СНАР. II.

Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment,

To

O be the proper and approved object either of gratitude or refentment, can mean nothing but to be the object of that gratitude, and of that refentment, which naturally feems proper, and is approved of.

But thefe, as well as all the other paffions of human nature, seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial fpectator entirely fympathizes with them, when every indifferent byftander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.

He, therefore, appears to deserve reward, who, to fome perfon or perfons, is the natural object of a gratitude which every human heart is difpofed to beat time to, and thereby applaud; and he, on the other hand, appears to deferve punishment, who in the fame manner is to fome perfon or perfons the natural object of a resentment which the breaft of every reasonable man is ready to adopt and fympathize with. To us, furely, that action must appear to deserve reward, which every body who knows of it would wish to reward, and therefore

delights

delights to fee rewarded: and that action must as furely appear to deferve punishment, which every body who hears of it is angry with, and upon that account rejoices to fee punished.

I. As we fympathize with the joy of our companions when in profperity, fo we join with them in the complacency and fatisfaction with which they naturally regard whatever is the cause of their good fortune. We enter into the love and affection which they conceive for it, and begin to love it too. We fhould be forry for their fakes if it was deftroyed, or even if it was placed at too great a distance from them, and out of the reach of their care and protection, though they fhould lofe nothing by its abfence except the pleasure of feeing it. If it is man who has thus been the fortunate inftrument of the happiness of his brethren, this is still more peculiarly the cafe. When we fee one man aflifted, protected, relieved by another, our fympathy with the joy of the person who receives the benefit ferves only to animate our fellow-feeling with his gratitude towards him who beftows it. When we look upon the perfon who is the cause of his pleafure with the eyes with which we imagine he must look upon him, his benefactor feems to ftand before us in the moft engaging and amiable light. We readily therefore fympathize with the grateful affection which he conceives for a person to whom he has been fo much obliged; and confequently applaud the returns which he is difpofed to make for the good offices conferred upon him. As we entirely enter into the affection from which thefe returns proceed, they neceffarily feem every way proper and fuitable to their object.

H 4

2. In

2. In the fame manner, as we fympathize with. the forrow of our fellow-creature whenever we fee his distress, so we likewise enter into his abhorrence and averfion for whatever has given occafion to it. Our heart, as it adopts and beats time to his grief, so is it likewise animated with that spirit by which he endeavours to drive away or destroy the cause of it, The indolent and paffive fellow-feeling, by which we accompany him in his fufferings, readily gives way to that more vigorous and active fentiment by which we go along with him in the effort he makes, either to repel them, or to gratify his averfion to what has given occafion to them. This is ftill more peculiarly the cafe, when it is man who has caufed them. When we fee one man oppreffed or injured by another, the fympathy which we feel with the diftress of the fufferer feems to ferve only to animate our fellow-feeling with his refentment against the offend

er.

We are rejoiced to see him attack his adversary in his turn, and are eager and ready to affift him whenever he exerts himself for defence, or even for vengeance within a certain degree. If the injured should perish in the quarrel, we not only sympathize with the real refentment of his friends and relations, but with the imaginary refentment which in fancy we lend to the dead, who is no longer capable of feeling that or any other human fentiment. But as we put ourselves in his fituation, as we enter, as it were, into his body, and in our imaginations, in fome measure, animate anew the deformed and mangled carcafs of the flain, when we bring home in this manner his cafe to our own bofoms, we feel upon this, as upon many other occafions, an emotion which the

perfon

perfon principally concerned is incapable of feeling, and which yet we feel by an illufive fympathy with him. The fympathetic tears which we fhed for that immense and irretrievable lofs, which in our fancy he appears to have fuftained, feem to be but a small part of the duty which we owe him. The injury which he has fuffered demands, we think, a principal part of our attention. We feel that refentment which we imagine he ought to feel, and which he would feel, if in his cold and lifeless body there remained any confcioufnefs of what paffes upon earth. His blood, we think, calls aloud for vengeance. The very afhes of the dead feem to be difturbed at the thought that his injuries are to pass unrevenged. The horrors which are fuppofed to haunt the bed of the murderer, the ghofts which, superstition imagines, rife from their graves to demand vengeance upon those who brought them to an untimely end, all take their origin from this natural fympathy with the imaginary refentment of the flain. And with regard, at least, to this most dreadful of all crimes, Nature, antecedent to all reflections upon the utility of punishment, has in this manner ftamped upon the human heart, in the strongest and most indelible characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of the facred and neceffary law of retaliation.

1.

CHAP.

CHA P. III.

That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it and that, on the contrary, where there is no difapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no fort of Sympathy with the refentment of him who fuffers it.

IT

T is to be observed, however, that, how beneficial foever on the one hand, or how hurtful foever on the other, the actions or intentions of the person who acts may have been to the perfon who is, if I may fay fo, acted upon, yet if in the one cafe there appears to have been no propriety in the motives of the agent, if we cannot enter into the affections which influenced his conduct, we have little fympathy with the gratitude of the perfon who receives the benefit: or if, in the other case, there appears to have been no impropriety in the motives of the agent, if, on the contrary, the affections which influenced his conduct are fuch as we muft neceffarily enter into, we can have no fort of fympathy with the refentment of the perfon who fuffers. Little gratitude feems due in the one cafe, and all fort of refentment feems unjuft in the other. The one action feems to merit little reward, the other to deserve no punishment.

1. First,