Зображення сторінки
PDF
ePub

To bring him back to a more juft fenfe of what is due to other people, to make him fenfible of what he owes us, and of the wrong that he has done to us, is frequently the principal end proposed in our revenge, which is always imperfect when it cannot accomplish this. When our enemy appears to have done us no injury, when we are fenfible that he acted quite properly, that, in his fituation, we should have done the fame thing, and that we deserved from him all the mischief we met with; in that cafe, if we have the least spark either of candour or justice, we can entertain no fort of refentment.

Before any thing, therefore, can be the complete and proper object, either of gratitude or resentment, it must poffefs three different qualifications, First, it must be the cause of pleasure in the one cafe, and of pain in the other. Secondly, it must be capable of feeling those fenfations. And, thirdly, it muft not only have produced thofe fenfations, but it must have produced them from defign, and from a defign that is approved of in the one case, and disapproved of in the other. It is by the first qualification, that any object is capable of exciting those paffions; it is by the second, that it is in any respect capable of gratifying them; the third qualification is both neceffary for their complete fatisfaction, and as it gives a pleasure or pain that is both exquisite and peculiar, it is likewise an additional exciting cause of those paflions,

As what gives pleasure or pain, therefore, either in one way or another, is the fole exciting cause of gratitude and refentment; though the intentions of any person should be ever so proper and benefi

cent,

cent, on the one hand, or ever fo improper and malevolent on the other; yet, if he has failed in producing either the good or evil which he intended, as one of the exciting caufes is wanting in both cafes, lefs gratitude seems due to him in the one, and less refentment in the other. And, on the contrary, though in the intentions of any person, there was either no laudable degree of benevolence on the one hand, or no blamable degree of malice on the other; yet, if his actions fhould produce either great good or great evil, as one of the exciting caufes takes place upon both thefe occafions, fome gratitude is apt to arise towards him in the one, and fome refentment in the other. A fhadow of merit seems to fall upon him in the firft, a fhadow of demerit in the fecond. And, as the confequences of actions are altogether under the empire of Fortune, hence arises her influence upon the fentiments of mankind, with regard to merit and demerit.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the extent of this influence of fortune.

THE effect of this influence of fortune is, first,

to diminish our fenfe of the merit or demerit of those actions which arofe from the moft laudable or blamable intentions, when they fail of producing their propofed effects: and, fecondly, to encrease our fenfe of the merit or demerit of actions, beyond what is due to the motives or affections from which they proceed, when they accidentally give occafion either to extraordinary pleasure or pain.

I. First, I fay, though the intentions of any person should be ever so proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever fo improper and malevolent, on the other, yet, if they fail in producing their effects, his merit seems imperfect in the one cafe, and his demerit incomplete in the other. Nor is this irregularity of fentiment felt only by those who are immediately affected by the confequences of any action. It is felt, in fome measure, even by the impartial fpectator. The man who folicits an office for another, without obtaining it, is regarded as his friend, and feems to deferve his love and affection. But the man who not only folicits, but procures it, is more peculiarly confidered as his patron and benefactor, and is entitled to his refpect and gratitude. The perfon obliged, we are apt to think, may with some

justice,

juftice, imagine himself on a level with the first : but we cannot enter into his fentiments, if he does not feel himself inferior to the fecond. It is common indeed to say, that we are equally obliged to the man who has endeavoured to ferve us, as to him who actually did fo. It is the speech which we constantly make upon every unsuccessful attempt of this kind; but which, like all other fine speeches, must be understood with a grain of allowance. The fentiments which a man of generofity entertains for the friend who fails, may often indeed be nearly the fame with those which he conceives for him who fucceeds: and the more generous he is, the more nearly will thofe fentiments approach to an exact level. With the truly generous, to be beloved, to be esteemed by thofe whom they themselves think worthy of efteem, gives more pleasure, and thereby excites more gratitude, than all the advantages which they can ever expect from those fentiments. When they lofe thofe advantages therefore, they seem to lose but a trifle, which is fcarce worth regarding. They still however lofe fomething. Their pleasure therefore, and confequently their gratitude, is not perfectly complete: and accordingly if, between the friend who fails and the friend who fucceeds, all other circumftances are equal, there will, even in the noblest and the best mind, be fome little difference of affection in favour of him who fucceeds. Nay, fo unjust are mankind in this respect, that though the intended benefit fhould be procured, yet if it is not procured by the means of a particular benefactor, they are apt to think that lefs gratitude is due to the man, who with the beft intentions in the world could do no more than help it a little forward. As their gratitude is in this cafe divided

among

among the different perfons who contributed to their pleasure; a smaller share of it seems due to any one. Such a perfon, we hear men commonly fay, intended no doubt to ferve us; and we really believe exerted himself to the utmost of his abilities for that purpose. We are not, however, obliged to him for this benefit; fince had it not been for the concurrence of others, all that he could have done would never have brought it about. This confideration, they imagine, should, even in the eyes of the impartial fpectator, diminish the debt which they owe to him. The perfon himself who has unfuccefsfully endeavoured to confer a benefit, has by no means the fame dependency upon the gratitude of the man whom he meant to oblige, nor the fame sense of his own merit towards him, which he would have had in the cafe of fuccefs.

Even the merit of talents and abilities which fome accident has hindered from producing their effects, feems in fome measure imperfect, even to thofe who are fully convinced of their capacity to produce them. The general who has been hindered by the envy of ministers from gaining fome great advantage over the enemies of his country, regrets the lofs of the opportunity for ever after. Nor is it only upon account of the public that he regrets it. He laments that he was hindered from performing an action which would have added a new luftre to his character in his own eyes, as well as in those of every other person. It fatisfies neither himfelf nor others to reflect that the plan or defign was all that depended on him, that no greater capacity was required to execute it than what was neceffary to concert it that he was allowed to be every way capa

ble

« НазадПродовжити »