CHA P. III.

Of the influence and authority of the general rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity.

THE regard to thofe general rules of conduct,

is what is properly called a fenfe of duty, a principle of the greatest consequence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions. Many men behave very decently, and through the whole of their lives avoid any confiderable degree of blame, who yet, perhaps, never felt the fentiment upon the propriety of which we found our approbation of their conduct, but acted merely from a regard to what they faw were the established rules of behaviour. The man who has received great benefits from another person, may, by the natural coldness of his temper, feel but a very small degree of the sentiment of gratitude. If he has been virtuously educated, however, he will often have been made to observe how odious those actions appear which denote a want of this sentiment, and how amiable the contrary. Tho' his heart therefore is not warmed with any grateful affection, he will ftrive to act as if it was, and will endeavour to pay all those regards and attentions to his patron which the livelieft gra

may

titude could fuggeft. He will vifit him regularly; he will behave to him refpectfully; he will never talk of him but with expreffions of the highest esteem, and of the many obligations which he owes to him. And what is more, he will carefully embrace every opportunity of making a proper return for past services. He may do all this too without any hypocrify or blamable diffimulation, without any felfifh intention of obtaining new favours, and without any design of impofing either upon his benefactor or the public. The motive of his actions be no other than a reverence for the established rule of duty, a serious and earnest defire of acting, in every refpect, according to the law of gratitude. A wife, in the fame manner, may fometimes not feel that tender regard for her hufband which is fuitable to the relation that fubfifts between them. If she has been virtuoufly educated, however, fhe will endeavour to act as if fhe felt it, to be careful, officious, faithful, and fincere, and to be deficient in none of thofe attentions which the fentiment of conjugal affection could have prompted her to perform. Such a friend, and fuch a wife, are neither of them, undoubtedly, the very best of their kinds; and though both of them may have the moft ferious and earneft defire to fulfil every part of their duty, yet they will fail in many nice and delicate regards, they will miss many opportunities of obliging, which they could never have overlooked if they had poffeffed the fentiment that is proper to their fituation. Though not the very firft of their kinds, however, they are perhaps the fecond; and if the regard to the general rules of conduct has been very ftrongly impreffed upon them, neither of them will fail in any effential part of their duty. None but those of

the

the happieft mould are capable of fuiting, with exact juftnefs, their fentiments and behaviour to the fmalleft difference of fituation, and of acting upon all occafions with the most delicate and accurate propriety. The coarfe clay of which the bulk of mankind are formed, cannot be wrought up to fuch perfection. There is fcarce any man, however, who by difcipline, education, and example, may not be impreffed with a regard to general rules, as to act upon almost every. occafion with tolerable decency, and through the whole of his life avoid any confiderable degree of blame.

Without this facred regard to general rules, there is no man whofe conduct can be much depended upon. It is this which constitutes the most effential difference between a man of principle and honour and a worthlefs fellow. The one adheres, on all occafions, fteadily and refolutely to his maxims, and preferves through the whole of his life one even tenour of conduct. The other, acts variously and accidentally, as humour, inclination, or intereft chance to be uppermoft. Nay, fuch are the inequalities of humour to which all men are subject, that without this principle, the man who, in his cool hours, had the most delicate fenfibility to the propriety of conduct, might often be led to act abfurdly upon the most frivolous occafions, and when it was scarce poffible to affign any ferious motive for his behaviour in this manner. Your friend makes you a vifit when you happen to be in a humour which makes it difagreeable to receive him: in your present mood this civility is very apt to appear an impertinent intrusion; and if you were to give way to the views of things which at this time occur, Р

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though civil in your temper, you would behave to him with coldnefs and contempt. What renders you incapable of fuch a rudenets, is nothing but a regard to the general rules of civility and hospitality, which prohibit it. That habitual reverence which your former experience has taught you for these, enables you to act, upon all fuch occafions, with nearly equal propriety, and hinders thofe inequalities of temper, to which all men are fubject, from influencing your conduct in any very fenfible degree. But if without regard to thefe general rules, even the duties of politeness, which are so easily obferved, and which can scarce have any serious motive to violate, would yet be fo frequently violated, what would become of the duties of justice, of· truth, of chastity, of fidelity, which it is often so difficult to obferve, and which there may be fo many strong motives to violate? But upon the tolerable obfervance of these duties, depends the very existence of human fociety, which would crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally impreffed with a reverence for thofe important rules of conduct.

This reverence is still further enhanced by an opinion which is firft impreffed by nature, and afterwards confirmed by reafoning and philofophy, that those important rules of morality, are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will finally reward the obedient, and punish the tranfgreffors of their duty.

This opinion or apprehension, I say, seems firft to be impressed by nature. Men are naturally led to afcribe to those myfterious beings, whatever they are, which happen, in any country, to be the ob

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jects of religious fear, all their own sentiments and paffions. They have no other, they can conceive no other to ascribe to them. Those unknown intelligences which they imagine but fee not, muit neceffarily be formed with fome fort of resemblance to those intelligences of which they have experience. During the ignorance and darkness of pagan fuperflition, mankind feem to have formed the ideas of their divinities with fo little delicacy, that they afcribed to them, indifcriminately, all the paffions of human nature, those not excepted which do the leaft honour to our fpecies, fuch as luft, hunger, avarice, envy, revenge. They could not fail therefore, to ascribe to thofe beings, for the excellence of whofe nature they still conceived the highest admiration, those sentiments and qualities which are the great ornaments of humanity, and which feem to raise it to a refemblance of divine perfection, the love of virtue and beneficence, and the abhorrence of vice and injuftice. The man who was injured, called upon Jupiter to be witness of the wrong that was done to him, and could not doubt, but that divine being would behold it with the same indignation which would animate the meaneft of mankind, who looked on when injuftice was committed. The man who did the injury, felt himself to be the proper object of deteftation and refentment of mankind; and his natural fears led him to impute the fame fentiments to thofe awful beings, whofe prefence he could not avoid, and whofe power he could not refift. Thefe natural hopes and fears, and fufpicions, were propagated by fympathy, and confirmed by education; and the gods were univerfally reprefented and believed to be the rewarders of humanity and mercy, and the avengers of perfidy

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