable or praife-worthy. These principles are cuftom and faction, principles which extend their dominion over our judgments concerning beauty of every kind.

When two objects have frequently been feen together, the imagination acquires a habit of paffing eafily from the one to the other. If the first appear, we lay our account that the fecond is to follow. Of

$ 3

their